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Background: It is widely acknowledged that Uganda was the first country in 
sub-Saharan Africa to experience a significant decline in HIV seroprevalence 
in the 1990s. Framed as the initial ‘success story’ in the history of the global 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, the behavioural mechanisms and policies accounting 
for the Ugandan HIV decline have been extensively debated over the past 25 
years. With reference to broader debates about the role of evidence in policy, 
this thesis aims to examine contested explanations for the decline in HIV 
prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the development of global 
HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
The thesis examines diverse explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline and how 
these came to be framed in the context of the emergence of Second 
Generation Surveillance (SGS), a global HIV/AIDS surveillance framework 
introduced by UNAIDS/WHO in 2000. Official accounts describe SGS as 
having been developed on the basis of Ugandan behavioural evidence 
presented during a key meeting of HIV/AIDS policymakers which took 
place in Nairobi in 1997. This meeting provides a focal point for examining 
the role of evidence in global HIV prevention policy and the relationship 
between evidence and policy pertaining to low income countries in the 
1990s. 
 
Methods: A review of UNAIDS/WHO documents and 29 in-depth 
interviews with HIV/AIDS experts from Uganda and international 
organisations were analysed.   
 
Results: UNAIDS documents present SGS as a technocratic, problem-solving 
response to limitations in established HIV surveillance approaches, 
developed at a UNAIDS-sponsored workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1997. 
These official accounts present the emergence of SGS as evidence-based and 
reflecting a clear consensus that developed during the Nairobi workshop. 
While interview data suggest agreement around the need for improved HIV 
surveillance systems, they indicate a more complex picture in terms of the 
	
extent to which SGS was evidence-based and highlight contested 
interpretations of this evidence among HIV experts. 
 
Findings from interviews suggest that the introduction of SGS by 
UNAIDS/WHO may be understood as serving both technical and broader 
strategic purposes. As indicated in UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation, 
SGS was intended to improve older global HIV surveillance methodologies 
via the triangulation of multiple data sources. The introduction of SGS also 
appears to have served two broader purposes, functioning as something akin 
to a marketing tool to help promote the institutional identity of UNAIDS, 
while also signalling a shift towards a ‘multisectoral’ approach that aimed to 
unify epidemiological and social scientific disciplinary approaches. 
 
While interviewees’ accounts coincide in describing a decline in HIV 
prevalence during the 1990s, they present divergent interpretations of this 
evidence which became significant in the development of SGS. One 
interpretation focused on a reduction in multiple partnerships within the 
Ugandan population as the key change driving the decline in HIV 
prevalence, while a contrasting explanation focused on increased use of 
condoms as the primary cause of this decline. Interviewees’ accounts suggest 
a process of competition, whereby different actors sought to secure the 
primacy of their interpretation in institutional understandings of Uganda’s 
HIV decline and in the development of SGS. Claims of disciplinary bias and 
institutional marginalisation appear to have contributed to the subordination 
of explanations focused on a decline in multiple sexual partners, while the 
policy entrepreneurship of one key actor appears influential in explaining 
the ascendency of explanations focused on increased condom use. Despite 
these contestations around the evidence used to inform the development of 
SGS, UNAIDS documents and peer-reviewed publications from this period 
emphasise one interpretation (that of increased condom uptake) which thus 
appears as the official explanation for the success of HIV control in Uganda. 
 
The transition from the WHO’s Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) to 
UNAIDS, and the initiation of a multisectoral HIV prevention approach, 
	
appear as important contextual and institutional influences in the 
interpretation of evidence for Uganda’s HIV decline. The failure of the 
partnership reduction explanation to align with the evolving institutional 
and political orthodoxy, and the potential for this explanation to challenge 
UNAIDS’ new focus on multisectoral HIV prevention, may help to explain 
why it did not inform subsequent HIV/AIDS policy and does not appear in 
official accounts of SGS’s development. In contrast, explanations focused on 
increased condom use were consistent with UNAIDS’ HIV prevention policy 
agenda (including its emphasis on multisectoral approaches) and appeared 
to reinforce the organisation’s need for increased financial resources to 
mitigate HIV/AIDS via the distribution and promotion of condoms. 
 
Discussion: This study demonstrates that the development of SGS, and the 
politics of evidence supporting its introduction, are more complex than 
existing UNAIDS/WHO accounts describe. Official explanations of the 
development of SGS provide a simplistic account of how evidence informed 
policy in a linear and rational way. In contrast, findings from this thesis 
suggest that SGS served multiple policy functions (i.e. marketing, promotion 
of institutional credibility, and a demonstration of disciplinary integration) in 
the context of the recently-formed UNAIDS, and that the role and 
interpretation of evidence in this context were highly contested. Consistent 
with the work of Kingdon (1995) and more recently Stevens (2007), this study 
suggests that personal, political and institutional factors play important roles 
in shaping how evidence is presented and linked with policy. These findings 
suggest that more nuanced understandings of the relationship between 
evidence and policy are needed to explain HIV/AIDS policy development 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
 
It is commonly acknowledged within the global health literature that 
Uganda was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to experience a 
significant decline in HIV seroprevalence in the 1990s (Genius & Genius: 
2005; Kirby: 2008; Okware et al: 2001; Slutkin et al: 2006; Stoneburner & Low-
Beer: 2004). Historic epidemiological data indicate that Uganda successfully 
reversed a generalised, high prevalence epidemic from as high as 30% in 
1992 to as low as 6% in 2000 among women attending certain urban 
antenatal clinics (Merson: 2006: pp. 333). Framed as the initial ‘success story’ 
in the history of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, it is thus unsurprising that 
considerable academic effort has been made to determine the precise cause of 
the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda (Merson: 2006: pp. 333). Indeed, the 
specific behavioural mechanisms accounting for the HIV decline in Uganda, 
have been subject to extensive debate during the past 25 years and there has 
been “much controversy around the relative importance of various 
components of sexual behavioural change—namely abstinence, partner 
reduction and condom use in contributing to the decline in HIV prevalence” 
(Merson: 2006: pp. 333).  
 
This thesis engages with these debates to examine how explanations 
advanced for the decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence were contested and the 
role of evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in the 
1990s. To facilitate this analysis, this thesis focuses on diverse explanations 
for Uganda’s HIV decline and how these came to be framed in the context of 
the emergence of Second Generation Surveillance (SGS), a global HIV/AIDS 
surveillance policy framework initiated by UNAIDS/WHO in 2000. Official 
accounts describe SGS as having been developed on the basis of Ugandan 
behavioural evidence presented at a key meeting of HIV/AIDS policymakers 
which took place in Nairobi in 1997. This meeting, and the discussions 
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surrounding it, thus provides a focal point for examining the role of evidence 
in global HIV prevention policy development and the relationship between 
evidence and policy pertaining to low income countries (LICs) in the 1990s. 
Prior to advancing, it is required to define SGS and to explain its significance 
within debates regarding the HIV decline in Uganda and to wider 
developments in global HIV/AIDS prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
1.2 Defining Second Generation Surveillance  
 
Formally introduced by UNAIDS/WHO in 2000, SGS has been the principal 
surveillance policy framework to monitor changes in the ongoing HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. It is claimed by UNAIDS/WHO that SGS was needed as older 
HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches were ill-equipped to capture the 
diversity of HIV/AIDS epidemics around the world (UNAIDS/WHO: 2000: 
pp. 1). Reflecting upon ten years of experience since the publication of the 
original WHO Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) guidelines on HIV/AIDS 
surveillance, UNAIDS/WHO depicted that HIV/AIDS epidemics were 
much more heterogeneous than originally conceived, affecting different 
populations in different ways in distinct geographical areas 
(UNAIDS/WHO: 2000: pp. 2). 
 
In reaction to the acknowledged distinctiveness of HIV/AIDS epidemics, a 
global enhancement in HIV/AIDS surveillance policy was seen as required 
and SGS was formally initiated by UNAIDS/WHO as the way forward. 
Significantly, improvements in global HIV/AIDS surveillance were required 
as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, at the time of the introduction of SGS, was 
increasing at the global level (excluding The Republic of Uganda and The 
Kingdom of Thailand) and existing HIV/AIDS surveillance systems were 
identified as failing to capture information about risk behaviours that were 
contributing to this global rise. Additionally, in the early years of HIV/AIDS 
surveillance, systems monitoring the HIV/AIDS epidemic focused mainly on 
tracking the HIV virus via antenatal clinic (ANC) sentinel surveillance and 
AIDS case reporting (Garcia-Calleja et al: 2006: pp. 64; Hladik et al: 2008: pp. 
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504). While these data sources were considered to be a useful component of 
formative HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches, they merely recorded 
historical HIV infections and were seen as missing an opportunity to give 
early warnings of the potential for HIV infection in specific at-risk groups 
(at-risk groups including: Commercial Sex Workers (CSWs), Men Who Have 
Sex With Men (MSM) and Injecting Drug Users (IDUs)) (UNAIDS/WHO: 
2000: pp. 4).  
 
In reaction to the acknowledged limitations of older HIV/AIDS surveillance 
approaches, SGS was intended to improve existing HIV/AIDS surveillance 
methodologies via the triangulation of multiple data sources, with 
behavioural surveillance data being incorporated as an adjunct to existing 
serological surveillance information. Such incorporation aimed to improve 
both HIV data collection methodologies and subsequent HIV/AIDS 
surveillance data analysis, which, in turn, could enhance planning and the 
evaluation of HIV prevention activities (UNAIDS/WHO: 2000: pp. 2; Rehle 
et al: 2004: pp. 122). For a pathogenic viral disease that is mainly transmitted 
by risk-taking behaviours, it was appropriate for any update in global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches to incorporate information about 
behavioural risk and this was precisely what SGS intended to accomplish. 
This commitment to the integration of behavioural data into existing 
HIV/AIDS surveillance information is reflected within an official definition 
of SGS advanced by the WHO on its website: 
 
Second generation surveillance for HIV/AIDS is the regular, 
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of information 
for use in tracking and describing changes in the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic over time. Second generation surveillance for 
HIV/AIDS also gathers information on risk behaviours, using 
them to warn of or explain changes in levels of infection. As 
such, second generation surveillance includes, in addition to HIV 
surveillance and AIDS case reporting, STI surveillance to 
monitor the spread of STI in populations at risk of HIV and 
behavioural surveillance to monitor trends in risk behaviours 
over time (WHO: 2015a). 
 
The introduction of SGS aimed to improve older HIV/AIDS surveillance 
approaches via the triangulation of multiple data sources with behavioural 
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data being incorporated as a core component of this enhanced global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance policy framework. Indeed, the addition and 
concurrent comparison of behavioural data to existing serological data 
sources is considered to be an essential and integral component of the SGS 
approach (Rehle et al: 2004: pp. 122; Pisani: 2006: pp. 27). This is as 
articulated by UNAIDS/WHO (2000): 
 
A central tenet of second generation surveillance is that 
behavioural and biological surveillance data be used to inform 
and explain one another. The power of the two sets of 
information to illuminate real trends in the epidemic and the 
behaviours that spread it is greatly increased if they are designed 
from the start to be used together (UNAIDS/WHO: 2000: pp. 36). 
 
Acknowledging the centrality of behavioural surveillance data within the 
SGS approach, it is useful to clarify why this particular kind of data was 
depicted as so significant in purportedly improving upon older HIV/AIDS 
surveillance methodologies. The significance afforded to behavioural 
surveillance data within the SGS approach comes from its professed capacity 
to not just identify how many people are infected with HIV (which is 
ascertained through seroprevalence data) but to examine why they are 
infected (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). Capturing information about behavioural 
risk, which older HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches failed to accomplish, 
was a central component to SGS. The SGS guidelines published in 2000 were 
therefore presented as addressing the limitations and deficiencies of earlier 
HIV/AIDS surveillance efforts by integrating, most critically, studies of the 
sexual behaviour of individuals at risk of acquiring and transmitting HIV 
(Bayer & Fairchild: 2004: pp. 3).  
 
The rationale for integrating behavioural surveillance data, alongside 
existing serological sources, also stems from its perceived capacity to 
enhance HIV/AIDS decision-making on multiple levels. The analysis of 
behavioural data by public health officials is seen as helpful in explaining 
variations in HIV prevalence whilst also elucidating who is at the greatest 
risk of acquiring HIV and why (Family Health International: 2000: pp. 2 – 3). 
Behavioural data is therefore regarded as valuable in helping program 
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planners and communities tailor existing HIV prevention activities and 
developing effective public health interventions to interrupt the chain of HIV 
transmission (Family Health International: 2000: pp. 2 – 3). Shifts in the 
pattern of risk can also be ascertained via the collection of behavioural 
surveillance data, and the analysis of behavioural data can give public health 
officials an indication of the success of HIV prevention activities aimed at 
promoting safe behaviour at the population-level (Family Health 
International: 2000: pp. 2 – 3). Table 1 summarises what UNAIDS/WHO 
regarded as the limitations of older HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches and 
the strengths of SGS:  
 
Table 1: Limitations of older HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches and 
strengths of SGS 
 












































In summary, it can be stated that SGS aimed to build upon established 
HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches via the triangulation of multiple data 
sources—with behavioural data being incorporated as a key component of 
this strengthened global HIV/AIDS surveillance policy framework. Via the 
integration and analysis of multiple data sources, the adoption of SGS was 
intended to create a more comprehensive approach to HIV/AIDS 
surveillance, which it was hoped could ultimately permit decision-makers to 
understand better the evolution of HIV transmission and its underlying 
behavioural determinants at the national, regional and global levels. 
According to UNAIDS/WHO, SGS aimed to build upon the lessons learned 
in the first decade of HIV/AIDS surveillance and the approach did not 
propose any radically new methods of data collection. Rather, SGS aimed to 
focus established HIV/AIDS surveillance methods on appropriate 
populations and sub-populations, in order to combine them in ways that had 
the greatest explanatory power (UNAIDS/WHO: 2000: pp. 8). Formally 
introduced in the year 2000, at a time when HIV/AIDS was increasing in 
most countries globally, UNAIDS/WHO intended SGS to give countries 
affected by HIV/AIDS more information about their own epidemics in order 
to combat its spread (WHO: 2015a). 
1.3 Rationale for using SGS to examine Uganda’s HIV decline and global 
HIV prevention policy development in the 1990s  
 
SGS has been used as a tool to examine contested explanations for the decline 
in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the development of 
global HIV prevention policy for two reasons. First, the substantive 
evidence-base used by UNAIDS/WHO to support the formal introduction of 
SGS was primarily derived from sexual behavioural research findings that 
emerged from Uganda in the early to late 1990s (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). 
Furthermore, the sexual behavioural change evidence, used to support the 
formal introduction of SGS, were concurrently utilised to permit HIV/AIDS 
experts to understand the sexual behavioural change reasons that could 
account for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda in the 1990s (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 5). In fact, it was primarily the presentation of Ugandan 
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behavioural evidence at a UNAIDS funded HIV surveillance improvement 
workshop, held in Nairobi, Kenya between the 10th to the 13th of February 
1997, that was used to illustrate the potential for utilising behavioural 
information to interpret serological trends in HIV infection—thus catalysing 
the idea for SGS (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). The centrality of Ugandan 
behavioural data at the workshop is reflected within UNAIDS Best Practice 
Collection policy documentation:   
 
The workshop began by analysing a case study presentation by 
one of the participant countries, Uganda. Uganda has strong HIV 
serosurveillance systems which indicate a drop in HIV infection 
rates in the youngest age groups in urban areas. The country also 
has repeat behavioural surveys, all showing that those same age 
groups are delaying sexual activity and using more condoms 
than in the past. But the two types of surveillance, serological 
and behavioural, had not been previously examined together. 
The exercise of analysing both sets of data in conjunction 
provided a graphic illustration of how behavioural surveillance 
can be used to help explain results found in serosurveillance 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). 
 
Ugandan behavioural data presented at the workshop have also been 
described within UNAIDS Best Practice Collection policy documentation as 
“the best data so far” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) and the exhibition of Ugandan 
data was described by UNAIDS (1998a) as “the centerpiece of the workshop” 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). Acknowledging the significance afforded to 
Ugandan behavioural surveillance data presented at the Nairobi workshop, 
it is necessary to explain why behavioural data from this particular sub-
Saharan African country took such a central role in supporting the 
introduction of SGS and the direction of subsequent global HIV/AIDS 
prevention policy in the 1990s.   
 
The centrality of Ugandan data stemmed primarily from the duration of its 
availability, and the observation that HIV prevalence had actually declined 
in this country. Unlike other sub-Saharan African countries, Uganda was at 
the forefront of recognising that HIV/AIDS was a major public health issue 
early on the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In fact, the early acknowledgment of 
HIV/AIDS as a domestic policy problem resulted in the Ugandan 
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government taking action to fight HIV/AIDS both openly and directly 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 5). It also resulted in the Ugandan government 
obtaining financial and technical support from donors and international 
organisations to help combat HIV/AIDS (Slutkin et al: 2006: pp. 359). In the 
process of addressing HIV/AIDS as a domestic public health problem early 
on in the epidemic, Uganda was able to develop what was seen as a “strong” 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 3) HIV surveillance system, which therefore created 
long-term surveillance data that could be analysed by experts attending the 
UNAIDS funded HIV surveillance workshop in 1997. It is documented 
within UNAIDS (1998a) that social scientists from Uganda were able to 
present surveys of sexual behavioural change from 1989 and 1995, which 
gave experts attending the Nairobi workshop ideas about the sexual 
behavioural change reasons that were contributing to Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline of the early to mid-1990s. Importantly, the 
comparison of the 1989 and 1995 surveys on sexual behavioural change, 
combined with 300 small-scale sociological studies, have been reported as 
key sources of evidence which alerted decision-makers to the possibility of 
sexual behavioural change in various age groups in urban areas within the 
country (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). These sources of evidence are important for 
two reasons. First, the analysis of these behavioural data sources provided 
decision-makers with a basis for understanding the formative sexual 
behavioural changes that were contributing to Uganda’s HIV decline of the 
early to mid-1990s. UNAIDS (1998a) attributed this to a rise in age at first sex 
and increased condom use in urban areas: 
 
Social scientists from Uganda were able to present surveys of 
sexual behaviour from 1989 and 1995. Although not perfectly 
comparable, these surveys gave an idea of changes in current 
behaviour in various age groups in urban areas. Together with 
evidence complied from more than 300 smaller-scale sociological 
studies, the survey results strongly suggest a rise in age at first 
sex and more use of condoms in cities (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5)  
 
Secondly, the concurrent comparison of Ugandan serological data with 
Ugandan behavioural data provided the first illustration of how behavioural 
surveillance could be utilised to help explain results found in 
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serosurveillance and was therefore presented as validating the behavioural 
component of the SGS approach (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Importantly, the 
substantive behavioural evidence-base which helped support the decision to 
introduce SGS came from Uganda. It is additionally clear that behavioural 
evidence, supporting the development of SGS, were also used to permit 
HIV/AIDS policymakers to understand the specific sexual behavioural 
change reasons that were contributing towards Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline of the 1990s. Thus, discussions pertaining to the 
development of SGS, and its underlying Ugandan evidence-base, directly 
relate to broader discussions about the Ugandan HIV decline, its contested 
nature, and the subsequent direction of HIV/AIDS prevention policy in the 
1990s. Therefore, a critical analysis of SGS enables an examination of how 
explanations advanced for the decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence were 
contested and why particular explanations informed the development of 
global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
The second reason for using SGS as a tool to examine the contested Ugandan 
HIV decline and the role of evidence in global HIV prevention policy 
development in the 1990s relates to simplistic, and therefore potentially 
problematic, accounts of its historical development that were advanced by 
UNAIDS/WHO from the late-1990s onwards. Significantly, official accounts 
that describe the development of SGS and its evidence-base have only been 
provided by UNAIDS/WHO (UNAIDS: 1998a; UNAIDS: 1998b; 
WHO/UNAIDS: 2000). Although useful in a descriptive sense, 
UNAIDS/WHO frame the development of SGS as a rational adaptation to 
older global HIV surveillance approaches. They assert that SGS emerged in 
reaction to the idea that behavioural surveillance data could be used to build 
upon older, serologically focused, HIV surveillance approaches in a 
seemingly rational manner. They also identify a seminal event in the 
development of SGS—namely the aforesaid UNAIDS sponsored HIV 
surveillance consensus building workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1997: 
 
Surveillance systems appropriate in the early days of the [HIV] 
epidemic need to be adapted and built upon as our knowledge 
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grows. UNAIDS sponsored the Nairobi workshop on improved 
surveillance with this in mind. The workshop succeeded in 
illustrating the potential for using behavioural data to interpret 
serological trends and in suggesting what countries might aim 
for in a “second generation” of surveillance activities (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 5). 
 
This account raises questions as it gives the impression of a linear link 
between new forms of research-based evidence (behavioural surveillance 
data) and its rational synthesis by decision-makers towards the development 
of enhanced global HIV surveillance policy. Such a depiction invites critical 
appraisal given that the relationship between evidence and policy, 
particularly within the field of global HIV policy, is typically non-linear as 
political obstacles often impede the policy-uptake of research-based evidence 
(Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1477). In the context of HIV policy, it has also been 
claimed that in numerous contexts, politics, ignorance and ideology can have 
a greater influence on HIV policy than do evidence and best practice. Despite 
the acknowledged political nature of HIV policy itself, there is astonishingly 
little published analysis on the political determinants of HIV policy—
especially pertaining to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
(Dickinson & Buse: 2008: pp. 1). Acknowledging that evidence rarely informs 
policy in a linear manner, and the noted political nature of HIV policy 
development itself pertaining to LMICs, it is required to examine critically 
the narrative advanced by UNAIDS (1998a) as it fails to reflect the 
complexity of the relationship between evidence and policy—particularly 
within the politicised field of HIV/AIDS. Moreover, documents produced by 
institutions, like UNAIDS/WHO, should not be assumed to be neutral 
sources of information as they often reflect unknown bias given that 
documents are written for some specific audience and some specific purpose 
(Yin: 2009: pp. 86 – 87).  
 
Perhaps a surprising element of the SGS approach is the apparent 
disciplinary integration of the medical community and behavioural 
scientists, the relationship of which was acknowledged by UNAIDS (1998a) 




Policy-makers are interested in levels of HIV infection because 
they want to be able to plan for the consequences of that 
infection. They also need to decide what to do to slow the spread 
of the virus, and want to judge the effectiveness of their past 
interventions…But there have traditionally been barriers 
between the medical community that governs seroprevalence 
and the social scientists who look at behaviour and what lies 
behind it, and those barriers are hard to break down (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 5) 
 
The acknowledgement by UNAIDS (1998a) of established barriers between 
the medical community and social scientists, when SGS emerged in the late-
1990s, raises interesting questions as competition between medical, and other 
health professionals, have been noted as influencing how certain forms of 
knowledge are accepted and others discarded in the process of developing 
policy (Bryant: 1998: pp. 89). Importantly, both disciplines approach the 
creation, analysis and evaluation of evidence according to their underlying 
epistemological worldviews, suggesting that competition between the two 
disciplines could have resulted in certain framings of Ugandan behavioural 
evidence being accepted as more credible, whilst others were potentially 
rejected, within the process of developing SGS itself. Moreover, at the time 
that SGS emerged, HIV/AIDS was mainly defined and framed through a 
biomedical paradigm, indeed, biomedical forms of knowledge dominated 
the discourse to HIV/AIDS policy in the early to late-1990s (Tarantola: 2000: 
pp. 1). The established biomedical dominance, at the time that SGS was 
developed, could have affected how individual decision-makers worked 
together and the noted barriers between the two disciplines may have 
influenced the way Ugandan evidence was used to support the development 
of SGS itself and broader debates surrounding HIV prevention policy 
development in the 1990s. Acknowledging these issues, it is therefore 
appropriate to examine competing claims about the Ugandan behavioural 
evidence used to support the development of SGS and explanations for the 
Ugandan HIV decline. It is also necessary to establish if the noted 
disciplinary barriers influenced the relationship between evidence and policy 





1.4 Thesis aim 
 
Via an analysis of the emergence of SGS, to examine contested explanations 
for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the 
development of global HIV prevention policy.  
 
1.5 Four research objectives 
 
I) To review literature examining the relationship between evidence and 
health policy pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, including literature 
examining the role of evidence in the formulation of HIV prevention policy, 
and the interpretation and use of Ugandan HIV surveillance data in the 
development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s; 
 
II) To examine developments in global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s, 
particularly the introduction of SGS, including the role and use of evidence 
from Uganda in this policy; 
 
III) To examine competing interpretations of Ugandan sexual behavioural 
change evidence used to create formative explanations for Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline; 
 
IV) To examine how institutional and political context change influenced 
competing Ugandan sexual behavioural interpretations and subsequent HIV 
prevention policy development in the 1990s. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
 
The next chapter aims to review academic literature to examine the role of 
evidence in the formulation of HIV prevention policy and to explore the 
interpretation, and use of, Ugandan HIV surveillance data in the formulation 
of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. This is situated within the context of 
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wider discussions of the relationship between evidence and policy pertaining 
to LICs within sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter commences by defining and 
discussing key terms of central analytical relevance to the thesis, namely: 
evidence, evidence hierarchies, policy, the policymaking process and policy 
networks. It then offers an appraisal of existing literature that provides an 
overview of the relationship between evidence and policy within high 
income countries (HICs). A focused discussion about the use of evidence 
within policymaking and key issues that influence the utilisation of evidence 
within the field of public health will be given. The chapter then turns its 
attention to exploring the relationship between evidence and health policy 
pertaining to sub-Saharan African contexts, whilst inductively analysing 
factors that influence evidence/health policy dynamics within the region. A 
concise discussion about the strengths and limitations of the literature that 
has attempted to examine the relationship between evidence and policy 
pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa and HICs will be advanced. 
 
An account of the methodological approaches selected to examine contested 
explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of 
evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy will be given 
within the third chapter. The chapter justifies the qualitative research design 
adopted for the study, the reasons supporting the use of a case-study 
approach, the function of documentary analysis, how participants were 
selected for interview, the tools used for data collection and the approach 
adopted for data analysis. It also outlines the process of acquiring Uganda 
National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST) research clearance. 
The process of addressing University of Edinburgh School of Social and 
Political Science (SSPS) ethical protocols that were secured prior to the data 
collection phase of this study will also be given. Epistemological and 
ontological reflections are discussed, and issues pertaining to researcher 
reflexivity are posited.  
 
It is the analytical objective of the fourth chapter to examine developments in 
global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s and in particular, the introduction 
of SGS and the role and use of evidence from Uganda in this policy. The 
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chapter aims to examine the aforementioned Nairobi workshop in detail, to 
explore the underlying sources of evidence used to support the development 
of SGS itself and to locate the key actors involved with SGS’s emergence. To 
achieve this, a detailed historical analysis of SGS and its evidence-base 
supported by interview material from HIV/AIDS experts who attended, or 
knew about, the workshop itself will be given. Such examination is required 
to address aspects of the core aim of this thesis, namely to examine contested 
explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of 
evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
Having unpacked the development of SGS and its evidence-base, the fifth 
chapter aims to examine how HIV/AIDS experts used Ugandan behavioural 
evidence to support the development of SGS and to create formative 
understandings of Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to mid-1990s. A critical 
examination of a competition over opposing interpretations of Ugandan 
sexual behavioural change evidence will be given. Attention is fixed to the 
influence of complex legitimising and discrediting strategies used by 
HIV/AIDS experts to garner support for two competing sexual behavioural 
change explanations that could account for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence 
decline of the early to mid-1990s. In relation to the thesis as a whole, it is the 
aim of the fifth chapter to unpack the competitive nature of the Ugandan 
evidence supporting the development of SGS, whilst considering the 
implications of the competitive debate over Ugandan evidence – that 
occurred among HIV/AIDS experts – upon the relationship between 
evidence and policy in HIV/AIDS policymaking networks.   
 
Chapter six aims to examine the influence of political and institutional 
adaptation upon competing explanations of Ugandan behavioural evidence 
advanced by HIV/AIDS experts within global and Ugandan level 
policymaking contexts. It explores the influence of developments in the 
approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention - namely multisectoralism - and 
how Ugandan evidence supporting the development of SGS, and formative 
accounts of Uganda’s HIV decline, were influenced by political and 
institutional change. Via an exploration of the institutional and political 
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context – within which evidence supporting the development of SGS was 
mediated by HIV/AIDS experts – the chapter will enable the thesis to clarify 
the role of evidence used to support the formal development of SGS, whilst 
locating broad level factors that can influence the relationship between 
evidence and policy. 
 
It is the aim of the seventh chapter to discuss the main empirical findings 
presented within the three results chapters, while reflecting upon the use of 
SGS as a case study to examine contested explanations for the decline in HIV 
prevalence in Uganda, the role of evidence in the development of global HIV 
prevention policy in the 1990s and the relationship between evidence and 
policy pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter discusses the study’s 
empirical contributions to existing accounts of SGS’s development, its 
contributions to historical narratives of Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story and it 
engages with existing theoretical frameworks that have attempted to model 
the relationship between evidence and policy—in particular Stevens’ (2007) 
evolutionary model. The limitations and strengths of the study are discussed 
and directions for future research are suggested.  
 






CHAPTER TWO: Defining key terms and examining 
the role of evidence, including Ugandan surveillance 
data, in HIV prevention policy in the 1990s  
 
2.1 Introduction to chapter 
 
It is the aim of this chapter to review academic literature to examine the role 
of evidence, including Ugandan surveillance data, in HIV prevention policy 
development in the 1990s. Its secondary aim is to explore the relationship 
between evidence and health policy pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, 
highlighting relevant theories of the relationship between evidence and 
health policy relating to LICs. The chapter will commence by defining key 
terms of analytical relevance to the thesis, specifically: ‘evidence’, ‘evidence 
hierarchies’, ‘policy’, the ‘policymaking process’ and ‘policy networks’. Once 
key terms are defined, an examination of established theoretical frameworks 
that attempt to model the relationship between evidence and policy—
drawing particularly on literature from HICs will be given. Following an 
examination of the rational or linear model, the chapter then reviews the 
influential work of Carol Weiss focusing on her models of research 
utilisation—giving particular attention to her account of the enlightenment 
and political models. A discussion of more recent theoretical works that 
attempt to model the relationship between evidence and policy, focusing in 
particular on Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model, will also be given to 
facilitate analyses in the discussion chapter of the thesis.  
 
Therefore, this chapter will define key terms of analytical relevance to the 
thesis; examine the role of evidence in HIV prevention policy development; 
and examine the analytical utility of existing evidence/policy theoretical 
models, in particular Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model, to facilitate 




2.2 Defining evidence, evidence hierarchies and the rise of evidence-based 
policymaking  
 
When attempting to answer ‘what is evidence?’ we must appreciate that this 
question is, in part, a philosophical one grounded in epistemological and 
ontological theory about how we relate to the world in terms of the genesis, 
interpretation and evaluation of information and knowledge (Dobrow et al: 
2004: pp. 208). The question of defining evidence is also more practical as 
evidence is firmly embedded within the process of decision-making and can 
be used to explicate support and to justify the decisions that we make 
(Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 208). Importantly, the philosophical and practical 
characteristics of evidence support two distinct orientations as to what 
constitutes evidence itself, reflecting different relationships between 
evidence and context: a philosophical-normative orientation and a practical-
operational orientation (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 208). 
 
A philosophical-normative orientation towards what constitutes evidence is 
unimpeded by context—addressing what sources of evidence would be the 
most ideal for supporting a decision. This orientation argues that evidence 
itself has inherent value with the ability to provide veridical justification for 
decisions (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 208). The philosophical-normative 
orientation focuses on the attributes of evidence itself, for example its 
validity and reliability, in order to establish the credibility of particular types 
of evidentiary sources for legitimising decisions (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 
208). This orientation frames evidence and context as mutually exclusive—
neglecting the role of context in decision-making and concentrating on what 
ought to be viewed as evidence. Consequently, from a philosophical-
normative orientation, what constitutes evidence is mainly a function of the 
quality of evidence itself—with the supposition being that higher quality 
evidence should result in higher quality decisions (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 
208). Championing this philosophical-normative orientation, in which focus 
is given to the simplistic quality of evidence itself, are organisations like the 
Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations which attempt to develop systematic 
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reviews of high-quality scientific evidence for health and social policy 
respectively (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209).  
 
Conversely, a practical-operational orientation towards what constitutes 
evidence is context-based, with evidence being defined with respect to a 
particular decision-making context (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209). This 
orientation argues that contextual and temporal differences strongly 
influence the determination of what constitutes evidence. In fact, this 
orientation maintains that evidence itself is not static but characterised by its 
provisional and emergent nature being inevitably inconclusive and 
incomplete (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209). According to the practical-
operational orientation, evidence creation is highly subjective with various 
perspectives generating different explanations for the same decision 
outcome. This orientation is more aligned with the decision-making sciences 
as it focuses on how a range of factors contribute towards a decision-making 
outcome (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209). Distinct from the philosophical-
normative orientation, the practical-operational orientation defines evidence 
less by its quality and more by its relevance and generalisability to a specific 
context—this orientation maintains that evidence and context are mutually 
inclusive (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209).  
 
In the interests of transparency, it should be noted that the author considers a 
practical-operational orientation towards what constitutes evidence to be 
more persuasive than a philosophical-normative orientation. Although a 
philosophical-normative orientation raises important questions about the 
quality and validity of evidence, it limits thinking to narrowly defined 
evidence constructions, while neglecting the role that context plays in 
impacting on what constitutes evidence itself (Dobrow et al: 2004: pp. 209).  
 
Importantly, the political context, within which evidence is used by decision-
makers operating in the policymaking process, is itself central to the 
movement and utilisation of evidence. This is articulated by Young (2005), 
who argues that the links between evidence and policy are dramatically 
shaped by specific political contexts, whilst also noting that the policy 
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process itself and the production of research are, in themselves, inherently 
political processes from start to finish (Young: 2005: pp. 730). The 
significance of context, for the utilisation of evidence within policy 
development, is also acknowledged by Bowen & Zwi (2006), who define the 
context within which evidence is used by policymakers as the setting or 
environment where policy is developed and implemented, incorporating 
historical, cultural and resource contexts. They note that the political context 
and the multiple forces at work within policy development, provide 
challenges to integrating evidence into policy and practice (Bowen & Zwi: 
2006: pp. 601). It is clear that context is key when attempting to understand 
the manner in which evidence informs subsequent policy output, and 
orientations that focus on the quality of evidence itself, rather than the 
political context within which evidence is used, neglect the broader 
complexity of evidence use within distinct policymaking environments. 
Having examined the philosophical and practical aspects of what constitutes 
evidence from two competing orientations, this chapter turns now to the 
question of how evidence is defined and constructed within the field of 
public health.     
 
Within public health, evidence is multifarious as it manifests in myriad forms 
and the framing of evidence by those involved within public health research 
is a highly subjective process as the value of evidence is often “in the eye of 
the beholder” (Brownson et al: 2009: pp. 177). Providing a comprehensively 
acceptable definition of evidence is therefore problematic, as when we talk 
about evidence we are simultaneously talking about the meaning attributed 
to knowledge construction itself—a process that is non-neutral and 
inextricably linked to existing power relations. These notions are particularly 
salient within the field of public health, as action within the discipline occurs 
on a terrain of contested meaning and unequal power, where different forms 
of knowledge struggle for dominance (Schoepf: 2004: pp. 1). Evidence can 
therefore be defined, valued and prioritised in a highly subjective manner by 
individuals from distinct disciplinary perspectives at different times in 
different social and decision-making contexts. Evidence is essentially a fluid 
social construction as all evidence is individually judged, framed and valued 
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through a prism of our own assumptions (Porter: 2010: pp. 11). While 
acknowledging that epistemological and knowledge/power debates are 
important to consider when attempting to define evidence, it is useful to 
advance a working definition of evidence and to examine the problematic 
notion of ‘hierarchies of evidence’ within public health research.  
 
A non-specific definition of evidence is advanced by Rychetnik et al (2004) 
who argue, in the broadest sense, that evidence can be defined as something 
serving as proof or facts and testimony in support of a statement, belief or 
conclusion (Rychetnik et al: 2004: pp. 538). This is quite a generic definition 
of evidence as it is devoid of context and fails to specify what counts as 
evidence for whom and when. A more expansive definition of evidence is 
provided by Fielding & Briss (2006), who argue that evidence can originate 
from a plurality of sources whilst noting, somewhat simplistically, that a 
larger body of evidence is better than a smaller one: 
 
A person’s hunch, an anecdotal observation, the expert opinion 
of a group, a formally designed and executed scientific study, or 
a group of studies all can constitute evidence. In general, 
however, scientific studies produce more reliable information 
than the alternatives, and multiple studies are better than single 
ones (Fielding & Briss: 2006: pp. 970 – 971).  
 
A definition which considers the practical use of evidence within decision-
making is advanced by Brownson et al (2009) who claim that evidence can be 
understood as some kind of qualitative or quantitative data, including results 
of program or policy evaluations, for use in making decisions or judgements 
(Brownson et al: 2009: pp. 177). Synthesising the definitions above, evidence 
can be conceptualised as various forms of data (both qualitative and 
quantitative) that ‘come’ in a multitude of forms (from personal hunches to 
scientific studies) which can be used to support various conclusions or 
beliefs. However, it is important to understand that evidence is never really a 
clear, accepted and bounded construct. There is also no such entity as ‘the 
body of evidence’; rather, there are rather more and less competing 
reconstructions of evidence able to support almost any position (Wood et al: 
1998: pp. 1735). Furthermore, evidence itself is never morally or ethically 
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neutral and debates over evidence reflect an underlying debate about the 
power to control the definition of evidence, who defines the types of 
materials that count as evidence, who determines the methods that generate 
the best forms of evidence and whose criteria are used to evaluate the quality 
of evidence itself (Denzin: 2009: pp. 142).  
 
Noting that constructions of evidence are inextricably influenced by the 
power to control what constitutes evidence itself, it is important to explore a 
manifestation of the power to grade evidence via the ‘evidence hierarchy’ a 
linear creation underpinned by the dominant and positivist discipline of 
epidemiology. It is commonly acknowledged that varying degrees of 
confidence can be attached to different types of evidence and a well-known 
‘hierarchy of evidence’, which emerged from the field of epidemiology, is 
frequently used within public health research to understand the relative 
strength of evidence itself (Evans: 2003: pp. 78). It is argued that different 
types of evidence can be ranked in order of their decreasing internal 
validity—arguing that systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials 
are the gold standard of evidence whereas expert opinion and editorials 
reside at the bottom of the hierarchy: 
 
Table 2: ‘Hierarchy of Evidence’ 
 
                 (Diagram adapted from: Wilson & Mabhala: 2009: pp. 194) 
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This linear framing of evidence has gained both currency and legitimacy 
within public health research as its development emerged from the field of 
epidemiology—a science that has traditionally been viewed as underpinning 
public health (Holland et al: 2007: pp. 23). However, the ‘hierarchy of 
evidence’ remains a source of debate within public health research as many 
researchers regard it as inappropriate to rely on study design as a marker for 
the credibility of evidence itself (Petticrew & Roberts: 2003: pp. 527). 
Moreover, the concept of an evidence hierarchy is difficult to apply when 
attempting to appraise evidence for public health interventions, as debate 
remains over the very use of the term ‘evidence’ within health promotion 
and the role that different types of research-based information play—in 
particular observational and qualitative data (Petticrew & Roberts: 2003: pp. 
527). Thus, McQueen (2001) contends that there is no real consensus in 
relation to hierarchies of evidence within public health research:  
 
Within the general area of community research, intervention and 
evaluation, there is currently great debate about what constitutes 
knowledge within the field and what is evidence, or even 
whether the notion of evidence is applicable to the evaluation of 
interventions in communities. In summary, there is no consensus 
on any ‘hierarchy of evidence’ between researchers and 
practitioners in the field. International groups have asserted that 
it is premature to prioritize types of evidence in a linear 
hierarchy (McQueen: 2001: pp. 266).  
 
Within public health, the social construction of quantitative evidence as more 
robust and more rigorous compared with qualitative evidence endures. 
Again, the construction of quantitative evidence as strong and qualitative 
evidence as weak stems from the long-standing dominance of 
epidemiological approaches within public health research—a discipline that 
places great confidence in quantitative methods to address questions of 
prevalence, effectiveness and causation (Jack: 2006: pp. 277). Stemming from 
the positioning of quantitative evidence as strong, qualitative evidence has 
often been constructed as weaker or less rigorous, with limited 
generalisability at the population-level (Jack: 2006: pp. 279). As a 
consequence of this framing, qualitative evidence is absent or poorly ranked 
within methodological hierarchies of scientific evidence (Jack: 2006: pp. 279). 
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Indeed, Denzin (2009) maintains that within the evidence-based community 
qualitative research does not count as research unless it is embedded within 
a randomised control trial design (Denzin: 2009: pp. 140). The effective 
marginalisation of qualitative evidence within much public health research is 
problematic as the field of health promotion, at the population-level, cuts 
across various sectors and disciplines (McQueen: 2001: pp. 262). Indeed, 
public health prides itself on being eclectic and multi-disciplinary with many 
of its principal activities relating to advocacy, partnerships and coalition 
building—areas considered to be more of an art than a science (McQueen: 
2001: pp. 262 – 263). It therefore seems problematic to subscribe to the 
existing rules of evidence which are often based upon the underlying 
positivist logic of epidemiology within public health research (McQueen: 
2001: pp. 266).  
 
2.2.1 Examining evidence-based medicine, the establishment of evidence-
based policymaking and the GRADE process for evaluating evidence 
 
Having defined evidence and made clear that its linear grading via the 
‘evidence hierarchy’ reflects the established dominance of epidemiological 
and quantitative approaches within the field of public health, the chapter 
now examines the growth and establishment of evidence-based 
policymaking (EBPM). However, to provide a full account of the 
development of EBPM it is first required to describe its academic precursor, 
namely the evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement the development of 
which can be traced back to the early-1990s. 
 
The EBM movement was spearheaded by epidemiologists Sackett & Guyatt 
in 1992 within McMaster University in Canada (Beague: 2009: pp. 1540). EBM 
came to fruition in an attempt to make the approach to medical practice more 
scientific and academically rigorous through the systematic critical appraisal 
of medical knowledge and by 1993 international enthusiasm for EBM 
coalesced with the creation of the Cochrane Collaboration which, as 
described above, attempts to improve decision-making by conducting 
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systematic reviews of the effects of healthcare interventions (Beague: 2009: 
pp. 1540). The arrival of EBM was highly significant described by Hitt (2001) 
as a revolution in the practice of medicine with its development resulting in 
the adoption of evidence-based approaches in multiple disciplinary fields 
including nursing, dentistry, occupational therapy, psychotherapy and ethics 
(Kohatsu et al: 2004: pp. 417). The establishment of EBM also had a marked 
conceptual influence in other non-clinical arenas, including education, public 
policy and public health (Behague: 2009: pp. 1540). Significantly, the 
development of EBM led to the subsequent development of EBPM which 
will now be defined and problematised.  
 
According to Cookson (2005), EBPM should be understood as a set of rules 
and institutional arrangements to promote a transparent and balanced use of 
evidence in public policymaking (Cookson: 2005: pp. 118).  Sutcliffe & Court 
(2005) maintain that EBPM can be defined as a discourse or set of methods 
which informs the policy process rather than attempting to determine the 
eventual ambitions of policy. It supports a more rigorous, rational and 
systematic approach to policymaking, noting that the pursuit of EBPM is 
premised upon the idea that policy decisions should be better informed by 
available evidence which should include rational analysis. It is argued that 
policy which is based upon systematic evidence is seen to produce better 
policy outcomes (Sutcliffe & Court: 2005: iii). EBPM has also been defined as 
an approach which permits individuals to make well-informed decisions 
about projects, programmes and policies by putting the best available 
evidence at the heart of policy development and implementation (Davies et 
al: 2000: pp. 11). As is emerging, EBPM attempts to promote a more rigorous 
and rational approach to policymaking acknowledging that policy 
development (and policy decisions) should be based upon high-quality 
evidence as this, it is assumed, will produce better policy outcomes.  
 
An example of the application of the evidence-based approach in health 
policy is the Grades of Recommendation, Assessment, Development, and 
Evaluation (GRADE) process. This process attempts to incorporate a 
formalised method to rate the quality of scientific evidence in order to 
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produce guidelines and recommendations that are as evidence-based as 
possible (Dijkers: 2013: pp. 1). Deriving from clinical science, the GRADE 
approach has been adopted by multiple national and international 
organisations and represents a systematic and transparent framework for 
evidence-based guideline development (Guyatt et al: 2011: pp. 380). The 
GRADE approach, similar to the hierarchy of evidence outlined above, 
operates by ranking randomised control trials as high-quality evidence and 
observational studies as low-quality evidence. However, it is posited that the 
GRADE approach is much more than an actual rating system as it offers a 
structured process to present evidence summaries for systematic reviews and 
guidelines for carrying out the steps involved in developing 
recommendations (Dijkers: 2013: pp. 2). Since its formal development by the 
GRADE working group in 2000, agencies involved with global public health 
have utilised GRADE as it is an internationally recognised framework for 
assessing the quality of a body of evidence which can be used to derive the 
strength of potential evidence-informed recommendations (Burford et al: 
2012: pp. 631). Indeed, the vast majority of specific GRADE applications in 
the field of global public health have occurred within the WHO, where the 
utilisation of GRADE has been mandatory since January 1st 2009 (Rehfuess & 
Akl: 2013: pp. 9).  
 
While the GRADE approach has successfully provided guidance for rating 
the quality of evidence and grading the strength of recommendations in 
health care and clinical science (Guyatt et al: 2011: pp. 380), its application 
within the field of public health and by experts operating within 
international organisations has not been straightforward. Indeed, the 
application of the GRADE approach by experts in the field of public health 
has faced a range of challenges: the complexity of public health 
interventions, the ability to discriminate between different kinds of 
observational studies, and the use of non-epidemiological evidence in the 
public health field (Rehfuess & Akl: 2013: pp. 1). Significantly, the GRADE 
approach ‘ranks’ non-epidemiological evidence as very low-quality. As the 
assessment of the effectiveness of public health interventions frequently 
relies on sources of evidence outside of epidemiology, the application of 
26	
	
GRADE can be challenging due to differences between the relative ‘strength’ 
of clinical and public health sources of evidence (Rehfuess & Akl: 2013: pp. 
8). Importantly, evidence-based public health guidance frequently relies on 
sources of evidence beyond the traditional hierarchy of epidemiological 
study design. By virtue of the public health field being multidisciplinary, the 
GRADE approach does not always offer a comprehensive framework for 
appraising, and integrating, contextualised evidence generated by disciplines 
other than epidemiology (Rehfuess & Akl: 2013: pp. 10). 
 
The field of public health has also been influenced by the growth, and 
establishment of, evidence-based approaches leading to the creation of 
evidence-based public health (EBPH) and the advancement of evidence-
based global health policymaking—each of which will now be defined. 
EBPH can be defined as a public health endeavour in which there is an 
explicit, informed and judicious use of evidence that has been derived from 
any of a selection of science and social science research and evaluation 
methods (Rychetnik et al: 2004: pp. 538). Brownson (1999) contends that 
EBPH can be understood as the development, implementation and 
evaluation of effective polices and programs in public health via the 
application of principles of scientific reasoning, including the systematic use 
of data and information systems and the appropriate use of program 
planning models (Brownson et al: 1999: pp. 87). A more population-based 
definition is posited by Kohatsu et al (2004), who maintain that EBPH is the 
process of assimilating science-based interventions with community 
preferences in order to improve the health of populations (Kohatsu et al: 
2004: pp. 418). At the global level, Yamey & Feachem (2011) define evidence-
based global health policymaking as a practice which attempts to enhance 
global health outcomes by urging policymakers to ground their policies on 
the best available evidence, rather than on the basis of whim, opinion or 
political popularity (Yamey & Feachem: 2011: pp. 97). It is clear from the 
definitions above that EBPM and evidence-based global health are explicitly 
concerned with the use and application of scientific data, and scientific 
reasoning, by using evidence from a range of sources in an attempt to 
enhance population health in various contexts. 
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However, EBPM and the purported adoption of evidence-based approaches 
in multiple disciplinary fields has been criticised. Significantly, EBPM is 
premised upon strong normative assumptions pertaining to the logical 
utilisation of evidence by actors who are believed to function in a 
comprehensively rational manner (Cairney: 2014: pp. 1). While EBPM has 
gradually established itself in multiple policymaking environments, 
becoming both an aspiration and catch-cry of governments in recent years 
(Botterhill & Hindmoor: 2012: pp. 367), this form of policymaking is 
reminiscent of 1950s rationalist understandings of policymaking where the 
‘best’ information about ‘what works’ moves within the policymaking 
process in a deterministic and unproblematic manner. It is reasoned by 
Cairney (2014), that EBPM should be understood as a vague and aspirational 
term. Indeed, it is maintained that EBPM should be conceptualised as an 
idealised form of policymaking as actors who operate within the process of 
policymaking, make their choices based on limited information and 
ambiguity within complex policy environments (Cairney: 2014: pp. 1). 
Importantly, the actual process of policymaking is both uncertain and 
inherently messy and while research may deliver the latest scientific 
evidence, it is not always translated effectively into policy (Botterhill & 
Hindmoor: 2012: pp. 367). Thus, the rationalist and normative assumptions 
of EBPM should be viewed with caution as evidence rarely informs policy in 
a direct and unproblematic manner. 
 
2.2.2 Examining policy, the policymaking process and policy networks 
 
Similar to evidence there is no universally accepted definition of policy 
(Cariney: 2012: pp. 23; Cairney: 2015: pp. 1; Torjman: 2005: pp. 1). Indeed, 
policy is widely acknowledged as a complicated term to define, however, 
our attempts to give it meaning are important to discuss (Cairney: 2015: pp. 
1). At a very rudimentary level, policy can be understood as a general term 
used to describe a plan of action or formal decision to achieve a particular 
goal (Richards & Smith: 2002: pp. 1). Policy can therefore be understood as a 
guide to action to change what would otherwise occur, a decision about the 
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commitment to certain areas of concern with policy itself setting priorities 
and guiding resource allocation (Milio: 2001: pp. 622).  
 
However, these understandings of policy overlook the significance of 
understanding policy in terms of non-decision-making as well as decision-
making (Vittal: 2013: pp. 26). Vittal (2013) notes that an absence of policy can 
be understood as a distinct policy position in and of itself, and - in some 
cases - the study of issues that fail to be reflected in active policy debates may 
be more enlightening than a focus on decisions that have been made (Vittal: 
2013: pp. 26). This notion aligns with Dye’s definition of public policy as 
“whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye: 1972: pp. 3). 
Cairney (2012) argues that a working definition of policy can be advanced as 
“the sum of government action, from signals of intent to the final outcomes” 
(Cairney: 2012: pp. 24 – 25). However, there are some important caveats to 
this working definition of policy namely: 
 
(a) it is problematic to conflate what people say they will do with 
what they actually do; (b) a policy outcome can be very different 
from the intention; (c) policy is made routinely through 
cooperation between elected and unelected policymakers and 
actors with no formal role in the process; (d) policymaking is also 
about the power not to do something (Cairney: 2012: pp. 24 – 25).  
 
Policy is therefore an inherently problematic term to define, however, it can 
be reasoned that policy should be understood as comprising of courses of 
action and inaction that can be made by state or non-state actors, to achieve 
some desired objective. An additional notion of analytical relevance to this 
research project – and more broadly the field of policy analysis – is the 
policymaking process which will now be defined and examined. According 
to Parsons (1995), the policymaking process can be defined as “how 
problems are defined, agendas set, policy formulated, decisions made and 
policy evaluated and implemented” (Parsons: 1995: pp. 16). Expanding upon 
the definition advanced by Parsons (1995), the policymaking process can be 
understood as comprising of five key stages: problem identification and 
agenda setting, policy formation, policy adoption, policy implementation 
and policy evaluation each of which will now be examined.  
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Problem identification and agenda setting relates to the manner in which 
policy problems are defined and how the policy agenda is set. In this stage of 
the policymaking process it is contended that public problems will only 
reach the policy agenda when they are converted into political issues 
(usually occurring when interests groups demand government action on a 
specific problem) (WHO: 2005: pp. 3). Policy formulation is the stage in 
which policies are formulated or adapted. Importantly, policies are the 
products of the political context within which they are developed. Therefore, 
it is useful to conceptualise policy formation as a social and political process 
in order to understand how policies are actually formulated (WHO: 2005: pp. 
4). Policy adoption is the stage in which policies are enacted or brought into 
force by actors involved with policy development and, more broadly, by 
state legislation. The implementation of policy relates to the mechanisms and 
actions in which policies are brought into practice, that is, where what is 
written in pieces of legislation or policy documentation are translated into 
reality. In this stage of the policymaking process the content of policy and its 
impact on those affected can be substantially modified or even negated 
(WHO: 2005: pp. 4). The final stage of the policymaking process is policy 
evaluation which includes the analysis, monitoring, criticism and assessment 
of existing or proposed policies. This includes the critical appraisal of policy 
content, its implementation and its effects, with policy evaluation aiming to 
help both policymakers and governments to implement policy in an efficient 
and effective manner (WHO: 2005: pp. 4). Having defined and examined the 
policymaking process, it is now required to examine another key notion of 
analytical relevance to this research project and the broader field of policy 
analysis, namely, policy networks.  
 
According to Compston (2009), policy networks in their most rudimentary 
sense refer to a set of political actors outside and inside government who are 
involved in, or take an interest in, the creation of public policy—and/or the 
relations between these actors (Compston: 2009: pp. 7). A core feature of 
policy networks is the notion that the relationships between network 
members are based on resource interdependencies, with actors wanting 
something from one or more other actors, whilst being prepared to exchange 
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something of their own in order to get it (Compston: 2009: pp. 7). Buse et al 
(2012) echo the notions above, defining policy networks as a: 
 
Generic term for interdependent organizations involved in an 
area of policy that exchange resources and bargain to varying 
degrees to attain their specific goals  (Buse et al: 2012: pp. 106).      
 
While the conceptualisation and definition of policy networks varies 
considerably between disciplines, Börzel (1998) maintains that they share 
common attributes including: 
 
A set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-
hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of 
actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and 
who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests 
acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve 
common goals (Börzel: 1998: pp. 254).      
 
However, it is important to appreciate that policy networks are actually 
political structures as the relationships within them prescribe the issues 
which are discussed and how they are dealt with; have sets of rules; define 
the roles which actors play within networks; and contain organisational 
imperatives, so that, at least, there is a significant pressure to maintain the 
policy network itself (Marsh & Smith: 2000: pp. 5). Policy networks also 
contribute towards the institutionalisation of beliefs, values, cultures and 
particular forms of behaviour. They shape actors’ attitudes while helping to 
routinize actions within the broader process of policymaking (Marsh & 
Smith: 2000: pp. 6). It is additionally reasoned by Marsh & Smith (2000) that 
policy networks help to simplify the policy process by limiting action, 
problems and solutions, with policy networks themselves helping to define 
roles and responses (Marsh & Smith: 2000: pp. 6). In doing this, policy 
networks are not neutral entities and comparable to other political 
institutions and processes, they both reflect past distributions of power and 
conflicts and shape present political outcomes (Marsh & Smith: 2000: pp. 6). 
Importantly, the rules of the game within specific policy networks also 




Policy networks can equally limit forms of behaviour which are unacceptable 
and by defining the sort of behaviour that is acceptable within the networks 
themselves, they can privilege certain alternative outcomes (Marsh & Smith: 
2000: pp. 6). It is reasoned that individual actors, who do not abide by the 
normalised rules within distinct policy networks, are likely to be excluded as 
policy networks, like other organisations, are the sum of previous policy 
decisions and outcomes and this is likely to privilege certain alternative 
policy options (Marsh & Smith: 2000: pp. 6).  
 
2.3 Theorising the relationship between evidence and policy within high-
income countries 
 
There is a well-established corpus of theoretical literature that has attempted 
to model the relationship between evidence and policy and much of this 
literature has been generated within HIC contexts. While this research 
project is interested in examining contested explanations for the Ugandan 
HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s and HIV prevention policy development 
pertaining to sub-Saharan and global level policymaking contexts, it is first 
useful to examine existing theoretical models that have attempted to 
problematise the relationship between evidence and policy within HICs. 
Such examination is required as the theoretical literature attempting to 
model the relationship between evidence and policy pertaining to LICs, 
especially within sub-Saharan Africa, is underdeveloped. It is therefore 
necessary to retreat temporarily to theoretical literature from HIC contexts 
and to consider its broader analytical utility in facilitating elements of the 
discussion within this thesis. The sub-sections below examine four 
theoretical frameworks that have attempted to model the relationship 
between evidence and policy, namely: the linear model, the enlightenment 





2.3.1 The linear model 
 
The linear or rational model assumes a direct link between the production of 
evidence and subsequent policy development. It assumes that evidence is 
mediated by actors operating within the policymaking process in a rational 
and sequential manner. The model is based on the supposition that because 
knowledge exists, it will consequently come to be utilised in policymaking 
(Monaghan: 2011: pp. 136). According to the linear model, actors operating 
within the policymaking process merely need to present their evidence in a 
convincing manner when policy decisions are being made, and if they are 
convincing enough, their evidence will be taken into account, and will from 
then on be incorporated into subsequent policy output (Overseas 
Development Institute: 2012).  
 
As noted by Monaghan (2011), the linear model can be read as an 
amalgamation of Weiss’ (1979) knowledge-driven and problem-solving 
models of research utilisation in which research findings are applied to 
policymaking in a deterministic manner (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 136).  
According to Weiss’ knowledge-driven model, research findings provide the 
required pressure for policy to develop in line with the production of new 
knowledge. In this model, it is reasoned that basic research highlights an 
opportunity for policy to develop, applied research is then undertaken to test 
and define these findings, relevant technologies are then developed, and 
finally, application occurs. The model is therefore premised on the simple 
assumption that because novel information exists it will then be utilised in 
subsequent policy development (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 136).  
 
Additionally premised upon a linear, or sequenced-based logic, is Weiss’ 
(1979) problem-solving model which maintains that research is used to fill 
gaps in knowledge where particular policy problems have arisen 
(Monaghan: 2011: pp. 136). While premised on a linear logic, like the 
knowledge-driven model, the steps by which evidence informs policy are 
different (Weiss: 1979: pp. 427). In this model decisions drive the application 
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of research. A predefined problem exists and a decision has to be made, 
understandings of information maybe lacking to create a solution to the 
problem and research information provides the missing knowledge—with 
the gap filled with knowledge a decision is reached (Weiss: 1979: pp. 427). 
According to Weiss (1979), the problem-solving model is based on the sense 
that there is a consensus of goals amongst policymakers and researchers 
(Weiss: 1979: pp. 427). As policymakers and researchers agree on desired 
goals, the main contribution of social scientific research is to identify and 
select the appropriate means to reach the intended policy goal (Weiss: 1979: 
pp. 427). According to the two models advanced by Weiss, decision-makers 
have clearly defined ideas about their intended policy goals and evidence is 
used to fill existing knowledge gaps and to clarify their choices in an 
unproblematic manner.  
 
However the linear model, and its assumption that evidence will inform 
subsequent policy output in a sequential manner, has been subject to 
extensive criticism throughout the past thirty years (Crewe & Young: 2002: 
pp. 2). Indeed, the linear model should be read as representing a zero-sum 
and outmoded understanding of the relationship between evidence and 
policy, as the idea that evidence informs policy in a straightforward or 
deterministic manner is anachronistic. Rationalist understandings of 
evidence utilisation tended to be popular in the age of logical positivism, and 
worked with Lasswell’s stages heuristic model of the policymaking process, 
where evidence flowed through the ordered phases of the policymaking 
process (namely the agenda-setting, formulation, legitimation, 
implementation and evaluations phases) in a linear manner. However, the 
linear model fails to capture the complex and multidirectional nature of 
evidence utilisation within policymaking and it must be stated that the 
relationship between evidence and policy is not a directional one. 
Appropriately, the linear model has been subject to criticism owing to its 
static view of the policymaking process in which evidence is directly linked 
to policy (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 7). It is well-established that policymaking is 
“rarely characterised by rational decisions made on the basis of the best 
information” (Young et al: 2002: pp. 218) and the idea that evidence will 
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automatically translate into policy is too simplistic—therefore an examination 
of more sophisticated frameworks is required. 
 
2.3.2 The enlightenment model  
 
A more sophisticated framework that attempts to model the relationship 
between evidence and policy is Weiss’ (1979) enlightenment model which 
makes reference to the arbitrary manner in which evidence can enter the 
policymaking arena. It is argued by Weiss (1979) that the most frequent way 
in which evidence enters the policymaking arena is through the 
enlightenment process—which represents a more sophisticated explanation 
of the evidence and policy connection (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 138). According 
to the precepts of the enlightenment model, it is not the results of a single 
study, or a body of studies, that directly influence policy—rather it is the 
theoretical perspectives and concepts that social scientific research has 
engendered which permeate the policymaking process itself (Weiss: 1979: pp. 
429). This model acknowledges that evidence percolates through the 
policymaking process and the percolation of evidence shapes the manner in 
which people think about particular social issues via a process of indirect 
diffusion (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429). Usefully, the enlightenment model is based 
upon a dynamic view of the policymaking process and it widens the 
platform upon which the evidence and policy relationship can operate 
(Monagahan: 2009: pp. 7).  
 
According to the principles of the enlightenment model, there is no 
underlying assumption that decision-makers actively seek out evidence 
when faced with a specific policy issue or even that they are aware of, or 
receptive to, specific research conclusions (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429). It is asserted 
by Weiss that evidence “diffuses circuitously through manifold channels” 
(Weiss: 1979: pp. 429) and it is noted that policymakers will rarely be able to 
cite the findings of particular studies that influenced their decisions. 
However, they will possess an understanding that evidence has given them a 
backdrop of ideas that has had important consequences (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429 
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– 430). Unlike Weiss’ problem-solving and knowledge-driven models, the 
enlightenment model does not assume that research results must be 
compatible with decision-makers’ goals and values. It is reasoned that 
evidence that challenges existing principles can work its way into official 
consciousness and with the help of dissident undergrounds it is possible to 
overturn established values and patterns of thought (Weiss: 1979: pp. 430). In 
actuality, in the enlightenment model evidence generates the conceptual 
tools for policymakers to facilitate their decision-making and the process of 
cumulating research and information over time serves to sensitise 
policymakers to new issues (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 138).  
 
The process of enlightenment should be understood as a two-way process—
in one direction it generates the awareness of decision-makers to specific 
issues, which can help set the agenda and the construction of certain 
problems as requiring solutions. Whereas, in the other direction, research can 
turn what were formerly pressing problems into lesser policy issues which 
can change the boundaries over where solutions are sought (Monaghan: 
2011: pp. 138). While the enlightenment model acknowledges that the 
policymaking process is dynamic and that evidence percolates into policy 
over time via a range of channels, it is noted that the model is conceptually 
deficient. Significantly, the filtration mechanism by which certain kinds of 
evidence are siphoned out of the policymaking process is absent, and there is 
an underlying assumption that all kinds of evidence have an equal chance of 
being utilised in decision-making (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 7). 
 
2.3.3 The political model 
 
Weiss’ (1979) political model is characterised by the selective use of evidence 
by decision-makers to satisfy their short-term interests (Weiss: 1979: pp. 7). 
According to the political model a constellation of competing interests 
around a particular policy issue coalesce and predetermine the positions that 
decision-makers take (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429). It is argued for reasons of 
interest, intellect or ideology that decision-makers are not likely to be 
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receptive towards new evidence that emerges from social scientific research 
(Weiss: 1979: pp. 429). Indeed, it is reasoned that evidence does not have any 
bearing on predetermined policy positions and evidence is used by decision-
makers as ammunition to convince waverers, to neutralise supporters or to 
bolster supporters (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429). It is maintained by Weiss (1979) 
that the political use of evidence by decision-makers operating within the 
broader policymaking process can take place for three key reasons: agency 
justification, self-serving purposes and personal aggrandizement (Weiss: 
1979: pp. 429). The political model therefore highlights the important 
influence of individual agency and its sway on the relationship between 
evidence and policy. 
 
According to the precepts of the political model, when new evidence is 
developed it is argued that it will have a negligible influence on decision-
makers’ predefined policy positions with evidence therefore serving a 
legitimising or justificatory function (Monagahan: 2011: pp. 139). The 
political model of research utilisation is a more sophisticated framework 
which better describes the relationship between evidence and policy, and it 
aligns with Weiss’ perceptive summation of the policymaking process itself 
which is viewed as an inherently political process, with the basic aim of 
reconciling interests in order to negotiate a consensus, not implementing 
logic and truth (Weiss: 1977: pp. 533).  
 
While the political model as distinct from the linear and enlightenment 
models starts to “descend the ladder of abstraction” (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 
140) to consider how evidence is, or is not, selected in policy decision-making 
(Monaghan: 2011: pp. 140) it too possesses conceptual limitations. It is 
reasoned that despite its acknowledgement of political imperatives upon the 
use of evidence in policy formation, the underlying logic of the political 
model is still linear (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 140). It is also contended that the 
political model offers a short-term and static understanding of the 
policymaking process, screening out the unintentional and serendipitous 
ways that evidence can come to be utilised in policymaking (Monaghan: 
2011: pp. 140). It is even contended that the political model provides a 
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restrictively narrow view of the evidence and policy connection, as if it was 
somehow deterministic which therefore neglects the unstable nature of 
policy development itself (Monaghan: 2011: pp. 14).  It is argued by 
Monagahan (2009) that the models outlined above (namely the linear, 
enlightenment and political models) function at too high a level of 
abstraction and that they provide inadequate grounds to conceptualise the 
relationship between evidence and policy—especially within heavily 
politicised policy areas (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 1). It is therefore warranted to 
examine a more contemporary framework that pays attention to the specific 
mechanisms through which evidence informs, or fail to informs, subsequent 
policy development—in particular Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model. 
 
2.3.4 The evolutionary model 
 
Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model examines bias in the use of evidence in 
policy development, arguing that existing models of the relationship 
between evidence and policy ignore the tendency for attention to be given to 
evidence helpful to the interests of powerful social groups (Stevens: 2007: pp. 
25). It is asserted, without the need for conspiracy or irrationality on the part 
of policymakers, that an evolutionary analogy can be used to explain how 
bias arises and its influence upon the use of evidence in policy development 
(Stevens: 2007: pp. 25). It is argued that an evolutionary analogy can be used 
to go beyond the conceptual limitations of Weiss’ political model, by helping 
to explain how evidence can be used selectively to advance the interests of 
powerful social groups, without relying on the deliberate involvement of 
policymakers—seeing social structures and political tactics as important in 
supporting selection in the use of evidence (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28 – 29). Using 
an evolutionary analogy, influenced by notions of social Darwinism, it is 
reasoned that: 
 
A variety of ideas come from evidence and compete for attention 
in policy, as genes arise and compete for survival. The ideas may 
be facts, findings or recommendations that have been produced 
by academics, journalists, think tanks, pressure groups or others. 
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Some of these ideas fit with the interests of powerful groups and 
some do not. Ideas that do fit will find powerful supporters. 
Others will not. Those ideas that fit will therefore have groups 
and individuals that can carry them into policy, as would a gene 
be reproduced if it finds a place in organisms that survive. The 
ideas that do not fit will tend not to be picked up by the people 
who have the power to translate them into policy. The 
evolutionary advantage leads to the survival of the ideas that fit 
(Stevens: 2007: pp. 28).  
 
It is argued by Stevens (2007) that the advantage of this biological analogy is 
that it highlights the biased use of evidence without relying on policymakers 
to be irrational, or the ability of powerful social groups to implement 
coordinated campaigns to ignore obstructive research (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). 
Reflecting on the information above, it can be appreciated that the pattern of 
evidence selection is based upon evolutionary social theory and that 
evidence comes to inform policy when it aligns with the ideas of those in 
positions of power (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 8). The model also equates evidence 
to ideas (the facts, recommendations and findings produced by a plurality of 
actors). It is reasoned by Monaghan (2009) that by focusing the analysis at the 
level of ideas, a wider understanding of evidence can be ascertained. Unlike 
the models outlined above (namely the linear, enlightenment and political 
models) the evolutionary model gives significant analytical attention to 
carefully defined mechanisms of selection and the influence of power within 
the broader policymaking process. It is reasoned that individuals functioning 
within the policymaking process have the power to pick up bits of evidence 
that confer advantage to ideas that suit the interests of powerful groups—
and similar to biological evolution the process of evidence selection is messy, 
complicated and sometimes brutal (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). Usefully, Stevens 
(2007) advances five mechanisms of evidence selection, namely: trawling, 
farming, repetition, flak and strain and their influence upon the use of 
evidence within policy development—each of these mechanisms of selection 
will now be examined.  
 
Trawling relates to policymakers, political parties, businesses and pressure 
groups fishing for evidence, hauling in the bits that suit their needs, and 
throwing back those bits that do not (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). Farming may 
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also occur which relates to actors commissioning research but only 
disseminating and using parts of it that meet the criteria set for the flavour 
and look of the evidence generated (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). Repetition, it is 
argued, is a useful tool to ensure that attention is given to useful evidence. It 
is claimed that actors, who possess a voice within the policy process, can 
repeatedly refer to bits of evidence, that may be ripped out of context and 
based upon methodologically suspect research. However, via repetition, 
such evidence can then become part of the accepted body of knowledge 
within a specific policy area (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). It is also maintained that 
flak can be used by powerful social groups to silence, discredit or attack 
evidence that comes into the public arena. Strain may also be implemented 
by powerful social groups upon organisations and individuals that produce 
and advocate unhelpful evidence, who may find that doing so is not 
conducive to organisational survival or to a successful career (Stevens: 2007: 
pp. 28).  
 
Power is key to the implementation of the aforesaid mechanisms, with those 
groups with the most power in society being able to apply these mechanisms 
to draw attention towards evidence that suits them and to encourage the 
ignorance of evidence that does not (Stevens: 2007: pp. 29). However, it is 
reasoned by Stevens (2007) that this does not mean that powerful social 
groups dominate the use of evidence entirely. Weaker social groups 
including environmental pressure groups and trade unions may also attempt 
to make these mechanisms of selection work for them. However, they have 
reduced access to the sources of research and they are less able to impose 
their own interpretations of research evidence on a wider public. It is also 
contended that weaker social groups have less opportunity to farm or trawl 
evidence, to repeat favourable evidence, to create flak, or to impose strain on 
those who generate and disseminate unhelpful research (Stevens: 2007: pp. 
29). Usefully, Stevens (2007) contends that the selective use of evidence 
maybe more likely to take place in more contentious policy arenas which, 
according to his analysis, included the fields of drug, asylum, alcohol and 
environmental policy. However, Stevens (2007) realises that his evolutionary 
model requires more testing in other policy fields before it can be advanced 
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as a reliable description of the evidence/policy connection (Stevens: 2007: pp. 
32). Realising that the selective use of evidence is more likely to occur in 
contentious policy areas, and the need to test the evolutionary model in 
additional policy fields, part of the discussion chapter will examine the 
analytical capacity of Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model in relation to the 
empirical findings that emerge from this study. 
 
The primary reason for using Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model within 
parts of the forthcoming discussion chapter relates to the useful mechanisms 
of evidence selection (trawling, farming, repetition, flak and strain) and the 
wider influence of power upon the process of evidence utilisation and 
subsequent policy development. The secondary reason relates to the 
recognised influence of politics within the field of HIV/AIDS policy and the 
contested nature of the Ugandan HIV decline of the early to mid-1990s. The 
politics surrounding the Ugandan HIV decline, and the acknowledged 
political nature of HIV/AIDS policymaking domains, are relevant reasons 
which necessitate the use of an evidence/policy theoretical model that can 
account for the selective use of evidence within policy development. Having 
introduced Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model, and examined its analytical 
potential in facilitating elements of the discussion chapter, it is now required 
to provide a concise discussion about the use of evidence within 
policymaking and to elucidate key issues that influence the utilisation of 
evidence within the public health field.   
 
2.3.5 Discussion on the use of evidence within the field of public health 
 
This chapter has so far highlighted that the use of evidence within the 
broader policymaking process is inherently complex with political, 
ideological and economic factors influencing the relationship between 
evidence and policy itself. It has also been ascertained that the use of 
evidence, within the field of public health, is complicated by the socially 
constructed nature of evidence and the idea that different kinds of evidence 
struggle to control action within the discipline. However, there are two 
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additional problems that need to be considered in relation to the use of 
evidence within the field public health, namely, the complex process of 
evidence use within the discipline and the influence of individual agency 
upon the utilisation of evidence itself.   
 
First, the use of evidence within public health should be understood as an 
imperfect process. While it would be advantageous for public health 
practitioners to incorporate scientific evidence when developing policies and 
making decisions, in reality, decisions are frequently based on short-term 
demands and policies are often developed around anecdotal evidence 
(Brownson et al: 1999: pp. 87). Moreover, policymakers within the public 
health field, when left to their own devices, can tend to make a highly 
selective use of evidence due to political incentives and psychological biases 
towards over-confidence in one’s own judgement (Cookson: 2005: pp. 119). 
While there is a commonplace assumption that decision-makers involved 
within public health will use the best available evidence to support the 
decisions they make, the best available evidence may not be good evidence. 
Furthermore, evidence can be biased, willingly or unintentionally, or even 
fabricated (Banta: 2003: pp. 569) and it is key to note that evidence use is 
based upon a combination of professional judgement, common sense and, at 
times, convincing evidence within public health is mainly a matter of 
presentation and rhetoric (Banta: 2003: pp. 569). The issue of the use of 
evidence within public health is therefore exceedingly complex, and as Banta 
(2003) argues, no existing model is adequate to the task of answering all the 
important questions concerning the use of evidence within the public health 
field (Banta: 2003: pp. 570). It is therefore not appropriate to subscribe to the 
precepts of existing theoretical frameworks that have attempted to model the 
relationship between evidence and policy in their totality. However, it is 
important to use existing models, like Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model, in 
an instrumental manner and to adapt aspects of existing models to new 
policymaking contexts and emerging research findings.  
 
A second problem which needs to be discussed when thinking about the 
function of evidence within the field of public health is the influence of 
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individual agency. Importantly, individuals involved with the mediation of 
evidence and the development of policy often make decisions in light of 
uncertainty and their decisions are not always done on a scientific basis 
(Choi et al: 2005: pp. 636). Scientific evidence may also conflict with the 
respective beliefs and values of policymakers and those involved with policy 
development may use evidence in the battle to control problem definition 
and policy solutions (Choi et al: 2005: pp. 636). Individual policymakers thus 
frequently search for evidence to support their own claims, which often 
results in systematic bias occurring in the way that policymakers look for 
and use data (Choi et al: 2005: pp. 633). Evidence may also fail to be used in 
policy development by individuals as new forms of evidence can be 
perceived as threatening to existing power relationships or entrenched 
vested interests, rather than because evidence is flawed or insufficiently 
robust (Hunter: 2009: pp. 583).  
 
It is also important to appreciate that evidence is only one of many 
considerations that lead to the development of subsequent policy output. It is 
often neglected that the development of policy is based on individual values 
and human emotions. Policy development, and the use of evidence to 
support policy change, is often shaped by the emotive actions of individual 
decision-makers who may use evidence in a strategic and political manner. 
The importance of individual agency upon the use of evidence within 
policymaking is acknowledged by Bowen & Zwi (2006). They assert that 
individual decision-makers are key in deciding about the use of evidence 
within policy development, as it is individuals who can decide whether to 
accept or reject something new (Bowen & Zwi: 2006: pp. 602). However, 
individual decisions are shaped by a range of factors including personal 
qualities and capacities such as beliefs and values, knowledge and leadership 
skills, broader organisational support, partnership links and networking 
(Bowen & Zwi: 2006: pp. 602). Importantly, the capacities and personal 
qualities of individual decision-makers can influence the uptake of evidence 
in decision-making processes and when individuals perceive evidence to be 
useful, compatible and comprehensible with their past experiences, it stands 
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a better chance of being used in policy development (Strydom et al: 2010: pp. 
2).  
 
2.4 Examining the role of evidence in the formulation of HIV prevention policy 
focusing on literature from Uganda 
 
This section of the chapter examines literature on the role of evidence in the 
formulation of HIV prevention policy, giving analytical focus to literature 
from Uganda. This exploration is required in order to ground the thesis in an 
appropriate body of knowledge which will facilitate the subsequent analysis 
of contested explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda, and 
the role of evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in 
the 1990s. Two sub-sections will be advanced within this portion of the 
chapter. The first locates and summarises the underlying Ugandan 
HIV/AIDS surveillance data sources referred to by experts and institutions 
in developing HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. The second describes how 
these data were interpreted by different groups of actors involved with 
national and international HIV/AIDS prevention, and key contextual factors 
that appeared to influence the process of evidence interpretation by those 
involved with HIV/AIDS prevention in the 1990s.  
 
Before examining the interpretation and use of Ugandan HIV/AIDS 
surveillance data in the formulation of HIV prevention policy, it is first 
essential to present the underlying sources of epidemiological and sexual 
behavioural surveillance data that were subsequently interpreted and used 
to create HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. This is achieved via a review of 
UNAIDS/WHO best practice policy documentation, which provide 
formative accounts of the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s, and 
are purportedly the original sources of data used to advance the narrative of 
HIV decline that emerged in the early to mid-1990s. UNAIDS asserts that the 
original sources of data used by the Ugandan Government and international 
organisations to develop HIV prevention policy were a combination of: 
antenatal HIV seroprevalence data, behavioural data emerging from 
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population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change and a range of 
smaller-scale sociological studies (see UNAIDS: 1998a & UNAIDS: 1998b). 
Each of these data sources will now be outlined as their use was key to the 
development of subsequent Ugandan and global HIV prevention policies in 
the 1990s.  
 
It is widely claimed that antenatal HIV seroprevalence data were used to 
demonstrate Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to late 1990s. Kirungi et al 
(2006) assert, via an analysis of ANC seroprevalence data, that there was a 
peak in HIV prevalence rates somewhere between 15 – 30%  in seven urban 
clinics in 1992 followed by a steady decline by 2002 to 5 – 12% (Kirungi et al: 
2006: pp. 36). Echoing this contention is Okware et al (2005) who also noted 
that HIV seroprevalence among women attending urban antenatal clinics 
throughout Uganda declined from about 30% in 1992 to 10% in 2002 
(Okware et al: 2005: pp. 625). Indeed, multiple authors acknowledge that 
Uganda successfully reversed a generalised, high prevalence epidemic from 
as high as 30% in 1992 to as low as 6% in 2000 among women attending 
certain urban antenatal clinics (Merson: 2006; Genius & Genius: 2005; Kirby: 
2008; Okware et al: 2001; Slutkin et al: 2006; Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004). 
In 2001 the Ugandan Ministry of Health produced a report summarising the 





Table 3: HIV seroprevalence rates in Uganda from 1989 - 2000 
     
     (Ugandan Ministry of Health HIV/AIDS Surveillance report: 2001: pp. 3). 
 
To understand the underlying behavioural mechanisms, that could account 
for the aforementioned declining trends in HIV seroprevalence in Uganda, 
UNAIDS describes two wide-ranging population-based surveys of sexual 
behavioural change that were conducted in 1989 & 1995. It is asserted that 
there was adequate overlap between the studies to permit analytical 
comparison as the same population range, the same survey methodology 
and the same key questions on sexual behaviour were used in both surveys 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 9). Two geographical areas were covered in the surveys 
(namely urban Kampala and urban Jinja) as seroprevalence surveillance had 
been carried out in these locales between 1989 & 1995. In 1989 the sub-
sample of the behavioural surveys that corresponded to the surveillance 
areas totalled 1,186 individuals and in 1995 it totalled around 1,600 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 9). UNAIDS (1998) maintain that the two sub-samples 
Site	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	
Nsambya	 24.5	 25.0	 27.8	 29.5	 26.6	 21.8	 16.8	 15.4	 14.6	 13.4	 12.3	 11.8	
Rubaga	 -	 -	 27.4	 29.4	 24.4	 16.5	 20.2	 15.1	 14.8	 14.2	 10.5	 10.7	
Mbarara	 21.8	 23.8	 24.3	 30.2	 18.1	 17.3	 16.6	 15.0	 14.5	 10.9	 11.3	 10.0	
Jinja	 24.9	 15.8	 22.0	 19.8	 16.7	 16.3	 13.2	 14.8	 11.0	 10.5	 10.8	 8.3	
Tororo	 -	 4.1	 12.8	 13.2	 11.3	 10.2	 12.5	 8.2	 9.5	 10.5	 4.5	 4.7	
Mbale	 3.8	 11.0	 12.1	 14.8	 8.7	 10.2	 7.8	 8.4	 6.9	 6.3	 5.7	 5.5	
Kilembe	 -	 -	 -	 -	 7.0	 16.7	 11.1	 10.4	 8.5	 -	 7.5	 4.2	
Soroti	 -	 -	 -	 -	 9.1	 -	 8.7	 7.7	 5.3	 7.7	 5.0	 5.0	
Hoima	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 12.7	 9.0	 5.4	 3.5	 -	
Arua	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.4	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.2	 5.2	
Pallisa	 -	 -	 -	 7.6	 5.0	 1.2	 -	 -	 3.2	 	 3.2	 3.8	
Matany	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2.8	 7.6	 -	 2.0	 1.6	 1.3	 0.9	 1.9	
Kagadi	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 10.3	 11.5	 11.0	 10.5	
Mutolere	 -	 4.1	 5.8	 -	 4.2	 -	 3.6	 2.6	 -	 2.5	 2.3	 2.1	
Moyo	 -	 -	 -	 -	 5.0	 -	 3.1	 -	 -	 3.2	 5.2	 2.7	
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were comparable in most respects, as the specific age distribution of 
respondents was not majorly different between the two periods. It is also 
noted that the 1995 population-based survey also included questions on 
whether or not respondents had changed their sexual behaviour over the 
previous five years (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 9). It is posited that the analysis of 
sexual behavioural change data – via the comparison of the 1989 & 1995 
surveys – demonstrated significant differences in sexual behaviour in almost 
every aspect that was investigated (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 9). Three key 
findings emerged from the analysis of the 1989 & 1995 surveys in particular: 
delayed age at first sex, fewer sexual relations with non-regular partners and 
increased condom use.  
 
Pertaining to delayed age at first sex, it is reasoned that the proportion of 
females aged between 15 – 19 reporting that they had never had sexual 
intercourse increased from 26% to 46%. For males aged 15 – 19, the 
proportion increased from 31% to 56%. For the youngest age cohort, 
specifically 15 year olds, the proportion of boys and girls reporting that they 
had never had sex rose from 20% to 50% between 1989 & 1995 (UNAIDS: 
1998b: pp. 9). UNAIDS additionally noted that there were declines in the 
number of sexual relations with non-regular partners. It is asserted that the 
proportion of men who reported sex outside a regular partnership in the 
previous year declined from 22.6% to 18.1% (also noting that the number of 
sexual partners tended to be fewer, with the arithmetic mean falling from 2.3 
to 2.0). For females it is reported that there did not appear to be any 
significant change, with the proportion reporting sex with non-regular 
partners increasing from 6% to 8% (an increase that was not considered to be 
statistically significant) (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 10). UNAIDS also reason that 
between 1989 & 1995 the percentage of sexually active people claiming to use 
condoms increased significantly. For men, the proportion of people who 
declared that they had ever used a condom increased from 15% to 55% and 
for women from 6% to 39%. It is equally maintained that the 1995 
population-based survey demonstrated that condom use tended to be higher 
for those who had sexual intercourse with a non-regular partner in the 
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previous 12 months, noting that condom use was 66% for men and 49% for 
women in their last sexual intercourse of risk (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 10).  
 
The UNAIDS report also states that sources of data used to understand the 
declining trends in HIV infection in Uganda and to inform the development 
of subsequent HIV prevention policy, were 300 quantitative and qualitative 
small-scale sociological surveys (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). While UNAIDS 
(1998) acknowledged that these data sources did not provide directly 
comparable data over time, they did support the proposition that there had 
been a significant shift in attitudes and behaviour (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). 
Key findings emerging from a UNAIDS commissioned literature review 
which analysed the 300 surveys included: changes in age at first sex, 
downward trends in age at first marriage, changes in sexual relations with 
non-regular partners, and increased condom use (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). 
 
UNAIDS (1998) assert that in relation to age at first sex, demographers and 
anthropologists recorded a lower proportions of male and female youths 
(aged 20 – 24) who reported first sex under the age of 19 compared with 
results in the late 1980s (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). Pertaining to age at first 
marriage, a downwards trend for the median age was observed from the 
1980s and early 1990s. It is reasoned that this trend could be associated with 
hardship, insurgency and war – while also noting that this trend could have 
been due to the fear of AIDS and the desire by men for a non-infected female 
partner (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). It is additionally noted by UNAIDS that 
there was relatively little reliable quantitative evidence pertaining to sexual 
relations with non-regular partners. However, UNAIDS’ interpretation of 
these data was that individuals in Uganda were increasingly being faithful to 
regular partners (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 11). Echoing the analysis from the 
1989 & 1995 population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change, it was 
reasoned by the authors of the UNAIDS report that different studies 
indicated significant increases in condom use. It was noted that the 
proportion of sexually active people who had ever used a condom increased 
nationally between 1987 & 1996 from about 3% to 25% (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 
11). Thus, via an analysis of the 1989 & 1995 population-based surveys of 
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sexual behavioural change (and 300 smaller-scale sociological studies) it was 
reported that declining trends in Ugandan HIV infection were the result of 
an “increase in condom use, a delay in the onset of sexual intercourse, and to 
a lesser extent a reduction in the number of sexual partners” (UNAIDS: 
1998b: pp. 13).  
 
2.5 Examining the interpretation, and use of, Ugandan behavioural 
surveillance data in HIV prevention policy development in the 1990s 
 
Having presented the underlying epidemiological and behavioural data 
sources which gave experts and institutions formative understandings about 
declining trends in HIV prevalence within Uganda in the 1990s, it is now 
required to examine their interpretation. Specifically, this section will explore 
how the outlined sources of Ugandan data were divergently interpreted by 
actors involved with HIV prevention in the 1990s and factors that influenced 
the actual process of evidence interpretation itself, focusing on the role of 
individual beliefs and complex cognitive framing processes. This 
examination will also involve a discussion of the Ugandan Abstinence, Being 
Faithful and Condom Use (ABC) prevention approach to HIV and how 
advocates of the individual elements of the ABC prevention model 
interpreted the Ugandan HIV surveillance data in a heterogeneous fashion. 
 
It must be noted that the interpretation of the outlined Ugandan 
epidemiological and behavioural data sources was inherently complex—
especially during the mid-1990s. This complexity directly relates to actors 
involved with HIV prevention interpreting the sexual behavioural change 
surveillance data in both a heterogeneous and highly partisan manner. 
Merson (2006) contends that the complexity surrounding the interpretation 
of sexual behavioural change data gravitates around the relative importance 
given to specific components of sexual behavioural modification, namely: 
abstinence, partner reduction, condom promotion and their contribution to 
declining trends in Ugandan HIV prevalence (Merson: 2006: pp. 333).  
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Okuonzi & Epstein (2005) also note that the analysis of the aforementioned 
Ugandan sexual behavioural change data led to a highly partisan debate 
between advocates of condoms versus abstinence and partnership reduction 
in the 1990s (Okuonzi & Epstein: 2005: pp. 3). While evidence supporting the 
sexual behavioural change reasons that could account for declining Ugandan 
HIV trends, and the subsequent direction of HIV prevention policy 
development, are contested and far from conclusive (Kiweewa: 2008: pp. 56), 
two key competing interpretations emerged in the mid-1990s. Specifically, 
abstinence and partner reduction interpretations versus increased condom 
uptake interpretations.   
 
Kiweewa (2008) argues that empirical studies provide support for the idea 
that abstinence and partner reduction were the primary factor in reducing 
HIV prevalence in Uganda. Kiweewa (2008) noted that Stoneburner & Low-
Beer (2004) maintained that partnership reduction – known colloquially 
within Uganda as zero-grazing – was equivalent to a vaccine of 80% 
effectiveness (Kiweewa: 2008: pp. 56). It is additionally reported by Kiweewa 
(2008) that advocates of condom use advanced similarly compelling 
anecdotal and empirical data as proof that it was condom use and not 
abstinence and partner reduction that could account for the observed 
declines in HIV prevalence and incidence (Kiweewa: 2008: pp. 57). However, 
Kiweewa (2008) maintains that evidence pertaining to the Ugandan HIV 
decline is inconclusive, contending that it is virtually impossible to 
disaggregate the relative contribution of specific behavioural programs 
embedded in the ABC model to any decline in the HIV epidemic (Kiweewa: 
2008: pp. 57). Merson (2006) echoes this supposition noting that while 
significant effort has been made to determine the precise cause of the decline 
in HIV prevalence in Uganda, it may never really be possible to disaggregate 
fully the contribution to the decrease in HIV prevalence (Merson: 2006: pp. 
333). While Merson (2006) asserts that it is not possible to disaggregate the 
specific reasons that caused the Ugandan HIV decline, a retrospective 
analysis of Ugandan sexual behavioural change data which attempted to 
disaggregate the behavioural data and the causal reasons accounting for the 
Ugandan HIV decline was implemented by Kirby in 2004. 
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Kirby’s (2004) analysis is useful to consider as it combined multiple sources 
of Ugandan evidence, including the data sources outlined in the previous 
section. It concluded that the main behaviour changes seen were a reduction 
in the average number of sexual partners, along with a delayed onset of 
sexual activity. Condom use was also noted as contributing to declining HIV 
trends, however this occurred later than these initial behavioural changes 
(Kirby: 2004: pp. 28; Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 20). Green (2006) also claims that 
condom use was not a central element of Uganda’s early response to 
HIV/AIDS, especially between 1986 & 1991, noting that the debate over what 
happened in Uganda was reflective of divisive abstinences-versus-condoms 
rhetoric, which appeared more related to culture wars in the USA than to 
African social reality (Green et al: 2006: pp. 335).  
 
Thus, two schools of thought emerged over the behavioural change evidence 
used to understand the Ugandan HIV decline, and the subsequent direction 
of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s, with one school contending that it was 
the abstinence (A) and being faithful (B) factors that could account for the 
success against HIV/AIDS (see Green et al: 2006; Hearst & Chen: 2004; 
Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004). The second school of thought emphasised 
condom use (C) and other structural factors – including poverty reduction, 
female empowerment and economic stability as largely responsible for the 
decline (Kiweewa: 2008: pp. 56). Again, advocates of the A & B elements of 
the ABC model maintain that various sources of evidence indicated that 
condom use was relatively low within Uganda in the early 1990s. For 
example, Hogle et al (2002) maintained that increased condom use had been 
relatively minor in Uganda – ranging from 1% in 1989 to 6% in 1995 and 16% 
in 2000 for females and from 16% in 1995 to 40% in 2000 for males.  Kiweewa 
(2008) reasons that as most significant declines in HIV prevalence had 
already taken place by 1995, it is asserted that it was highly improbable that 
increased condom use played a significant role in the HIV decline (Kiweewa: 
2008: pp. 56). Again, however, the epidemiological and sexual behavioural 
data – which allowed actors in the 1990s to advance formative explanations 
for the decline in HIV and to shape the subsequent direction of HIV 
prevention policy are limited.  
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Parkhurst (2012) even asserts that the underlying epidemiological data, used 
to demonstrate the decline in Ugandan HIV infection, have been based on 
misinterpretation with claims of Ugandan success being based upon selective 
pieces of data, which have been falsely presented as representative of the 
nation as a whole (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 78). Therefore, it is important to 
acknowledge that the interpretation of Ugandan epidemiological and sexual 
behavioural change data was complex as various actors generated competing 
behavioural understandings of the Ugandan HIV decline which ultimately 
shaped the direction of subsequent HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. It is 
equally important to acknowledge that the underlying data sources, used to 
support the narrative of Uganda’s decline and the ABC prevention model, 
were far from conclusive, leading certain authors to reason that it remains 
impossible to locate the definitive reason that could account for the Ugandan 
HIV decline.  
 
As demonstrated above, it is clear that the interpretation of the outlined 
epidemiological and behavioural data sources was inherently complex, as 
actors involved with HIV prevention analysed the sexual behavioural change 
surveillance data in both a heterogeneous and highly partisan manner. 
Parkhurst (2012) advances an additional range of factors that appeared to 
influence the interpretation of Ugandan behavioural evidence and its 
subsequent use in the development of international HIV prevention policy. 
Analysing how evidence supporting the formulation of international HIV 
prevention policy, namely PEPFAR’s ABC approach, was influenced by 
cognitive framing processes, it is claimed that interpretations of evidence 
reflected internal consistency with individual core beliefs about sexual 
behaviour (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 17). Relying on theoretical literature from 
cognitive science and psychology, Parkhurst (2012) conducts a critical 
discourse analysis of interviews and textual data surrounding PEPFAR’s 
ABC prevention approach to HIV. He explains how Ugandan evidence, 
which was used to justify PEPFAR’s decision to use the ABC approach, was 
framed to develop policy responses to international HIV prevention. 
Interestingly, the study attempts to examine how Ugandan evidence 
supporting the ABC prevention approach were competitively analysed by 
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those involved with HIV prevention, and how the same set of Ugandan 
historical and epidemiological evidence was interpreted in different ways by 
different groups of policymakers within PEPFAR (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 18). 
Parkhurst (2012) claims that various players in PEPFAR referred to particular 
elements of the ABC approach, how different lessons were drawn from it 
and how this led to competing HIV prevention policy recommendations 
(Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 18). It is asserted that various players within PEPFAR 
adopted different positions in relation to HIV prevention on the basis of 
analysing the same HIV evidence from Uganda and how those players (from 
various sides of the ABC debate) claimed that their diverging interpretations 
of the Ugandan HIV prevention approach were ‘evidence based’ whilst 
drawing on the HIV prevention experience of Uganda to justify their 
conclusions (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 17). 
 
The study examines how policy constructions of HIV prevention derive from 
competing underlying moral belief systems, the interpretive framing process 
based on those beliefs and their influence on evidence (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 
19). On the basis of cognitive psychological theory, it is posited that 
individual belief systems shape the understanding of evidence itself, as well 
as how pieces of evidence can be interpreted in ways consistent with one’s 
worldview (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 29). In this light, it is reasoned that 
interpretations of complex information that are most consistent with core 
beliefs are most likely to be developed into decisions, arguments and ideas 
(Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 29). It is asserted by Parkhurst (2012) that how humans 
deal with complexity, and manage to make sense of evidence when there are 
limitations in that evidence, is critical to understanding the role of evidence 
in HIV prevention policy formulation. Parkhurst (2012) equally maintains 
that cognitive psychological theories can provide a useful avenue to 
understand how humans negotiate complex evidence, arguing that when 
faced with complexity, the human mind uses simplifying heuristics and 
processes of association in order to understand information (Parkhurst: 2012: 
pp. 21). Usefully, cognitive science has explored how humans comprehend 
information and make decisions, especially in situations of complexity and 
uncertainty. It is reasoned that information is processed by, and understood 
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with reference to, simplifying models based on past experiences, 
expectations or personal beliefs (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 19).  
 
Importantly, understanding these issues can facilitate an analysis of how 
groups with contrasting belief systems interpret and use evidence differently 
– not just because they are seeking different policy outcomes but also 
because their existing beliefs will structure the cognitive frames through 
which new evidence is understood and applied (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 19). It is 
reasoned by Parkhurst (2012) that this process can be linked to political 
concerns. Advancing a cognitive-political approach to the use of evidence in 
policy which can facilitate an understanding of the reasons behind differing 
portrayals of evidence in controversial policy debates (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 
19). Valuably, Parkhurst’s analysis examined how various players within 
PEPFAR examined Ugandan evidence which supported the ABC prevention 
approach to HIV. However, the study demonstrated that the Ugandan 
sources of evidence supporting the application of the ABC approach by 
PEPFAR were competitively interpreted, with decision-makers aligning their 
own interpretations of evidence in line with their core beliefs about sexual 
behaviour itself. Indeed, Parkhurst’s analysis demonstrated that explanatory 
terms and statements of justification illustrated the fundamental difference 
between opposed groups, stemming from their core belief systems on 
sexuality (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 30).  
 
On the basis of Parkhurst’s analysis it can be posited that individuals 
involved with the formulation of HIV prevention policy will often use and 
frame evidence in a manner that is consistent with their previous beliefs, 
their underlying values and past experiences. Importantly, the role of 
evidence in relation to the development of HIV prevention policy is clearly 
contingent upon individual belief systems and complex cognitive framing 
processes, which links and interprets information to ensure consistency, or 
alternatively which rejects or questions information that is not consistent 




Therefore, the individual framing of evidence by experts involved with HIV 
prevention policy development, is important to consider when 
understanding the process by which public health evidence comes to be 
developed into subsequent policy recommendations. Via the critical analysis 
of PEPFAR’s ABC policy for HIV prevention and the function of Ugandan 
evidence in shaping PEPFAR’s international HIV prevention policy 
approach, it is clear that rather than speaking for itself, sources of Ugandan 
evidence were defined by framing processes, with competing interpretations 
of the same evidence found to reflect internal consistency with core beliefs 
about sexual behaviour (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 17). Importantly, Parkhurst’s 
study demonstrates the analytical imperative to make explicit the complex 
role that individual belief systems play in shaping how evidence is used in 
the development of HIV prevention policy development (Parkhurst: 2012: 
pp. 17). 
 
This section has examined literature on the role of evidence in the 
formulation of HIV prevention policy, focusing on literature from Uganda. It 
is beginning to emerge that the existing body of knowledge in this area 
highlights the complex and partisan manner in which Ugandan HIV 
surveillance data were interpreted and utilised by policymakers to inform 
the subsequent direction of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. The reviewed 
literature within this section indicate that the use of evidence pertaining to 
the development of HIV prevention policy is contingent upon the individual 
agency of HIV/AIDS experts, their underlying belief systems, and complex 
framing processes. Importantly, these contextual influences appear to shape 
the interpretation and utilisation of behavioural evidence by experts 
involved with HIV/AIDS prevention and the respective significance 
attached to individual components of sexual behavioural change (namely 
abstinence, condom use and partnership reduction). While the studies 
outlined above have provided an account of the complexity surrounding the 
interpretation of Ugandan HIV surveillance data in HIV prevention policy 
development, they have not examined the contested nature of the decline in 
HIV prevalence in Uganda in substantive analytical detail. Equally, they 
have not given focused analytical attention to the political and institutional 
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context within which the contested sources of behavioural evidence were 
analysed and subsequently used to advance formative explanations for the 
decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and developments in HIV prevention 
policy in the 1990s. While the reviewed literature has noted that the analysis 
of the Ugandan HIV surveillance data, supporting both formative 
explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline and HIV prevention policy 
development is contested, it has not generated detailed qualitative data from 
the HIV/AIDS experts who were directly involved with the creation of the 
original sources of evidence used to explain the Ugandan HIV decline, and to 
shape the direction of subsequent HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. To 
address this absence of empirical information, it is appropriate for this study 
to use SGS as a lens via which to examine the contested explanations for the 
decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the 
development of global HIV prevention policy. Via this analysis it should be 
possible to complement the existing body of knowledge – including the 
research advanced by Parkhurst (2012) – to understand better the salience of 
individual agency and framing processes upon the use and interpretation of 
evidence in policymaking contexts at the national and global level. Having 
examined the role, and interpretation of, evidence in the formulation of HIV 
prevention policy in Uganda, it is now appropriate to explore additional 
factors that appear to influence the role of evidence in HIV prevention policy 
development from other LICs contexts.  
 
2.6 The influence of political factors, policy entrepreneurship and policy 
networks on the role of evidence in HIV prevention policy pertaining to sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
To understand better the role of evidence in the development of HIV 
prevention policy, this section of the chapter critically examines key themes 
that emerged from the literature pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa. The 
reviewed literature indicates that three factors appear to influence the role of 
evidence in HIV prevention policy, namely: political factors, policy 
entrepreneurship and policy networks – each of which will now be 
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examined. Once analysed, the following sub-section will explore factors that 
influence the relationship between evidence and health policy pertaining to 
sub-Saharan Africa. This is important as it is claimed that the relationship 
between evidence and health policy, and factors that influence the dynamic 
itself, are poorly understood across sub-Saharan Africa and conceptual gaps 
in our understanding about the relationship remain (Woelk: 2009; Burris et 
al: 2011; Pang & Tharyan: 2009; Uneke et al: 2012; Ssengooba et al: 2011).  
 
Buse et al (2006) note that political factors can influence the role of evidence 
in HIV prevention policy – and more broadly sexual and reproductive health 
policy – within LICs in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed it is asserted that political 
factors can determine which reproductive and sexual health issues are 
included in national health policy agendas, which evidence is examined (or 
excluded), which policy alternatives are considered (and ultimately 
adopted), and the degree to which they are implemented (Buse et al: 2006: 
pp. 2101). Parkhurst (2012) echoes these notions arguing that HIV prevention 
policy development is an activity that cannot be pursued without making 
value judgements and is an inherently political process (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 
1). Acknowledging that there have always been political dimensions to HIV 
prevention policy development, it is reasoned that policy decisions relating 
to HIV often involve complex choices between competing and contested 
outcomes (Parkhurst: 2012: pp. 2). Thus, when reflecting upon the role of 
evidence in the development of HIV prevention policy, it is important to 
depart from simple conceptions of HIV prevention policy formulation and 
the idea that value-neutral assessments of evidence and ‘what works’, 
appraised solely in terms of HIV incidence reduction or proximal behaviour 
change, will determine policy outcomes in their own right  (Parkhurst: 2012: 
pp. 2). Buse (2008) additionally contends that there is a common sense 
understanding that politics and, more broadly, distinct socio-political 
contexts are salient determinants of HIV policy and evidence utilisation. It is 
reasoned that those who seek to influence HIV prevention policy 
development must fully appreciate the political dimensions of HIV policy, 
asserting that failure to do so can frustrate efforts to promote and implement 
evidence-informed policy (Buse et al: 2008: pp. 572). Dickenson & Buse (2008) 
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also assert that as HIV has been a disease associated with sex and illegal 
drugs, HIV prevention policy formulation has been highly politicised from 
the outset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (Dickenson & Buse: 2008: pp. 1). It is 
even claimed that in multiple contexts, politics, ignorance, and ideology have 
proven to be more influential on HIV policy development than evidence, 
epidemiological data, or technical best practice (Dickenson & Buse: 2008: pp. 
1). It is reasoned by Dickenson & Buse (2008) that to conceptualise properly 
the role of evidence in the development of HIV prevention policy, one must 
stand back and first reflect upon the broader policymaking process.  
 
Dickenson & Buse (2008) reason that the policymaking process should be 
understood in the context of ongoing interactions among institutions (the 
rules and structures which shape how decisions are made), ideas (discourses, 
arguments and evidence), and interests (the individuals and groups who 
stand to lose or gain from change (Dickenson & Buse: 2008: pp. 1). This 
conceptualisation of policymaking suggests that the role of evidence in the 
development of HIV prevention policy is inevitably complicated by 
conflicting values and competing interests, with evidence rarely speaking for 
itself in direct relation to HIV prevention. It is also asserted that the 
emergence of evidence and ideas, and how they are discussed and 
communicated amongst experts involved with HIV policy development, 
influences the content of HIV policies and how they are subsequently 
implemented in various policymaking contexts (Dickinson & Buse: 2008: pp. 
4). 
 
One study critically examines the influence of political factors upon the role 
of evidence in HIV prevention policy development within the context of 
Tanzania. Hunsmann (2012) notes that far from being strictly evidence-
driven, HIV prevention policy within the country results from a politically 
negotiated aggregation of competing and frequently non-optimising 
rationalities amongst policymakers who possess different ideas about the 
prevention of HIV (Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1477). It is reasoned that failure to 
consider the invariably political nature of HIV-related policymaking, 
particularly within LICs like Tanzania, impedes the creation of effective, 
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politically-informed strategies for positive change. Departing from the 
widely assumed notion of rational evidence utilisation within policymaking, 
it is reasoned that it is important to develop policy practitioners’ 
understanding of how to engage in evidence-informed political struggles 
over priorities, and to appreciate that technical approaches to HIV 
prevention will be influenced by political controversies that occur amongst 
policymakers (Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1477). Via the critical analysis of 
allocative decisions regarding HIV prevention within Tanzania, it is asserted 
that political constituencies, the vertical nature of the Tanzanian HIV 
response, the expected timeline of interventions’ political returns, and 
economic cost all downgrade the influence of evidence within the 
policymaking process. It is significant to note that these factors conspire to 
influence the creation of Tanzanian HIV prevention policies in ways that are 
drastically at odds with rationalist decision-making models (Hunsmann: 
2012: pp. 1482). It is claimed that Tanzanian HIV prevention policies are not 
wholly evidence-driven, arguing against apolitical conceptions of health 
policy formation within this particular sub-Saharan African country. 
 
It is also maintained that rationalist conceptualisations of policymaking in 
direct relation to HIV prevention policy are essentially a fallacy or idealised 
form of policymaking that fail to demonstrate real-world understandings of 
decision-making processes, especially within LICs like Tanzania (Hunsmann: 
2012: pp. 1483). Indeed, it is asserted that HIV prevention policies, at least 
within the context of Tanzania, are primarily based on politics and that 
ignoring the political nature of HIV prevention policy exposes actors 
involved with HIV/AIDS policy to repeated frustrations, which impedes the 
formulation of politically informed strategies for positive change 
(Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1484). Hunsmann’s (2012) study is useful to consider 
as it provides a realistic appraisal of policymaking processes and the 
complex role of evidence in HIV prevention policy development within sub-
Saharan Africa. It possesses an additional analytical strength as it argues for 
in-depth understandings of policymaking processes within sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the importance of examining the complexity surrounding the 
heterogeneous influence of politics upon evidence and subsequent policy 
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formation within the region. It is reasoned that future research that seeks to 
examine evidence utilisation within sub-Saharan Africa should go beyond 
solely examining the underlying bio-epidemiological rationalities of HIV 
policy, to examine competing dialectics at play in the formulation of HIV 
policy and their selective, politically mediated, implementation (Hunsmann: 
2012: pp. 1483). 
 
Analysis of literature pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa suggests that policy 
entrepreneurship can also influence the role of evidence in HIV prevention 
policy development. Prior to advancing, it is required to define policy 
entrepreneurs and the idea of policy entrepreneurship. Policy entrepreneurs 
can be defined as individuals who possess a specific claim to hearing within 
distinct policymaking networks or broader policymaking domains. This 
claim to hearing is underpinned by up to three sources: their individual 
expertise, their ability to speak for others, and/or their authoritative 
decision-making position (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 180). According to Kingdon 
(1995), there maybe an array of individuals who float within the 
policymaking process, however policy entrepreneurs are the central actors 
who can capture the attention of others in order to promote their personal 
interests and their intended policy objectives (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 123). Policy 
entrepreneurs possess four central qualities which can facilitate their ability 
to develop their intended policy goals, namely: their negotiating skills, their 
political connections, their tenacious nature which permits them to push 
their ideas about policy problems (and how to address them in multiple fora) 
and the possession of a known level of expertise, which again gives them a 
legitimate claim to hearing within distinct policy networks (Kingdon: 1995: 
pp. 180 – 181). The primary motivation for policy entrepreneurs to function 
within the broader policymaking process is driven by the promotion of 
personal self-interest, which can include the imperative to protect one’s own 
bureaucratic turf, to maintain one’s employment, to expand one’s individual 
agency, and/or to advance personal career promotion (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 
123). One study has highlighted the influence of policy entrepreneurship 
upon the role of evidence in HIV prevention policy formation within the 
context of Ghana. 
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Burris et al (2011) examined the influence of policy entrepreneurship upon 
the role of evidence, and more broadly the relationship between evidence 
and HIV health policy, in Ghana. They specifically explored how evidence 
which related to HIV/HSV-2 interactions shaped policy development at the 
international level, and the mechanisms of international to national policy 
transfer, using aspects of HIV policy in Ghana as a case study. Significantly, 
they noted the function of policy entrepreneurs as playing recurrently 
important roles in driving policy change, and how evidence alone was 
insufficient to influence policy without the engagement and alignment of 
multiple factors (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 8). Indeed, they discovered that a 
well-placed policy entrepreneur within the Ghanaian Ministry of Health or 
the National HIV control Program was a particularly effective agent for 
using operational research findings to change policy (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 
7). However, for a policy entrepreneur to bring about policy change on the 
grounds of operational research evidence, the intended policy change 
needed to: (a) save money in the long run, (b) be highly visible and good for 
public relations, (c) be beneficial to the population at no extra cost, or (d) 
have any extra costs covered by donor agencies, and/or (e) have the 
potential to attract donor funding (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 7).  
 
The authors reasoned that these conditions were essential prerequisites for 
generating the political will needed to bring about policy change within 
Ghana in relation to HIV. Based upon their qualitative interview data, Burris 
et al (2011) found that policy entrepreneurs could carry issues and 
operational research into broader policy networks, where personal ties with 
either colleagues or old friends acted as the main route to the latest research 
findings which, in turn, could generate internal pressure for policy to change 
(Burris et al: 2011: pp. 7). Usefully, this study displayed the key function of 
policy entrepreneurs in influencing the role and utilisation of research 
evidence and subsequent Ghanaian HIV/HSV-2 policy reform, specifically 
noting their critical function in bridging the gap between research evidence 
and policy itself (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 7). Having examined the impact of 
policy entrepreneurship upon the role of evidence in the development of 
HIV prevention policy, it is now appropriate to explore the influence of 
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policy networks and their impact upon the role of evidence in HIV 
prevention policy development.  
 
In addition to noting policy entrepreneurs’ influence upon the role of 
evidence in relation to HIV policy in Ghana, Burris et al (2011) 
acknowledged the pivotal influence of policy networks in functioning as the 
primary conduit of information exchange between researchers and 
policymakers at both international and domestic levels (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 
1). Their study maintained that communication between research and 
policymaking networks was critical for the uptake of evidence and how 
evidence was utilised by experts in relation to HIV/HSV-2 policy 
development. They claimed that once evidence of a synergy between 
HIV/HSV-2 had accumulated through observational data and meta-analyses 
a policy network of program managers, policymakers, and researchers took 
it upon themselves to drive the policy agenda (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 5). Their 
study identified that interactions between researchers and policymakers 
involved with HIV/HSV-2 policy change at the Ghanaian and international 
levels (including expert decision-makers from the WHO) were characterised 
by a club-like camaraderie, and links between key networks of actors were 
essential in shaping the function of evidence within the broader 
policymaking process in both contexts.  
 
It was understood that these interactions played an important role in the 
influence of evidence on HIV policy, through the formation of policy 
networks at global (WHO) and national (Ghanaian) levels. The authors note 
that policy networks, and policy entrepreneurs operating within the 
networks themselves, provided the primary impetus for policy change in 
relation to HIV policy, suggesting that evidence alone was insufficient to 
shape policy development (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 8). It was also ascertained 
that researchers involved with HIV relied upon their friends, who held key 
policymaking positions, to be instrumental in the researchers’ attempt to 
develop policy which, it is argued, constituted a policy network—one that 
linked researchers with well-placed policymakers who were then able to 
influence subsequent policy development (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 7). 
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Significantly, this study maintained that communication amongst 
policymakers and researchers was of critical importance in facilitating the 
uptake of evidence, with policy networks themselves functioning as the key 
force to catalyse policy change in relation to HIV policy in the international 
(WHO) and national (Ghanaian) contexts (Burris et al: 2011: pp. 1). 
 
2.6.1 Factors influencing the relationship between evidence and health policy 
pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Having examined the influence of political factors, policy entrepreneurship, 
and policy networks on the role of evidence in HIV prevention policy 
development, it is now required to examine their influence upon the broader 
relationship between evidence and health policy pertaining to other sub-
Saharan African contexts. This exploration is needed as HIV policy falls 
under the broader rubric of health policy, thus an analysis of the relationship 
between evidence and health policy in other sub-Saharan African contexts 
can increase conceptual understandings of the role of evidence in policy 
development within this under-researched geographical area. In line with 
the literature examined above, three factors appear to influence the role of 
evidence in health policy pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, namely: political 
factors, policy entrepreneurship, and policy networks – each of which will 
now be examined. 
 
Within the setting of Nigeria, in a study aiming to promote evidence-
informed health policymaking within the country, it was noted by Uneke et 
al (2010), that a number of political barriers influenced the translation of 
research into policy and practice via evidence use. Specifically: an absence of 
relevant research data, interdisciplinary conflicts (meaning a lack of 
interdisciplinary team work between researchers and policymakers), and a 
lack of knowledge on the part of policymakers to appreciate the relevance of 




Additional barriers that influenced the use of evidence within health policy 
development in Nigeria included communication gaps and poor networking 
between policymakers and researchers, and capacity constraints at 
individual and organisational levels. Uneke et al (2012) claim that one of the 
central political issues which complicates the process of evidence/policy 
translation within Nigeria stems from ‘huge gaps’ between researchers and 
policymakers. They contend that one of the central challenges to the 
successful implementation of EBPM within Nigeria, stems from 
incompatibilities existing between researchers and policymakers. It is 
asserted that researchers operating within LICs, like Nigeria, lack knowledge 
of the policymaking process and they often produce research evidence that is 
irrelevant to the policymaking process itself (Uneke et al: 2012: pp. 2). It is 
reasoned by Uneke et al (2012) that the promotion of EBPM within LICs in 
sub-Saharan Africa cannot be achieved without ‘bridging the gap’ between 
researchers and policymakers (Uneke et al: 2012: pp. 14). While Uneke et al 
(2010; 2012) identify some relevant political barriers that can impede the 
utilisation of evidence and subsequent policy development, their studies are 
influenced by underlying rationalist and normative assumptions about the 
function of evidence within policymaking in the context of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Indeed, their 2012 study was implemented with a normative desire to 
promote EBPM within the context of Nigeria—as outlined within the 
introduction of their investigation: 
 
This study was designed to promote evidence-informed 
policymaking and improve the capacity of policymakers and 
other stakeholders to acquire, assess, adapt and apply research 
evidence effectively. This study was also designed to facilitate 
linkage and exchange among the major players in Nigerian 
health policymaking arenas (policymakers, researchers and other 
stakeholders) and to bridge the huge gap existing between 
policymakers and researchers (Uneke et al: 2012: pp. 3) 
 
The study therefore assumes that EBPM can be realised within LICS, like 
Nigeria, by building links and enhancing partnerships between researchers 
and policymakers. The ideas advanced by Uneke et al (2012) resonate with 
notions relating to the use, and non-use, of evidence by policymakers and 
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researchers involved within the process of decision-making, as advanced by 
Caplan in the late-1970s. Caplan (1979) sought to explain the use, or non-use, 
of evidence by actors involved within the process of decision-making. It was 
reasoned that researchers and policymakers operated in two communities 
and reasons contributing to the non-use of research evidence stemmed from 
cultural gaps between the two groups. Caplan reasoned that social scientists 
were directly concerned with esoteric issues and pure science, while 
policymakers were more action-oriented, being more practical and 
concerned with more obvious and immediate issues (Caplan: 1979: pp. 459). 
Although one can argue that researchers and policymakers operate in 
different fora, the two communities model can be criticised, as it is based on 
a simple dichotomous relationship between the use versus non-use of 
research evidence within the broader policymaking process (Neilson: 2001: 
pp. 3). The two communities notion, which Uneke et al (2012) appears to 
endorse, is potentially problematic as policymaking processes and divisions 
of labour between researchers and policymakers are more amorphous than 
this model suggests, since researchers are often simultaneously operating as 
policymakers, especially within LICs in sub-Saharan Africa. While this study 
accounts for some political barriers that influence the movement of evidence 
within the policymaking process (interdisciplinary conflicts, a lack of 
knowledge by policymakers to appreciate the relevance of evidence-based 
research, and an absence of relevant research data at the country-level), it 
possesses strong normative commitments to the notion and practice of EBPM 
within the context of Nigeria. This should be viewed with caution, as it has 
been established that the relationships between evidence and health policy 
within other sub-Saharan African countries are both complex and inherently 
political. 
 
Within the context of Uganda, Orem et al (2014) attempted to examine the 
role that evidence played in relation to malaria treatment policy change. 
Their study noted that evidence was utilised to adapt malaria treatment 
policy within the country, however the consistency between evidence and 
policy decisions varied along the policy development cycle (Orem et al: 2014: 
pp. 1). Their study acknowledged that changes in malaria treatment policy 
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within Uganda were reported to be very technical, with the role of evidence 
seen as being very important (Orem et al: 2014: pp. 1). The sources of 
evidence that were apparently considered were categorised into nine areas 
including: local and international evidence on drug efficacy, guidance from 
the WHO, cries from the community1, evidence on cost, implementation 
feasibility, local and international experiences, observational evidence, 
routine monitoring data, and evidence on behavioural change (Orem et al: 
2014: pp. 6). While different kinds of evidence were seen as informing policy 
change in relation to malaria treatment policy, certain political factors were 
noted as inhibiting the uptake of evidence within the country. In particular: 
resistance from implementers, including health workers involved with 
domestic malaria treatment policy change, and the Ugandan health systems’ 
capacity to implement the new policy and its financial sustainability (Orem 
et al: 2014: pp. 12 – 13). In relation to individual level factors (resistance from 
health workers), it was discovered that certain individuals involved with 
malaria treatment were not willing to adjust established behaviours in 
relation to the treatment of malaria itself, which highlights the role of 
individual agency in the non-use of evidence within the context of Uganda 
(Orem et al: 2014: pp. 12). More broadly, issues with the Ugandan health 
system, and a perceived lack of sustainability regarding the new malaria 
treatment policy, were seen as additional barriers to the uptake of evidence. 
Specifically, concerns existed in relation to the supply chain system that 
would ensure the availability of artemisinin combination therapy within the 
country and there was doubt as to whether the policy could be sustained on 
the basis of Ugandan financial resources (Orem et al: 2014: pp. 12). Usefully, 
this study explored how political factors influenced the uptake of evidence in 
relation to malaria policy development. Via a qualitative case study 
methodology (involving interviews with key informants) and document 
review, this study demonstrated that a diverse range of stakeholders played 
various roles and gained different levels of influence upon the uptake of 
evidence in relation to malaria treatment policy change. Having examined 
the influence of political factors upon the relationship between evidence and 
																																																								
1	Cries from the community referred to requests from the Ugandan public to 
take action in relation to malaria (Orem: 2014: pp. 6)	
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health policy within the contexts of Nigeria and Uganda, the chapter now 
turns to the concept of policy entrepreneurship and its influence on the 
evidence/health policy dynamic within the region of sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
One study has highlighted the influence of policy entrepreneurship upon the 
relationship between evidence and health policy within sub-Saharan African 
policymaking contexts. Noting that few empirical studies of research 
utilisation have been implemented within LMICs, Daniels & Lewin (2008) 
explored how research evidence influenced policy decisions around the use 
of magnesium sulphate in the treatment of eclampsia and pre-eclampsia in 
South Africa (Daniels & Lewin: 2008: pp. 1). Adopting a qualitative case-
study approach, they noted the importance of policy entrepreneurship in 
using research evidence in shaping maternal health care policy development 
and in placing issues on the policy agenda. They discovered that local 
researchers from South Africa functioned as policy entrepreneurs, bringing 
attention to priority health issues and influencing the use of evidence to 
bring about policy change in relation to maternal healthcare policy (Daniels 
& Lewin: 2008: pp. 1). Usefully, this study reflected upon the national 
political environment within South Africa and how the political climate 
during apartheid prevented policy entrepreneurs from gaining attention in 
ways that would achieve meaningful policy change in relation to maternal 
healthcare policy (Daniels & Lewin: 2008: pp. 10). When the political climate 
changed with the demise of the apartheid regime in 1994 however, 
individuals with strong links and the relevant expertise were appointed to 
key positions in maternal healthcare and were thus able to function as policy 
entrepreneurs to bring about policy change via the strategic use of evidence 
(Daniels & Lewin: 2008: pp. 10). This study makes a valuable contribution to 
the limited literature on factors influencing the uptake of evidence into 
policymaking within South Africa, highlighting the importance of a 
conducive domestic political environment upon the policy entrepreneurs 
involved with the utilisation of evidence and subsequent policy 
development. This study helpfully contextualised the activities of policy 
entrepreneurs against a broader political climate of receptivity, and the 
salience of external political change upon the ability of individuals involved 
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within maternal healthcare policy development, to use evidence to drive 
meaningful policy change. It therefore demonstrates the importance of 
considering macro-level political factors in exploring the role of policy 
entrepreneurs, making clear that the use of evidence within distinct policy 
networks can be influenced by broad adaptions in domestic political systems.   
 
The third key factor that can influence the relationship between evidence and 
health policy within sub-Saharan Africa are policy networks. This section 
examines one article that highlight policy networks’ role in the way evidence 
helps shape health policy development within sub-Saharan Africa, and their 
function in facilitating policy change by placing key issues on the policy 
agenda in various countries within the region. Examining two policy case-
studies focused on the use of magnesium sulphate in the treatment of 
eclampsia in pregnancy (a clinical case) and the use of insecticide treated bed 
nets and indoor household residual spraying for malaria control (a public 
health case), Woelk et al (2009) attempted to examine factors influencing the 
use of evidence in national policy development in three sub-Saharan African 
countries. Using Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe as country case 
studies, they discovered that policy networks were important in the 
utilisation of evidence in both the clinical and public health case studies 
(Woelk: 2009: pp. 1). In relation to the eclampsia case study, it was 
discovered that academic obstetricians, who were important to local policy 
development, were involved in national, regional, and international research 
networks (Woelk: 2009: pp. 7). Importantly, these networks were seen as key 
to creating a culture of research and evidence-based medicine by exposing 
local level clinicians to new ideas as they developed internationally. It is 
reasoned both directly and indirectly that these networks shaped the 
translation of evidence into policies, whilst building links to leading research 
taking place at the international level (Woelk: 2009: pp. 7).  
 
Regarding the use of insecticide treated bed nets compared with indoor 
household spraying for malaria vector control, they found that policymakers 
and researchers were organised into strong regional networks that were 
important in sharing approaches and ideas for malaria control (Woelk: 2009: 
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pp. 9). It was also found that while policymakers involved with malaria 
control became aware of evidence through their own reading, a range of 
additional interfaces were also significant in terms of how evidence informed 
the policymaking process. In all three countries, researchers were co-opted 
into formal government advisory committees which consequently led to the 
creation of close relationships between health officials and researchers for 
implementing malaria treatment control (Woelk: 2009: pp. 9). It is argued 
that the influence of national, regional, and international research and policy 
networks, in relation to the routes through which research evidence entered 
the policymaking process, were important in both the eclampsia and malaria 
case studies (Woelk: 2009: pp. 11). However, the nature and the size of the 
policy networks involved with the two case studies varied dramatically. 
Indeed, in the eclampsia case study the authors noted that researchers and 
obstetricians in all three countries often belonged to the same national 
clinical and research networks, attending the same conferences and meetings 
(Woelk: 2009: pp. 11). They contend, in relation to the eclampsia case study, 
that a tightly knit group, which they defined as a policy community, was key 
in ensuring a homogenous conceptualisation of evidence, for providing 
resources, and for lobbying and facilitating knowledge exchange (Woelk: 
2009: pp. 11). The existence of these tightly knit national policy communities 
(made up of a small number of clinicians with similar disciplinary 
backgrounds and training) was seen as important in facilitating consensus 
around research evidence in relation to the eclampsia case study (Woelk: 
2009: pp. 11).  
 
Distinct from the eclampsia case study, however, Woelk et al (2009) 
identified a wider array of stakeholders within the malaria control domain, 
with groups from divergent backgrounds possessing different interests and 
opinions. Members of these policy networks were described by Woelk et al 
(2009) as an unruly mélange of political actors and interest groups, who 
frequently contested existing and novel interventions whilst championing 
different causes based upon ideological and political interests (Woelk: 2009: 
pp. 11). In debates over malaria control, including which specific insecticide 
to use and whether or not to use bed nets or spraying, various groups 
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aligned to different positions, with pro- and anti-spraying groups being 
present in all three countries (Woelk: 2009: pp. 11).  
 
The authors maintain that the differences found between the eclampsia and 
malaria policy networks relates to the distinct nature of the two issues. 
Indeed, it is argued that eclampsia is a focused clinical condition which 
therefore has a narrow footprint, in the sense that the number of actors 
involved was fairy compact. Common understandings of the research 
evidence were therefore easily achieved, based on close working 
relationships (Woelk: 2009: pp. 11).  In contrast, the malaria control case 
study had a broad footprint with a very wide range of actors with diverse 
agendas, in both the research and policy areas, making the development of a 
common understanding of evidence more difficult (Woelk: 2009: pp. 11). 
Helpfully, this study acknowledged that the movement of evidence and its 
influence on policy is a complex and context sensitive process, arguing that 
researchers seeking to examine evidence and the process of knowledge 
translation itself within sub-Saharan Africa need to be aware of policy 
networks’ influence upon the evidence/policy dynamic (Woelk: 2009: pp. 2). 
It also demonstrated that larger policy networks made up of experts from 
divergent backgrounds possessed competing interests, which made the 
process of gaining consensus over evidence more difficult in direct relation 
to malaria treatment policy change. It therefore demonstrated how 
heterogeneous policy networks, as opposed to more homogenous policy 
networks, complicated the movement of evidence within the broader 
policymaking process. 
 
2.7 Discussion of key findings and chapter summary 
 
The literature reviewed within this chapter demonstrated that the role of 
evidence in the formulation of HIV prevention policy can be influenced by 
an array of complex factors. The salience of political factors, policy 
entrepreneurship, and policy networks were noted as key in shaping the role 
of evidence in HIV policy development and more broadly the relationship 
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between evidence and health policy, pertaining to various countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. In combination, these factors serve as a reminder that 
rationalist or linear understandings of the evidence/policy connection 
should be viewed with caution, as they are likely to complicate how evidence 
is used within the broader policymaking process itself.  
 
Relating to the interpretation and use of Ugandan data in the formulation of 
HIV prevention policy in the 1990s, it was demonstrated that HIV 
surveillance data were utilised in both a heterogeneous and at times highly 
partisan manner, by HIV/AIDS experts involved with HIV policy 
development in this specific period of time. It was also discovered, via an 
analysis of Parkhurst (2012), that the role of evidence in HIV prevention 
policy development can be influenced by complex cognitive framing 
processes and by an individual’s ideas and beliefs about sexual behaviour. It 
is clear on the basis of literature from Uganda that HIV surveillance evidence 
was used to support particular approaches to subsequent HIV prevention 
policy development, with debates taking place in relation to the broader ABC 
prevention policy approach to HIV that emerged in the mid 1990s.   
 
While the studies examined above provided an account of the complexity 
surrounding the interpretation of Ugandan HIV surveillance data and the 
subsequent direction of HIV prevention policy, they have not generated 
qualitative data from the cohort of Ugandan and global level HIV/AIDS 
experts who were involved with the generation, analysis, and utilisation of 
the original sources of evidence used to explain Uganda’s HIV decline, and 
subsequently to shape the direction of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. To 
address this absence of empirical information, it is appropriate for this study 
to use SGS as a lens via which to examine the contested explanations for the 
decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda, and the role of evidence in the 
development of global HIV prevention policy. Via this analysis it should be 
possible to complement the existing body of knowledge, including the 
research advanced by Parkhurst (2012), to understand better the salience of 
individual agency and framing processes upon the use and interpretation of 
evidence in policymaking contexts at the national and global level. As noted 
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above, Hunsmann (2012) demonstrated that the relationship between 
evidence and policy in direct relation to HIV prevention policy, was 
influenced by competing rationalities among HIV/AIDS prevention experts 
and the broader influence of politics upon evidence and subsequent policy 
development. It is reasoned by Hunsmann (2012) that future research 
seeking to examine the role of evidence in policy development needs to go 
beyond the sole content of HIV policies and their underlying bio-
epidemiological rationalities to examine competing dialectics at play in the 
formulation of HIV policies and their selective, politically mediated 
implementation (Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1483). The current study thus aims to 
address Hunsmann’s call by further exploring the political determinants of 
HIV/AIDS policy by attempting to open the conceptual black box of 
‘political factors’, to provide a more nuanced account of the contestation 
surrounding explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda, and 








CHAPTER THREE: Methodology 
  
3.1 Introduction to chapter 
 
This chapter explains the methodological approaches selected to examine 
contested explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the 
role of evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in the 
1990s. It commences with an examination of the role of qualitative 
methodological approaches within the field of public health, elucidating 
their utility in relation to the critical analysis of the contested Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline and the use of SGS as a case study—discussing the 
strengths of the case study method for addressing the central thesis aim. The 
process of identifying documents for review, and the purpose of 
documentary analysis is then presented. The function of semi-structured 
interviews with elites, the tools used for data collection and the approach 
adopted for data analysis are outlined. The process of securing Uganda 
National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST) research clearance is 
clarified. A concise discussion of University of Edinburgh School of Social 
and Political Science (SSPS) ethical protocols that were addressed prior to the 
data collection phase of this study, will also be given. Epistemological and 
ontological reflections are discussed, and issues pertaining to researcher 
reflexivity are posited.  
 
3.2 Function of qualitative methodological approaches within the field of 
public health 
 
Qualitative methodological approaches have been used in this study 
reflecting the inherent complexity of the public health field which is full of 
puzzling questions, slowly evolving events, and complicated relationships – 
phenomena leaving gaps in understanding that invite qualitative methods to 
fill (Rubin & Rubin: 1995: pp. 51). In addition to addressing puzzling 
questions, qualitative methodological approaches, and qualitative 
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researchers alike, seek to confront complex problems in the real world by 
gathering what they hear, observe and read from places and people with the 
aim of learning about specific facets of the social world itself (Rossman & 
Rallis: 1998: pp. 5). Via the use of qualitative methodological approaches, it is 
also possible to examine key components of the social world which, in turn, 
can facilitate novel understandings that can be used by the social world itself 
(Rossman & Rallis: 1998: pp. 5). These notions indicate that qualitative 
methodological approaches can be used to explore puzzling questions of 
interest in order to create new ideas about the social world itself – 
particularly within the field of public health.  
 
As this project seeks to examine a complex research aim, namely to examine 
contested explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda, and the 
role of evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in the 
1990s via the analysis of SGS, qualitative approaches have been selected to 
facilitate an exploration of this multifaceted subject matter. As demonstrated 
within the preceding chapters, the role of evidence in the development of 
HIV prevention policy, and the contestation surrounding the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline of the 1990s, is inherently complex. Given the complexity 
of the subject matter under analysis, it is appropriate to use qualitative 
methodological approaches within this project as they can enable the 
researcher to examine the contested Ugandan HIV decline and the 
subsequent development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s in an 
analytically rigorous manner.    
 
An additional reason supporting the use of a qualitative approach in this 
project, pertains to methodological choice. In relation to particular methods 
that can be implemented when using a qualitative research design, public 
health researchers are faced with a plethora of approaches from which they 
can pick those methods most likely to generate the most valid and 
comprehensive answers (Baum: 1995: pp. 465). While noting that a range of 
qualitative methods are available to help examine puzzling questions of 
interest within public health research, it is necessary to outline the key 
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qualitative method that underpins the research project in its totality—namely 
the case study approach. 
 
3.3 Adoption of a case-study approach 
 
To examine how explanations advanced for the decline in Ugandan HIV 
prevalence were contested and how this contestation affected broader HIV 
prevention policy development in the 1990s, a case study – namely SGS – 
was selected. Due to the centrality of the case-study approach within the 
project, it is required to justify why this specific method was used to facilitate 
an exploration of its analytical subject matter under investigation. A case 
study approach is useful when asking how or why questions, when one has 
little control over events and when the focus of research is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin: 2009: pp. 2). The 
central area of analytical investigation within this project is the critical 
examination of the contested Ugandan HIV prevalence decline and the 
development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. Thus, a clearly 
identifiable policy case study was needed to allow the researcher to explore 
this complex subject matter in analytical detail. The emergence of SGS was 
selected as a lens via which to examine the contested Ugandan HIV decline, 
and the development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s, as it is a clearly 
identifiable policy initiative supported by behavioural evidence from 
Uganda itself – behavioural evidence that was used to shape formative 
accounts for the contested Ugandan HIV prevalence decline in the 1990s. 
Therefore, this policy case was a suitable vehicle to permit the researcher to 
analyse how broader explanations advanced for the decline in Ugandan HIV 
prevalence were contested, and why particular explanations informed the 
development of global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
As a research method, the case study approach can be used in multiple 
contexts in order to contribute to knowledge about individual, group, 
organisational, political and social related phenomena (Yin: 2009: pp. 4). The 
case study method also permits researchers to examine the meaningful 
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characteristics of real life events including individual life cycles, small group 
behaviour and organisational processes (Yin: 2009: pp. 4). It also permits 
researchers to undertake in-depth and multifaceted explorations of 
complicated problems in their real-life settings, which is especially useful 
when one needs to obtain detailed appreciations of an issue, event or 
phenomenon of interest in its natural context (Crowe et al: 2011: pp. 1). 
Importantly, the case study approach also allows events, interventions and 
policy developments to be studied in critical detail (Crowe et al: 2011: pp. 8). 
As the case study approach can facilitate the detailed study of complex 
problems – including policy developments – it was justifiable to select this 
particular methodological approach as the subject matter under examination 
within this project – namely contested explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline – is acknowledged as being a complex area of research to 
analyse. Prior to advancing, it is necessary to describe how SGS was located 
for analysis (this involves a concise description relating to the evolution of 
this research project itself). Once outlined, the function of documentary data 
analysis, and its role in helping to examine the evidence used to support the 
development of SGS will be advanced.     
 
The specific case-study on which this research is based developed over a 
two-year period, partly in response to emerging issues with evidence and 
claims about evidence in relation to the development of SGS. Based within 
the Centre for International Public Health Policy, my original research 
project aimed to assess critically the evidence-base used to generate the 
global burden of disease (GBD) estimates for HIV/AIDS in Uganda2. It was a 
specific objective of my original research project to locate and analyse the 
evidence-base that had supported the GBD estimates for HIV/AIDS—
critically assessing their empirical validity from an epidemiological and 
quantitative analytical perspective. However, in the early stages of my 
research, difficulties arose in locating the Ugandan epidemiological data 
sources that were used to generate the GBD figures for HIV/AIDS within the 
																																																								
2	Uganda was used as a case study country as my former supervisor was 
researching and working with colleagues from Uganda as part of the 
Accessing Medicines in Africa and South Asia (AMASA) project.	
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country. In reaction to my inability to locate the Ugandan HIV/AIDS 
epidemiological data sources for critical appraisal, a modification in my 
research direction was required. Importantly, however, in the process of 
reviewing HIV/AIDS surveillance reports produced by the Ugandan 
Ministry of Health, as part of my original GBD research project, the term 
‘Second Generation Surveillance’ kept appearing. For example, within a 
Ugandan Ministry of Health HIV/AIDS surveillance report published in 
2001 it was stated that: 
 
We are routinely collecting data on HIV/AIDS surveillance as 
part of Second Generation Surveillance to get a better 
understanding of the behavioural context in which the epidemic 
is progressing (Ugandan Ministry of Health: 2001: pp. 1). 
 
The commitment to SGS was reaffirmed in another HIV/AIDS surveillance 
report that was published by the Ugandan Ministry of Health in 2009: 
 
HIV surveillance in Uganda is conducted in the context of second 
generation surveillance whereby the HIV biological surveillance 
data are complemented by data from behavioural surveillance, 
STI, and AIDS case surveillance as well as programmatic 
monitoring, evaluation and operational research (Ugandan 
Ministry of Health: 2009: pp. 1). 
 
Significantly, the term ‘Second Generation Surveillance’ immediately 
attracted my interest and it raised some profound questions. If there is a 
‘second generation’ of HIV surveillance what was the first generation? What 
is SGS and how was evidence supporting its introduction mediated by 
experts involved with its formal development? Which institutions developed 
SGS and why was it being used in Uganda? In reaction to these questions, 
time was taken to research SGS and the evidence supporting its formal 
introduction. After rudimentary online literature searches and formative 
document review, it became clear that SGS was introduced by 
UNAIDS/WHO in 2000—supported mainly by evidence from Uganda. 
Reflecting upon SGS further, I realised that it could be used as a policy case 
study to understand the acknowledged contestation that surrounds the 
Ugandan HIV/AIDS decline and the subsequent development of HIV 
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prevention policy in the 1990s. Thus, more time was taken to locate relevant 
policy documentation pertaining to the development of SGS—the process of 
which will now be described in detail.   
 
3.4 Selection and analysis of documentary data 
 
To facilitate an examination of contested explanations for the decline in HIV 
prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the development of global 
HIV prevention policy, it was important to locate, and analyse, relevant SGS 
policy documentation. To locate policy documentation, directly pertaining to 
SGS, the search engine Google was used to identify germane sources of 
policy material. Searches on Google including: “Second Generation HIV 
Surveillance” and “Second Generation Surveillance” were inputted—using 
quotation marks (to search for these exact phrases and to reduce the potential 
number of hits). These simple searches, as expected, yielded a vast amount of 
hits (6,540 for “Second Generation HIV Surveillance” and 14,300 for “Second 
Generation Surveillance”). Naturally, it was not possible to review all of the 
information from the search terms inputted on Google. Thus, the researcher 
only focused on hits that made direct reference to SGS on the first page of 
retrieved results—sources were also excluded for analysis if they took the 
form of editorials and commentaries. The top hit for both of the search terms 
above was an official WHO webpage3 which provided a concise description 
of SGS, a list of key reference material and a link to another webpage where 
additional sources of information about SGS were provided4. Via the use of 
Google, and simple key word searches, relevant policy documentation which 
directly pertained to the development of SGS were located. Key sources of 









Table 4: SGS related documentation 
 
1.	 World	 Health	 Organization	 and	 UNAIDS.	 Second	 generation	 surveillance	 for	 HIV:	
compilation	 of	 basic	 materials.	 CD-ROM.	 Geneva,	 World	 Health	 Organization	
(WHO/HIV/2002.07).	2002	
	
2.	World	 Health	 Organization	 and	UNAIDS.	 Initiating	 Second	Generation	 HIV	 Surveillance	
Systems:	 Practical	 Guidelines.	 Geneva,	 World	 Health	 Organization	 (WHO/HIV/2002.17).	
2002	
	
3.	 World	 Health	 Organization	 and	 UNAIDS.	 Guidelines	 for	 Second	 Generation	 HIV	
Surveillance	 for	 HIV:	 The	 Next	 Decade.	 Geneva,	 World	 Health	 Organization	
(WHO/CDS/EDC/2000.05).	2000	
	











Sexual	Behaviour	 in	 Thailand:	Data	Collection	and	Comparison.	Geneva,	UNAIDS	 (UNAIDS	
98.15).	June	1998.	
	
8.	 UNAIDS	 Best	 Practice	 Collection.	 A	 Measure	 of	 Success	 in	 Uganda:	 the	 Value	 of	





As a social research method, document analysis is recognised as a useful tool 
for gaining nuanced understandings of complex issues whilst helping 
researchers to study specific research phenomena, events, organisations and 
policy programmes in detail (Bowen: 2009: pp. 29). The analysis of 
documents also permits researchers to discover meaning, to develop 
understanding, and to discover critical insights into specific research 
problems (Bowen: 2009: pp. 29). Thus, it was appropriate to locate, and 
examine, key sources of documentation to help address the core research aim 
of the project, namely the wish to explore the contestation surrounding the 
decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence – via the analysis of SGS – and the role 
of evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy. Documents 
were analysed within this project for two core reasons. First, to gain 
formative understandings of SGS, its evidence-base and the actors – both 
individual and institutional – involved with its policy genesis. Second, to 
locate the names of HIV/AIDS experts who were cited as being involved 
with the development of SGS and its underlying evidence-base.  
 
Document analysis was therefore important in helping to gain formative 
understandings of SGS’s development, background to the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline, and to commence the process of identifying possible 
participants for interview. The approach taken to documentary analysis was 
informed by a thematic analysis approach. This particular form of analysis 
can facilitate pattern recognition, with emerging themes becoming the 
categories for analysis (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane: 2006: pp. 4). The process 
of thematic analysis requires a judicious, focused reading and review of the 
documentary data on multiple occasions (Bowen: 2009: pp. 32). While 
thematic analysis often involves coding and category construction, the 
purpose of the thematic analysis of SGS documentation was conducted to 
capture key overarching themes, recurring concepts, chronological 
information and to identify those key actors involved with the development 
of SGS itself. The analysis of documentation, in the early stages of the 
research project, was thus key in providing detailed understandings of SGS, 
and it enabled the researcher to commence the process of targeting 
participants for interview.  
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3.4.1 Process of identifying participants for interview 
 
UNAIDS/WHO documentation pertaining to SGS were reviewed to locate 
electronic contact information. Email addresses, that were located via 
document analysis, were used to send messages to both UNAIDS and the 
WHO (including: hiv-aids@who.int, unaids@unaids.org, 
publications@who.int, info@who.int and named HIV/AIDS experts 
published in the documentary material—usually found within the 
acknowledgments section). The emails sent to the addresses above initially 
made requests to locate additional sources of evidence which supported the 
development of SGS, and to gain a copy of the CD-ROM described in the list 
above (as it provided a compilation of basic materials that related to SGS). In 
the process of this email exchange the researcher secured access to two 
gatekeepers (one from UNAIDS and one from the WHO). These gatekeepers 
were emailed project information and were notified of my intent to conduct 
semi-structured interviews with HIV/AIDS experts directly involved with 
the development of SGS and the analysis of behavioural data used to create 
explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline of the 1990s. Usefully, one of the 
gatekeepers was directly involved with SGS and acted on my behalf to 
contact other HIV/AIDS experts within UNAIDS/WHO. In a short space of 
time, one of the gatekeepers had contacted other HIV/AIDS experts involved 
with SGS (and forwarded on my project information electronically which 
explained my wish to examine SGS, the Ugandan HIV decline, and the role 
of evidence in supporting its formal development).  
 
Thus, gatekeepers were used to help the researcher secure access to 
HIV/AIDS experts who had been directly involved with the development of 
SGS, and more broadly the analysis of the Uganda HIV prevalence decline, 
within UNAIDS/WHO in the 1990s. On the basis of suggestions advanced 
by one of the gatekeepers, a meeting was arranged at the headquarters of 
UNAIDS to liaise in person and to allow the researcher to hand out project 
information sheets and consent forms to HIV/AIDS surveillance experts in 
the headquarters of UNAIDS and the WHO. Once in Geneva, the researcher 
worked with the gatekeeper to implement a snowball sampling technique. 
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Snowballing is noted as being an effective technique for locating participants 
by asking others to identify individuals, or groups, with special 
understandings of specific phenomena (Ulin et al: 2005: pp. 58). It must be 
noted that the researcher was able to interact in a productive manner with 
the gatekeeper from UNAIDS, this subsequently enabled the researcher to 
meet other HIV/AIDS surveillance experts, to discuss my research project 
and to target potential participants for interview via snowballing. 
Discussions with the gatekeepers – and other HIV/AIDS experts within 
UNAIDS/WHO – was also essential in helping to commence the process of 
targeting HIV/AIDS experts from Uganda for formal interview. Focused 
discussions with HIV/AIDS experts in Geneva allowed the researcher to 
understand which Ugandan HIV/AIDS experts to target via email. It must 
be noted that a key gatekeeper was subsequently located within the 
Ugandan Ministry of Health (following discussions with experts within 
UNAIDS/WHO in Geneva). The researcher was then able to replicate the 
process of identifying additional participants for interview in person within 
Uganda. 
 
3.4.2 Role of semi-structured interviews with elites  
 
To generate data for analysis, semi-structured interviews with experts 
involved with the policy emergence of SGS and the analysis of Ugandan 
behavioural evidence used to advance explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
decline of the 1990s were conducted. Semi-structured interviewing is a well-
established approach for generating qualitative data with its core features 
including an interactional exchange of dialogue, a relatively informal style 
and a thematic, topic-centered, narrative approach (Mason: 2002: pp. 62). An 
additional key feature of semi-structured interviewing relates to the notion 
of knowledge being contextual and situated, which requires the researcher to 
guarantee that relevant contexts are brought into focus so that situated 





Importantly, during the interview process understandings and meanings are 
created in an interaction, in essence a co-production, which involves the 
construction and reconstruction of knowledge (Mason: 2002: pp. 62). Semi-
structured interviews can also be viewed as a social, or even a learning event, 
which have their own interactional rules wherein participants can discover, 
uncover or generate the rules of the game within the interview itself, whilst 
the interviewer can become more adept at interviewing, in relation to the 
techniques used to elicit responses (Holland & Ramazanoglu: 1994: pp. 135). 
The overarching motivation for using semi-structured interviews, as a 
method to generate data within this project, relates to the notion of flexibility. 
While acknowledging that is was my principal goal to elicit as much 
information about SGS, and the behavioural explanations accounting for the 
Ugandan HIV prevalence decline, it was important to allow the interviewees 
to talk from their own worldview via their own frames of reference, ideas 
and meanings that were familiar to them—and flexibility in the approach to 
interviewing was key to this taking place (Edwards & Holland: 2013: pp. 30). 
Noting the need to promote a flexible approach, each semi-structured 
interview was viewed, and conducted by the researcher, as a conversation 
with a purpose (Burgess: 1984: pp. 102) and it was attempted to make each 
interview a conversational partnership (Rubin & Rubin: 1995: pp. 10) rather 
than an asymmetric or top-down relationship.  
 
In relation to this project, the researcher conducted interviews with elites in 
order to generate context-rich data which could facilitate the subsequent 
analysis of both SGS and the broader contestation surrounding the Ugandan 
HIV prevalence decline and the role of evidence in the development of global 
HIV prevention policy. Richards (1996) maintains that interviewing elites can 
permit researchers to discover valuable insights into their own perceptions 
and detailed understandings of political events (Richards: 1996: pp. 199). It is 
also reasoned that elite interviews can facilitate one’s ability to capture 
information that is not officially recorded, and they can help researchers to 
interpret official documentation—particularly if one secures access to the 
authors responsible for putting together a relevant document or report 
(Richards: 1996: pp. 200).  
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Thus, by interviewing elites involved with the emergence of SGS and the 
analysis of data sources used to advance formative explanations for the 
Ugandan HIV prevalence decline it was possible for the researcher to unpack 
official narratives of SGS’s development, to engage with the authors of 
official SGS policy documentation, and to explore the broader contestation of 
explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline of the 1990s. The table below 
outlines the names of the participants interviewed in the project, their 
employment title and the frequency/kind of interviews with each 
participant: 
 



































































































In total, 29 semi-structured interviews were conducted with HIV/AIDS 
experts in Geneva and Uganda, with one interview being conducted in 
London at the Wellcome Trust and four interviews being conducted via 
Skype. The majority of the semi-structured interviews were conducted 
between August 2011 to February 2012. All but one of the interviews were 
conducted on a one-to-one basis, which was the approach the researcher 
sought to implement for each semi-structured interview. However, the first 
interview conducted during data collection ended up being more of a focus 
group—rather than a one-to-one interview (which was not planned or 
expected). During the first interview with Dr Txema Garcia-Calleja, other 
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HIV/AIDS experts (including Dr Mary Mahy and Dr Rand Stoneburner) 
were informed about my presence in the headquarters of UNAIDS. These 
HIV/AIDS experts subsequently entered the room, within which I was 
interviewing Dr Garcia-Calleja, and consequently were interviewed 
alongside Dr Garcia-Calleja. Naturally, this unexpected event changed the 
dynamics of the individual interview with Dr Garcia-Calleja. However, after 
explaining my need to interview participants in isolation, each expert agreed 
to be interviewed on their own at a future data.   
 
3.4.3 Conducting the semi-structured interviews  
 
Acknowledging the importance of trust in generating valid data for analysis, 
time was always taken to introduce myself to the participants whilst 
explaining the goals of the research project and my research background 
prior to the interview taking place. Issues relating to informed consent, and 
the option of participants’ comments being made anonymous, were also 
discussed – in detail – in advance of the interview commencing. Informed 
consent was obtained for every participant prior to the semi-structured 
interview taking place. 20 out of the 21 participants signed the consent form 
demonstrating that they were happy to be interviewed for this research, and 
that quotations could be directly attributed to them (see Appendix 1 for a 
copy of the project information sheet and consent form).  
 
However, one participant, when signing the consent form in Geneva, listed a 
range of extra conditions relating to the use of their information within the 
research project. Owing to the complexity of their additional requests 
(namely their wish to review, and physical amend, the verbatim transcribed 
interview data prior to it being presented within the thesis) it was decided to 
not include any direct quotations from this participant with attribution. 
While this participant did tick the box stating that they were happy to be 
interviewed for this research, and that quotations could be directly attributed 
to them, their additional conditions (and their wish to amend their own data) 
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could have changed the meaning of the narratives generated within the 
context of the semi-structured interview.  
 
To secure the informed consent with Dr Stefano Lazzari (who was the only 
participant the researcher did not meet in person), the consent form was 
emailed and signed by Dr Lazzari and a digital copy was emailed back to the 
researcher for safe keeping. Once informed consent was secured with Dr 
Lazzari, a Skype interview was conducted with the researcher in Geneva and 
Dr Lazzari in Tunis, Tunisia. Please note that informed consent with the 
other two participants interviewed via Skype had been secured in person 
during their principal interviews which took place in Geneva. Only one 
participant, who initially signed the consent form stating that they were 
happy to have quotations directly attributed to them changed their mind 
during data collection. During interview the participant stated that they were 
still happy to be interviewed (on the basis that all identifiable features were 
removed and that their participation in the research would not be disclosed). 
Thus, any identifiable features of this participant were removed in line with 
their request. Gaining informed consent was thus straightforward (as the 
vast majority of participants were happy to be interviewed and for their 
quotations to be directly attributed to them).  
 
As a researcher, it was attempted to maintain a friendly and receptive 
demeanour whilst being sensitive to the needs of each participant. Being 
sensitive to, and acting upon, the individual needs of my participants was 
central prior to the interview taking place and it ensured that participants’ 
questions, and their concerns, were addressed in order to facilitate an 
effective working partnership within the context of the semi-structured 
interview itself. In one instance a participant within UNAIDS was initially 
hesitant to be interviewed formally. However, after a careful discussion of 
my research aims (and an ice-breaking coffee in the UNAIDS cafeteria) it was 
possible to learn about the concerns of the participant and how best to 




Each interview commenced with questions that related to the historical 
development of SGS. In the interests of consistency, the following questions 
(or some variation of the questions below) were always asked at the start of 
each interview: Can you tell me how and why SGS came about?, Why did 
SGS come about?, Can you tell me why SGS was needed? These broad 
questions were posed in order to allow each participant to give me their 
distinct narratives, or oral histories, about the development of SGS and they 
were effective in opening up the discussion on my policy case study of 
interest. Questions were derived via document analysis – generally of key 
UNAIDS/WHO policy material which directly pertained to the development 
of SGS and its Ugandan evidence-base. Key UNAIDS/WHO documents 
(which were analysed prior to the commencement of the interviews taking 
place) allowed the researcher to formulate questions relating to the 
emergence of SGS, its evidence-base and the principal individual and 
institutions involved with its development. Key UNAIDS/WHO documents 
which were analysed to facilitate the development of questions asked during 
interview included: 
 
• UNAIDS (1998a) Reaching regional consensus on improved 
behavioural and serosurveillance for HIV: Report for a regional 
conference in East Africa: UNAIDS Best Practice Collection. 




• UNAIDS (1998b) A Measure of success in Uganda: The value of 
monitoring both HIV prevalence and sexual behaviour, UNAIDS Case 





• UNAIDS/WHO (2000) Guidelines for Second Generation HIV 
Surveillance for HIV: The Next Decade. 
WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/2000.5. Geneva. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/surveillance/en/cds_edc_2000_5.pdf 
 
Interviews were carried out according to a semi-structured topic guide. 
However, it is important to note that the semi-structured interviews did not 
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follow a predesigned interview script as the researcher wanted the dialectic 
to evolve in an emergent and free-flowing manner (for a list of additional 
questions that were advanced during interview see Appendix 2). 
 
During the interviews, reference was made to key UNAIDS/WHO policy 
documentation when discussing the historical development of SGS and the 
sources of evidence that were used to support its formal introduction in 2000. 
Indeed, when questions that related to the Ugandan sources of evidence 
used to support the development of SGS were given, hard copies of relevant 
UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation were made available for the 
participants to examine if necessary. Having these policy documents to hand 
during the interview was useful as it allowed certain participants to recall 
past events relating to the emergence of SGS and the creation of formative 
explanations for the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s—this 
potentially reduced retrospective recall issues. On occasion, handwritten 
notes were taken during the course of the semi-structured interviews to 
allow the researcher to return to key ideas or complex narratives that 
required further clarification. However, it was generally attempted to avoid 
taking notes during the interview as the researcher wanted to make clear that 
my full attention was given to the participants at all times. 
 
3.4.4 Tools used for data collection and the data transcription process 
 
Each interview conducted during data collection was audio recorded. Each 
audio recording was transcribed verbatim within 24 to 48 hours of the 
interview taking place. It was a self-imposed research rule to transcribe the 
interview data within this timeframe, as key points, key themes and 
interview nuance would otherwise have been overlooked or perhaps 
forgotten by the researcher. The level of transcription was highly detailed 
with pauses, coughs, hesitations and repetitions being transcribed. 
Transcribing the interview data was both labourious and time-consuming, 
however, in the process of transcribing the recorded interview data, the 
researcher started to gain much needed intimacy with the interview material 
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and rough patterns started to emerge from the interview data. Microsoft 
Word® 2008 was used to transcribe the audio files—each transcribed 
interview file was password protected to keep the interview data secure.  
 
3.5 Approach adopted for data analysis 
 
The researcher adopted an inductive approach to data analysis. Via the 
implementation of an inductive approach to data analysis, patterns, themes 
and categories emerge from the data rather than them being imposed on 
predefined categories or codes (Bradley et al: 2007: pp. 10). To organise the 
interview data, interview transcripts were reviewed, both in audio and 
written form, over a period of several months. By reviewing the interview 
data on multiple occasions it was possible to allow themes and patterns to 
emerge in a flexible manner. The role of iteration was key to the analytical 
approach implemented within this study. By revisiting the interview 
material on multiple occasions it was possible to make new connections and 
complex formulations in relation to what my data actually meant (Berkowitz: 
1997: pp. 8). It is important to state that the role of iteration was not a simple 
mechanical task but a deeply reflexive process that was useful in developing 
insight and formal meaning (Srivastava & Hopwood: 2009: pp. 23). 
Immersion in the qualitative interview data for several months was essential 
in helping to develop themes, sub-themes and overarching narrative 
patterns. While the process of data immersion was both time consuming and 
isolating, it led to the development of defined findings that pertained to the 
historical development of SGS, and the contestation surrounding the 
Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s. The physical procedure of 
data analysis within this study was highly tactile as interview transcripts 
were printed out, colour coordinated, cut into sections and displayed onto a 
results board. Hands-one intimacy with the interview data was important as 
it permitted the interview data to be physically organised which brought 




Data were also coded during the analysis phase. Coding was used as it 
possesses several advantages when analysing qualitative data, namely, it 
fractures the data into smaller aspects, thus freeing the researcher from 
description and forcing interpretations to higher levels or abstraction, it is a 
pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of core categories and it 
both follows up, and leads to, generative questions which can facilitate new 
insights and understandings (Strauss: 1987: pp. 134). The approach to coding 
was a highly inductive process, interview data were reviewed line-by-line 
and as a pattern in the data emerged a code was assigned. As the analysis 
developed, codes were continually assigned reflecting the themes that 
emerged from the interview data. As more data was analysed certain codes, 
that developed in the formative stages of data analysis, were adapted to 
reflect newer understandings of the interview data. The role of iteration was 
again key during the process of data coding in order to prevent the 
researcher from forcing preconceived results. Usefully, via the use of data 
coding overarching themes emerged from the interview data, which allowed 
the researcher to understand core aspects of the development of SGS and the 
identification of context-specific variables that appeared to shape the 
development of explanations for Uganda’s contested HIV decline of the 
1990s. 
 
It was noted that qualitative data analysis software could have been used to 
organise and code my interview data—specifically Nvivo 11. Indeed, Nvivo 
11 was initially tested in an attempt to assess its utility within the data 
analysis phase of the project. However, Nvivo 11 did not generate the 
intimacy that I needed as a researcher to analyse and thematically organise 
my qualitative interview data. In fact, when using Nvivo 11 I felt 
disconnected from the interview data and it was required to return to the 
methods outlined above. Key reasons for not using qualitative data analysis 
software are noted by Ulin et al (2005), and the following information 
resonates strongly with the data analysis process used within this study:  
 
It is possible to conduct qualitative analysis without a computer. 
For many decades qualitative researchers have used handwritten 
notes or transcribed verbatim interviews by hand. They have 
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underlined text, written codes into pages margins, or otherwise 
highlighted segments of print to distinguish ideas and messages. 
They have cut and pasted, sorted, and piled – organizing data 
around central themes. In fact, some researchers still worry that 
relying too much on computer shortcuts will impede the process 
by distancing them from the text (Ulin et al: 2005: pp. 151). 
 
Overall, the approach adopted for data analysis within this research project 
was based upon the notions of flexibility, induction and iteration. Via the 
systematic line-by-line analysis of the qualitative interview data over a 
period of several months, it was possible to allow key notions to emerge 
from the data itself rather than forcing out erroneous themes and findings.   
 
3.6 Ugandan research clearance and University of Edinburgh ethical 
protocols 
 
To undertake data collection within Uganda, it was legally required to 
submit an RS6 research clearance form to the Uganda National Council of 
Science and Technology (UNCST). UNCST is a semi-autonomous 
government agency that was created in 1990 to coordinate research and 
development activities within the country (UNCST: 2007: pp. 1). Once the 
RS6 was officially verified by UNCST, it was necessary for UNCST to inform 
the Office of the President that I wished to conduct research within the 
country. Once UNCST informed the President’s Office about my research 
project, approval was granted from the President’s Office. Having received 
approval from the Office of the President it was then required to report in 
person to the Resident District Commissioner within Kampala to show the 
appropriate letters of research approval from UNCST and the Office of the 
President (refer to Appendices 3 & 4 which display the letters of approval). 
Once the documentation was verified by the Regional District Commissioner 
within Kampala clearance to conduct my data collection within the country 
was formally granted. 
 
This research project required a Level 2 University of Edinburgh SSPS ethical 
audit to be conducted. This project warranted a Level 2 ethical audit as it was 
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felt that participants could potentially be adversely affected by my research 
findings once publically disseminated. In light of this risk, relevant solutions 
were created to mitigate possible problems from developing. Indeed, a Level 
2 ethical audit form was completed and relevant solutions were created to 
mitigate potential ethical dilemmas. 
 
3.7 Epistemological and ontological reflections 
 
While this research project is grounded within international public health 
policy, a transparent and reflexive approach to research necessitates that I 
outline my epistemological and ontological position. Although public health 
has traditionally been governed by epidemiological positivism and the desire 
to analyse reality through the rigorous application of a small range of 
quantitative techniques (Popay: 2003: pp. 59) the researcher does not 
subscribe to such positivist and reductionalist approaches. Indeed, the 
researcher adopts a post-positivist worldview subscribing to critical realism. 
Critical realism assumes the existence of a world that is independent of our 
perceptions of it (which echoes positivism), however, the world is accessible 
through our own subjectivity and senses (including those of the researcher – 
which echoes interpretative approaches). Those who adopt a critical realist 
worldview, are concerned with representing the structural order of the 
external, namely the social and the material world that underlies the 
experience of it, and they do not view scientific knowledge as the only means 
of accessing this order (Edwards & Holland: 2013 pp. 22). A critical realist 
epistemology is adopted by the researcher as it denies the idea that we can 
possess any ‘objective’ knowledge about the world around us and we must 
accept the possibility of alternative valid accounts of any study phenomena 
(Maxwell: 2012: pp. 5). Furthermore, critical realists subscribe to an 
ontological worldview in which a social world exists independent of our 
perceptions, whilst simultaneously accepting a form of epistemological 
constructivism—which contends that the world is inevitably constructed 
from our own standpoints and perspectives (Maxwell: 2012: pp. 5). Thus, 
critical realism rejects positivist epistemologies and the simple idea that 
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science can ‘get at truth’. In essence, the researcher is critical of our ability to 
understand reality and the adoption of a post-positivist epistemology allows 
the researcher to appreciate the fallibility of observation and the idea that 
knowledge construction itself is an imperfect process.   
 
3.7.1 Researcher reflexivity 
 
It is important to acknowledge that my individual perspectives, and my 
underlying epistemological position, will have influenced the collection and 
interpretation of the qualitative interview material created during the data 
collection phase of the study. While it is important to state that the interview 
data, which emerged during the semi-structured interviews, was co-
constructed by the participant and the researcher, the actual process of data 
analysis was undertaken by the researcher in isolation. It is therefore 
important to discuss my reflexive nature to understand the potential 
influence that I had upon the qualitative data created within the research 
project itself.  
 
During the course of this research project, the most critical issue that 
required regular reflection by the researcher, especially within the context of 
the semi-structured interviews, were my underlying beliefs about the role of 
evidence within the broader policymaking process. Importantly, my 
academic background (which is a mélange of political science and public 
health) initially led the researcher to possess strong normative opinions 
about how evidence should inform subsequent policy output in a directional 
and rational manner. Indeed, my original research project (as outlined above) 
sought to examine and critically assess evidence used to support the GBD 
estimates for HIV/AIDS within the context of Uganda (from an 
epidemiological worldview). It was my original wish to assess the ‘strength’ 
of the evidence used to support the development of the GBD estimates—
whilst discussing the good and bad characteristics of the evidence itself. 
These notions gradually eroded as the direction of the project evolved and 
94	
	
my knowledge about the complexity surrounding the relationship between 
evidence and policy grew. However, at times during data collection and data 
analysis the researcher found it difficult to maintain a critical perspective on 
narratives from participants (or findings from data analysis) which 
illustrated that evidence used to support the development of SGS had been 
influenced by political and institutional factors. Indeed, the 
acknowledgement that evidence had moved within the policymaking 
process in a complex (or non-linear) manner was initially difficult for the 
researcher to comprehend as (according to my older worldview) the 
evidence supporting the development of SGS should have moved through the 
policymaking process in a logical and unproblematic manner (with good 
evidence informing policy and bad evidence being filtered out).  
It was equally problematic to learn about the non-movement of evidence 
within the confines of the semi-structured interviews, as the views from my 
participants challenged my own underlying normative assumptions about 
the role of evidence within policymaking. However, critical reflection during 
the process of data transcription permitted the researcher to think more 
broadly about the role of evidence within policymaking and to work with, 
rather than against, the complex narratives that were advanced by my 
participants during the semi-structured interviews. Via a process of critical 
reflection, which took place during data collection, the researcher was able to 
adapt his old worldview pertaining to the use of evidence within the 
policymaking process, which therefore allowed the researcher to understand 
better the values and worldviews of my participants during data collection. 
 
3.8 Methodological limitations 
 
There are four key limitations pertaining to the methods used within this 
research project namely: limitations with the case-study method (in terms of 
data generalisability), the inability to locate, and analyse, two key sources of 
Ugandan evidence, which were used to support the development of SGS and 
to create formative explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline, problems 
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with gaining access to certain HIV/AIDS experts for interview—especially 
within UNAIDS and recall bias. 
 
It must be noted that the case-study method has often been criticised for 
lacking scientific rigour and providing a small degree of generalisability—
meaning that findings relating to the case study under analysis may not be 
transferable to other contexts (Crowe et al: 2011: pp. 7). It is also maintained 
by Yin (2009) that the greatest concern, in relation to the case study method, 
is the lack of rigour on the part of individual researchers (namely their 
inability to not follow systematic procedures or to allow equivocal evidence, 
or biased views, to influence the direction of findings and conclusions). An 
additional limitation of the case study method is that they take too long to 
implement and they often result in massive unreadable documents (Yin: 
2009: pp. 15). Using a policy case-study (i.e. SGS) to examine how 
explanations advanced for the decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence were 
contested, and the role of evidence in the development of global HIV 
prevention policy will ultimately lead to the production of context-specific 
and esoteric findings. Thus, their wider generalisability in relation to the 
existing body of literature about the contested Uganda HIV prevalence 
decline maybe limited.  
 
While attempts were made to locate relevant sources of documentary 
evidence pertaining to the development of SGS (in order to examine the 
broader Ugandan HIV prevalence decline and its contested nature), it must 
be noted that two key sources of evidence (which were cited within official 
UNAIDS documentation as being key to the introduction of SGS) could not 
be located for formal analysis. This must be acknowledged as a significant 
limitation. Within UNAIDS (1998a) it is claimed that two Ugandan 
population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change (conducted in 1989 
and 1995) were used to demonstrate the value of behavioural surveillance 
data, and how this kind of data could be compared within serosurveillance 
data. Thus, these two population-based surveys were key in justifying the 
behavioural component of SGS—whilst concurrently providing sexual 
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behavioural change evidence that could help explain declining HIV trends 
within Uganda in the mid-1990s. These sources of  evidence have been 
described by UNAIDS as “the best data so far” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) and 
‘centrepiece’ data which generated an idea of changes in current behaviour 
in various age groups in urban settings within Uganda (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 
5).  
Acknowledging the significance of the 1989 and 1995 population-based 
surveys of sexual behavioural change, as being key to the conceptual 
development of SGS, and formative explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
decline of the 1990s, careful searches to locate these sources of evidence were 
implemented. Despite online literature searching, bibliographic tracing and 
asking HIV/AIDS experts involved with the creation, and analysis of, these 
specific sources of evidence in person, it was not possible to locate these two 
sources of evidence which were seemingly key to SGS’s development (and to 
the creation of formative explanations of Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence 
decline of the early to mid-1990s). This is a significant limitation given the 
apparent centrality of these documents in relation to the development of SGS 
and formative explanations the could account for the Ugandan HIV 
seroprevalence decline of the 1990s.  
Securing access to prospective participants, via the use of gatekeepers and 
snowball sampling, was not always successful in practice. While contact 
details of prospective participants were provided by gatekeepers within 
UNAIDS/WHO, certain prospective participants failed to reply to my 
requests to be formally interviewed. While emails were sent by the 
researcher to potential participants, certain individuals did not reply to my 
requests (which thus reduced the sample size within the study which is a 
limitation). While 29 HIV/AIDS experts were interviewed as part of this 
study, the absence of key policymakers consenting to be interviewed – 
especially within UNAIDS/WHO – has an effect upon the validity and 
broader generalisability of the empirical findings presented in the 
subsequent results chapters. While the data generated from the 29 interviews 
are of sufficient quality and quantity to make inferences about the Ugandan 
HIV decline, its contested nature, and the role of evidence in the 
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development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s, the sample size of this 
study means that definitive statements relating to the aforementioned issues 
cannot be presented. While multiple attempts were made to interview 
HIV/AIDS experts and senior policymakers within UNAIDS/WHO to gain 
data for subsequent analysis, many individuals either declined to be 
interviewed – citing a lack of expertise – or they simply did not respond to 
my email requests.    
 
It must be noted that the interview data generated within this study related 
to events from the mid to late-1990s. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that the empirical data generated within the study were subject 
to recall bias. This can undermine the internal validity of studies utilising 
self-reported data (Hassan: 2005: pp. 1). The researcher used physical print 
outs of UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation as a prompt to help 
interviewees to remember past events and previous actions. Although the 
recall of information depends entirely on human memory, which is 
inevitably imperfect and unreliable (Hassan: 2005: pp. 1), the combination of 
using policy documentation as a mental prompt and giving the participants 
time to reflect upon their life histories were useful techniques in an attempt 
to mimimise this particular form of bias. It is also possible that some of the 
interviewees may have reinterpreted or selectively remembered events 
relating to the analysis of Ugandan behavioural evidence in the 1990s. This 
may be especially likely when these events have taken on particular 
significance for the person in question. Therefore it is important to 
acknowledge that the qualitative data generated within this project were 
subject to recall bias – especially in relation to the analysis and utilisation of 
Ugandan behavioural evidence in the 1990s.      
 
3.9 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter described the qualitative research design adopted within the 
project, the salience of the case study research method and how SGS was 
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located as a case study to examine how explanations advanced for the 
decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence were contested, and the role of evidence 
in the development of global HIV prevention policy. A detailed description 
of the semi-structured interviews was advanced, making clear the 
importance of gaining trust prior to the interview taking place, and the 
significance of flexibility during the interview process itself. The tools used 
for data collection and the approach adopted for data transcription was 
outlined, elucidating that the transcription process was highly detailed, with 
the process of transcription taking place within 24 – 48 hours of the 
interviews occurring. The approach adopted for data analysis was given, 
making clear that an inductive approach was taken to gain meaning from the 
qualitative interview data. The process of gaining UNCST research clearance 
and University of Edinburgh SSPS ethical protocols, that were addressed 
prior to the data collection phase were examined. The researchers’ critical 
realist epistemological position was discussed, making clear the need to push 
away from epidemiological positivism and reductionalist worldviews when 
studying within the field of public health.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: Examining the role of evidence in 
global HIV prevention policy development via the 
emergence of SGS and its evidence-base 
 
4.1 Introduction to chapter  
 
It was demonstrated in the introduction chapter that UNAIDS (1998a) 
framed the emergence of SGS as a problem-solving adaptation to older HIV 
surveillance approaches supported by Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
evidence. In fact, it was claimed by UNAIDS (1998a) that SGS emerged in 
reaction to the idea that behavioural surveillance data could be used to build 
upon older, serologically focused, HIV surveillance approaches in an 
ostensibly rational manner. UNAIDS (1998a) present SGS as having emerged 
at one specific event—namely a UNAIDS funded HIV surveillance consensus 
building workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1997:  
 
Surveillance systems appropriate in the early days of the [HIV] 
epidemic need to be adapted and built upon as our knowledge 
grows. UNAIDS sponsored the Nairobi workshop on improved 
surveillance with this in mind. The workshop succeeded in 
illustrating the potential for using behavioural data to interpret 
serological trends and in suggesting what countries might aim 
for in a “second generation” of surveillance activities (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 5). 
 
Given the apparent centrality of the Nairobi workshop in the emergence of 
SGS and broader discussions relating to the development of HIV/AIDS 
prevention policy (via the analysis of Ugandan behavioural evidence 
presented at the workshop itself) this chapter aims to achieve two key 
objectives. First, to examine developments in global HIV prevention policy in 
the 1990s – particularly the introduction of SGS – including the role and use 
of evidence from Uganda in this policy. Second, to examine the Nairobi 
workshop in detail and to explore the underlying sources of evidence that 
were apparently drawn on to support the development of SGS itself. To 
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achieve this the chapter will examine the historical emergence of SGS in the 
1990s and its evidence-base supported by interview material from 
HIV/AIDS experts who attended, or knew about, the workshop itself. Such 
examination is required to address aspects of the core aim of this thesis, 
namely to examine contested explanations for the decline in HIV prevalence 
in Uganda and the role of evidence in the development of global HIV 
prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
4.2 Examining the 1997 Nairobi Workshop  
 
UNAIDS (1998a) claim that SGS emerged between the 10th – 13th of February 
1997 at an HIV surveillance workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 3). The workshop was presented as having been held to examine 
the strengths and weaknesses of existing HIV surveillance systems within 
the East African region in order to locate ways to enhance both 
serosurveillance and behavioural surveillance approaches respectively 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Additionally, the workshop is described as having 
aimed to explore the links between behavioural surveillance and sentinel 
surveillance and to create cooperative links between epidemiologists and 
social scientists. It also sought to generate an East African dialogue focusing 
on enhancing HIV surveillance which would ensure UNAIDS support for the 
process (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). It is claimed that the workshop was 
attended by AIDS programme managers, government epidemiologists, 
specialists from UNAIDS, partner institutions and social scientists from 
Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). The table below displays the individuals who 







Table 6: Attendees of the workshop, their institutional affiliation and their role 






































The table indicates that there were 33 attendees of the workshop. 6 attendees 
came from UNAIDS, with Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention, 
taking the role of chairperson at the workshop itself. 2 attendees came from 
the United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID) with an 
additional 2 attendees coming from the US Census Bureau. 3 attendees came 
from the Ugandan Ministry of Health, 2 attendees came from the Kenyan 
Ministry of Health. 2 attendees came from Zambia, 2 from Tanzania and 1 
from Swaziland. 5 attendees of the workshop came from HIC academic 
institutions or consultancy settings. 8 attendees also attended the workshop, 
providing technical and expert input relating to HIV/AIDS surveillance 
development at the workshop itself.     
 
The theme of the centrality of the workshop, in relation to the formal 
development of SGS, was emphasised by the majority of the participants 
interviewed during data collection. Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS 
external consultant, described the workshop as the “crunch point” (Pisani: 
31/8/2011) in relation the development of SGS. This claim was reinforced by 
Daniel Tarantola, a former senior employee of the GPA/former senior policy 
advisor to the Director General of the WHO, who described the workshop as 
“important” to the formal development of SGS (Tarantola: 27/10/2011). 
Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, similarly 
claimed that the workshop was the “meeting where second generation 
surveillance evolved” (Stoneburner: 26/10/2011). The workshop was also 
described as the “main genesis” of SGS by Wilford Kirungi, a senior 
epidemiologist from the Ugandan Ministry of Health. Joshua Musinguzi, the 
control programme manager of HIV/AIDS within the Ugandan Ministry of 
Health, claimed that the workshop as “an open meeting where we [Ugandan 
Ministry of Health] presented our surveys…we presented our antenatal 
clinic data” (Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). Musinguzi also asserted that the 
workshop was an opportunity for attendees to: 
 
Throw issues on the table…then in subsequent discussions and 
in the group work…that’s when people were beginning to come 
up with, how we move this [SGS] forward to have an approach 
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that is systematic…that puts things together in protocols that can 
help countries go back and collect data (Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
 
However, a contradictory narrative about the function of the workshop, in 
relation to the development of SGS, was advanced by Michel Caraël, former 
head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS and chairperson of the workshop 
itself: 
 
I wouldn’t overemphasise the workshop. For sure, the workshop 
is one point where you put everybody together…but it is not the 
workshop who [sic] convinced the people. The people were 
convinced before the workshop (Caraël: 20/09/2011). 
 
This narrative is incongruous as it appears to be inconsistent with the 
majority of interviewees who highlighted the significance of the workshop in 
helping develop SGS. It also appears to contradict official UNAIDS accounts 
that describe the historical development of SGS (as UNAIDS policy literature 
states that SGS formally emerged at the workshop itself). Given the 
significance of Michel Caraël at the workshop, and his function as head of 
HIV prevention within UNAIDS at the time of the workshop, it is interesting 
to discover that he appears to promote the idea that the development of SGS 
perhaps occurred at an earlier point in time.    
 
4.3 Examining the structure of the 1997 Nairobi workshop 
 
The workshop commenced by analysing a Ugandan case study presentation 
which was given by Ministry of Health officials from the Ugandan 
Government (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Those presenting at this stage of the 
workshop included: Joshua Musinguzi, Alex Opio and Godwil Asiimwe-
Okiror who were epidemiologists and senior HIV/AIDS specialists from the 
Ugandan Ministry of Health. The role of Ugandan HIV surveillance data 
presented at the workshop was highlighted by Joshua Musinguzi, the control 
programme manager of HIV/AIDS within the Ugandan Ministry of Health, 
who described the manner in which Uganda’s HIV prevalence data, which 
indicated a decline in HIV infection, were discussed at the workshop: 
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…that is when the meeting in Nairobi was organised and as a 
country we thought it would be helpful for us [Ugandan 
Ministry of Health officials] to go and present. And I think at that 
time…there were very few countries…if not only us [Uganda] in 
this region who were observing declining [HIV] trends. So our 
presentation was especially interesting for many other countries 
where the [HIV] epidemic was either stable or actually rising 
(Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
The notion of declining HIV trends emerging from the Ugandan surveillance 
data was claimed to be an object of tremendous excitement at the workshop 
by Musinguzi:  
 
Even in the presentation we had in Nairobi there was a lot of 
excitement. For the first time in an African country we are seeing 
something…some kind of impact on the [HIV] epidemic. 
Whether that’s because of the behaviour, whether it was because 
of the natural trend of the [HIV] epidemic…but at least we were 
seeing something and it was so exciting...it was very exciting. 
And I think it drove momentum further for everybody to 
see…let’s understand the dynamics…the drive for second 
generation was really strong after those 
presentations…especially after our [Ugandan Ministry of Health] 
presentation (Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
Once the presentation and analysis of the Ugandan surveillance data was 
complete, other presentations from the aforementioned participant East 
African countries were given. UNAIDS (1998a) does not directly state which 
countries gave presentations after the Ugandan case study was outlined. 
However, it is likely that subsequent country presentations were given by 
attendees from: Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The 
only other country which is directly cited within UNAIDS policy 
documentation, in terms of presenting HIV surveillance data at the 
workshop, is Zambia.  
 
According to UNAIDS (1998a) data from Zambia, produced by Knut 
Fylkesnes 5  were presented at the workshop. This study presented 
																																																								
5 	Fylkesnes, K. (1998) The first Zambian population-based HIV survey: 




information which compared sentinel surveillance data with results from a 
survey of HIV prevalence within the general population (UNAIDS: 1998a: 
pp. 10). Importantly, the HIV prevalence data presented within this study, 
after discussion in the workshop were re-analysed by single year of age 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 11). This, at the time, novel year-by-year analysis of 
surveillance data departed from the traditional approach of presenting HIV 
prevalence data aggregated by five-year age groups. By examining HIV 
prevalence data by single year of age, their analysis illustrated the 
importance of “gathering behavioural data, rather than jumping to 
conclusions about behaviour from purely epidemiological evidence” 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 12).  
 
This conclusion was arrived at as the previous surveillance data analysis, 
which had been analysed according to traditional five-year age groups, gave 
misleading indications of behavioural change in the youngest age cohorts. 
UNAIDS (1998a) also claim that the Zambian data presented at the workshop 
validated “the crucial importance of looking at data by single year of age if 
we are to understand trends in infection” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 12). The role 
of Zambian data presented at the workshop was also emphasised by 
Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS external consultant: 
 
We sat in that meeting [Nairobi] and we farted around with 
different data sets that were available…which were not very 
many. One of the people who was there was Knut [Fylkesnes] 
who was working at that time in Zambia. And he had the raw 
data set with him…their surveillance data. So we all sat there 
and said well what if we could look at younger age 
groups…different from older age groups (Pisani: 31/08/2011). 
 
Pisani then claimed that the aforementioned Zambian data were re-analysed 
overnight during the course of the workshop by Knut Fylkesnes:  
 
And then we all went out and drank very heavily…and had a 
very funny dinner…and then the next morning…Knut 
[Fylkesnes] was really excited because he stayed up all night 
reanalysing his data…and showed that there were distinct 
differences in trends by age…so that gives you an indication of 




Pisani’s narrative, consistent with UNAIDS policy documentation, suggests 
that Zambian data appear to have played a role in helping to justify the need 
to integrate behavioural surveillance data alongside serological surveillance 
to improve established HIV surveillance approaches and broader HIV 
prevention policy. Once the Ugandan and Zambian presentations were 
complete, the attendees of the workshop spilt into two groups to work on 
improvements in behavioural and serosurveillance systems respectively 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Following the group work, a plenary session was 
held which presented the recommendations generated during the group 
work. The recommendations that were voiced at the plenary session “became 
the departure point for country working groups” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). 
After the plenary session, epidemiologists and social scientists from the 
participating countries worked together on country specific plans, 
synthesising the recommendations on improving HIV surveillance created 
by themselves and their colleagues throughout the duration of the workshop 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Following the country presentations, group work 
and plenary discussions six outcomes of the workshop were formally 
advanced within subsequent UNAIDS best practice guidelines. The six key 
outcomes of the workshop included:  
 
• The establishment of the major components of second-generation 
systems; 
 
• The successful identification of major limitations in current HIV 
surveillance systems;  
 
• The creation of recommendations to enhance existing systems in 
certain areas of monitoring and data collection;  
 
• Illustrated the significance of collecting behavioural data to inform 




• Catalysed action plans for synthesising the conclusion of the Nairobi 
workshop into domestic surveillance activities; 
 
• Helped to build up effective partnerships between behavioural 
scientists and epidemiologists within the East African region 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 12). 
 
UNAIDS (1998a) finally claims that it formulated guidelines for SGS as a 
direct outcome of the workshop itself:   
 
As a consequence of the workshop, UNAIDS has already 
formulated guidelines for second-generation surveillance. These 
will cover recommendations for sentinel serosurveillance and 
behavioural surveillance, and will be made available to all 
countries (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 12).  
 
Having examined the internal structure of the workshop, it is now important 
to explore the evidence used to support the policy development of SGS in 
greater detail. This is required to determine which sources of evidence were 
used to support the development of SGS, and to understand if the claims 
surrounding the significance of its Ugandan evidence-base, as advanced by 
UNAIDS (1998a; 1998b), are fully comprehensive.  
 
4.4 Mapping out the evidence supporting the development of SGS—
competing narratives from interviewees 
 
A range of competing narratives were provided by interviewees relating to 
the sources of evidence used to support the development of SGS and where 
they emanated from. Four themes were identified in relation to the evidence 
used to support the introduction of SGS. First, the theme that older HIV 
surveillance data, produced during the time of WHO’s GPA, were used to 
support SGS. Second, the role of Ugandan evidence and the development of 
SGS, which is broadly congruent with existing UNAIDS policy literature. 
Third, the theme that Ugandan evidence was not relevant to the 
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development of SGS—which appears to contradict UNAIDS policy 
documentation. Fourth, the role of other sources of sexual behavioural 
evidence, namely data that emerged from the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 
United States in the 1980s onwards, and its association with the development 
of SGS. In the process of examining the evidence used to support the 
introduction of SGS, the following four sections will also begin to introduce 
key individuals (namely HIV/AIDS experts) involved with the development 
of SGS and broader global HIV prevention policy—they are described in 
order to gain formative understandings of who did what and when in 
relation to SGS and HIV/AIDS policy development in the 1990s. However, it 
must be noted that the evidence mapping within the following four sections, 
and the identification of relevant HIV/AIDS experts involved with the 
development of SGS and broader HIV/AIDS policy development, serves a 
mainly descriptive purpose, namely, to allow this chapter to ascertain who 
did what on the basis of which sources of evidence in relation to SGS. Such 
description will allow subsequent chapters to understand better the role of 
evidence used to support the introduction of SGS, the key HIV/AIDS experts 
involved the analysis of SGS’s evidence-base and the development of 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy in the 1990s. 
 
4.4.1 Long-term GPA evidence and the development of SGS 
 
The first theme relates to long-term GPA surveillance data sources being 
referred to as evidence to support the development of SGS. Txema Garcia-
Calleja, a senior epidemiologist from WHO, claimed that multiple sources of 
evidence from GPA were used to support the development of SGS. Garcia-
Calleja asserted that the evidentiary basis for SGS can be traced back to early 
behavioural surveillance surveys that were created by GPA in the early 
1990s: 
 
There were a lot of data…I mean what happened is in the 1990s 
the Global Programme on AIDS started promoting national 




Garcia-Calleja also named individual decision-makers who were involved 
with early GPA behavioural surveys conducted in the 1990s, which included 
Daniel Low-Beer and Rand Stoneburner who were former GPA employees:  
 
There was Daniel Low-Beer…there was also Rand Stoneburner 
involved with [HIV] surveillance data…and Rand [Stoneburner] 
use to work with and Daniel [Low-Beer] with the Global 
Programme of AIDS in the 1990s (Garcia-Calleja: 05/08/2011).  
 
The role of Michel Caraël in relation to GPA surveillance data sources, which 
helped support the development of SGS, was also emphasised by Garcia-
Calleja:  
 
…the 1990s the Global Programme on AIDS it was with Michel 
Caraël…he’s another former WHO/UNAIDS colleague…they 
were promoting national household behavioural surveys it was 
funded by the Global Programme on AIDS…national 
behavioural surveys…only about HIV/AIDS. So it was lots of 
countries…lots of data and there are several papers by Michel 
Caraël about these results in different surveys (Garcia-Calleja: 
05/08/2011).  
 
Echoing the above claim, a former UNAIDS official contends that evidence 
supporting the introduction of SGS came about from “a number of papers by 
Michel Caraël” (former UNAIDS official: 25/10/2011). These papers, which 
were created by Michel Caraël whilst working within the GPA, showed that 
behavioural surveillance approaches could be used to understand better the 
behavioural drivers of HIV transmission which, in turn, could be used to aid 
the development of wider HIV/AIDS prevention policy: 
 
I think you have a number of papers by Michel Caraël…because 
I read all these papers…and there was more and more evidence 
that if you had safer behaviours that it was going to reduce [HIV] 
incidence (former UNAIDS official: 25/10/2011). 
 
Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, also 
claimed that previous GPA surveillance studies created in the early 1990s 




I think to me it [evidence for SGS] came out in very early in the 
early 1990s…where I was in WHO…in the Global Programme on 
AIDS. And we [GPA] were trying to look at the diversity on 
sexual behaviour. I was in a research unit…and we would 
launch…what we called the comparative population 
survey…about sexual behaviour and we started to develop an 
analysis of risk behaviours for HIV…associated with sexual 
behaviour. So from there, I got the impression that despite many 
biases in the reporting in sexual behaviour…there was a 
possibility to record this type of data (Caraël: 20/09/2011). 
 
4.4.2 Ugandan evidence and the development of SGS 
 
A second theme relates to the role of Ugandan evidence used to support the 
development of SGS. Manuel Carbello, the former chief of behavioural 
research at the GPA maintains that an analysis of Ugandan data conducted 
by Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, were relevant 
sources of evidence that supported the development of SGS: 
 
Rand [Stoneburner] has done a lot of work…for example with 
Uganda data and I think that Rand [Stoneburner] would be 
among the first to say that if we had taken the Uganda…for 
example Rakai data…and then the Kampala and Entebbe data at 
face value it wouldn’t have told us anything about who was 
getting the message…and what interventions were beginning to 
work. And I think that Rand’s data analysis basically showed 
that the number of new cases of HIV was indeed coming 
down…but only in selected groups (Carbello: 20/09/2011). 
 
Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, also emphasised 
the centrality of Ugandan data relating to the development of SGS and 
broader HIV prevention policy development. Stoneburner noted that two 
population-based sexual behavioural surveys conducted in 1989 and 1995 
were used to understand sexual behavioural change within the country. 
Stoneburner maintained that these behavioural data sources from Uganda 
helped to assemble the SGS approach from the mid-1990s onwards “second 
generation surveillance kind of started with what was cobbled together 
within Uganda” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). Stoneburner also commented on 
the seemingly intuitive nature of using the 1989 and 1995 Ugandan 
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behavioural surveys to help improve older, serologically focused, HIV 
surveillance approaches:    
 
…we have these [1989 and 1995] behavioural surveys…let’s put 
them together…wasn’t that interesting. It wasn’t a policy…let’s 
do second generation surveillance investigators already said well 
we have this data…of course it’s reasonable let’s just look at 
them (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). 
 
Building upon his earlier GPA evidence narrative, Txema Garcia-Calleja, a 
senior epidemiologist from WHO, also highlighted the central role of 
Ugandan behavioural data in developing the SGS approach. Data below 
illustrate the manner in which different decision-makers sought to use 
Ugandan data to improve older HIV surveillance methodological 
approaches: 
 
But the highlight was Uganda because there was a declining 
[HIV] prevalence…and changes in sexual behaviour…and 
Daniel Low-Beer and Rand Stoneburner…they were involved 
with the analysis of the data. And then Elizabeth [Pisani] and 
Bernhard [Schwartländer] they used this as an example…to look 
at it from different sources…and they kind of knew the idea 
of…okay lets promote [HIV] surveillance again and lets try to 
pull up together…not only HIV prevalence…but…as I say with 
other parameters (Garcia-Calleja: 05/08/2011). 
 
The central role of Ugandan data was also asserted within UNAIDS policy 
documentation (UNAIDS: 1998a; UNAIDS: 1998b). Within: ‘Reaching 
Regional Consensus on Improved Behavioural and Serosurveillance for HIV 
– Report from a Regional Conference in East Africa’ (UNAIDS Best Practice 
Collection Key Material: 1998) a subsection named “the best data so far” 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) mentions that “centrepiece” (UNAIDS: 1998a pp. 5) 
data presented at the workshop emanated from urban areas in Uganda 
where a significant decrease in HIV prevalence had been recorded, especially 
in younger age groups (UNAIDS: 1998a pp. 5). Reference is also made to an 
earlier UNAIDS study named: ‘A Measure of Success in Uganda’ (1998b) 
which remains part of UNAIDS’ Best Practice Collection. This earlier 
UNAIDS document was purported to demonstrate “a plausible link between 
the epidemiological data showing declining HIV prevalence in urban areas 
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and behavioural data showing growing adoption of safer sex among youths” 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 12). This earlier UNAIDS study was therefore 
important in providing support for linking behaviour change data with 
serological data sources and in understanding the sexual behavioural change 
reasons that could account for the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline. The 
UNAIDS (1998a) report also claims that Ugandan Ministry of Health 
officials, attending the workshop were able to make reference to two 
population-based surveys on sexual behavioural change from 1989 and 1995. 
These studies “gave an idea of changes in current behaviour in various age 
groups in urban settings” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5).  
 
These two 1989 and 1995 population-based Ugandan surveys were presented 
alongside “evidence compiled from more than 300 smaller-scale sociological 
studies” (UNAIDS: 1998a pp. 5) which strongly suggested “a rise in the age 
at first sex and more use of condoms in cities” (UNAIDS: 1998a pp. 5). The 
300 smaller-scale sociological studies were described as having been 
reviewed by Tom Barton, an anthropologist, under the direct instruction of 
Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS and the 
chair of the workshop. During interview, Michel Caraël commented on the 
manner in which he instructed Tom Barton to conduct the review of the 
Ugandan studies: 
 
I was the one who contacted [Tom] Barton…who was a friend at 
the time. He reviewed not 300 but probably 150 a very light 
review I should say…it was useful showing…a lot of 
studies…really captured in Uganda…you know? Showing some 
evidence of behavioural change there (Caraël: 20/09/2011). 
 
However, the 300 small-scale sociological surveys reviewed by 
anthropologist Tom Barton, under the instruction of Michel Caraël, appears 
to be a contested and complex issue. The following data begin to introduce 
the complexity: 
 
Interviewer: I would really appreciate if I could try and find those 300 





Michel Caraël: Okay…there was a conflict there because we were 
in conflict with Rand Stoneburner with this journalist…who is 
linked to Daniel Halperin…what is her name? Who wrote on 
Uganda… 
 
Interviewer: Helen Epstein? 
 
Michel Caraël: Helen Epstein…is really somebody dishonest. I 
mean that…I wouldn’t trust [her] for anything…I mean…she 
was accusing me of having deleted the conclusion of [Tom] 
Barton…because it wouldn’t meet my expectations…let’s say or 
something like that…because I was…she said…promoting 
condom use despite the evidence that condom use were [sic] not 
working…so for me it’s like rewriting the history again (Caraël: 
20/09/2011). 
 
It was also claimed by Rand Stoneburner, a former senior GPA/UNAIDS 
epidemiologist, that there were “misadventures” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011) 
in relation to the Ugandan behavioural data that were used to develop the 
SGS approach and to gain formative understandings of the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline at the workshop:  
 
They [UNAIDS] were moving to second generation…I was at the 
meeting in Nairobi and yeah it was a great foundation for 
building it…but when you talk about Uganda there were some 
misadventures let’s say (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). 
 
Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS external consultant, also advanced a 
complex narrative which relates to Uganda’s HIV prevalence decline 
‘success’ story. Data advanced by Pisani suggest that there were issues 
between certain individual decision-makers relating to the sexual 
behavioural change reasons contributing to Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story:  
 
I don’t know what Rand [Stoneburner] told you…but the reason 
that so much effort was put into that [explaining HIV decline 
within Uganda] was partly because there was a catfight going 
on. So Uganda was a success story…we declared it a success 
story…we have declared it as a success...so now why is it a 
success? So there’s a giant catfight going on about why it 




In the process of explaining this “catfight” (Pisani: 31/08/2011) amongst 
decision-makers, Pisani advanced the names of decision-makers who were 
involved with interpreting the emerging HIV decline narrative, and the 
behavioural change reasons contributing to the HIV decline itself within 
Uganda: 
 
So this guy called…what’s his name...Green? He’s completely 
loopy…anyway he decided that it was because of more 
abstinence…because of a rise in age at first sex in Uganda…that’s 
what explained it. And then Rand [Stoneburner] decided that it 
was partly about…they were proving that it’s about 
abstinence…and that it was about partner reduction…and so we 
felt the need to prove that it was about condoms…and it was a 
stupid, stupid, stupid catfight which actually just took up an 
awful lot of time and energy…and everyone was just pissing on 
one another’s patch (Pisani: 31/08/2011). 
 
The data above are beginning to highlight that there is a degree of 
complexity relating to Ugandan behavioural data sources used to support 
the development of SGS which is interlinked with an overarching narrative, 
specifically the process of understanding which specific sexual behavioural 
change reasons were contributing to declining HIV prevalence rates within 
the country. These contested narratives which relate to “conflict” (Caraël: 
20/09/2011) and “misadventures” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011) will be 
explored in greater analytical detail in the two following results chapters (as 
it is the function of this chapter to describe and introduce the actual sources 
of evidence used to support the development of SGS itself). Having outlined 
the role of Ugandan evidence in supporting the introduction of SGS, which 
appears to be a contested issue, it is now appropriate to introduce other 
themes relating to the evidence used to support the development of SGS 
itself. This is undertaken to demonstrate a greater level of complexity 
surrounding the evidence used to support the development of SGS, and the 
finding that Ugandan evidence may not have been as central to SGS’s 
introduction (which thus appears to contradict aspects of the narratives 




4.4.3 Ugandan evidence not being relevant to the development of SGS 
 
It was claimed by Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS external consultant, 
that data from Uganda were not central to the introduction of SGS “we 
didn’t even look at it” (Pisani: 31/08/2011). Pisani maintains that Ugandan 
HIV surveillance data were of poor quality which resulted in the data not 
being used to inform the development of SGS: 
 
I see a lot of shit data sets…and that was a shit data set. There 
was no codebook…there was no…we can’t even find the base 
questionnaire that was used…we [UNAIDS] are making 
assumptions up the wazoo about the comparability of individual 
variables (Pisani: 31/08/2011).  
 
However, Pisani’s doctoral thesis interestingly contrasts with her 
aforementioned narrative which appears to highlight the principal role of 
Ugandan behavioural data and its relationship with developing SGS at the 
workshop: 
 
A meeting called to review the evidence in Nairobi in February 
1997 looked carefully at a number of behavioural studies in 
Uganda (principally nationally-representative cross-sectional 
surveys of sexual behaviour conducted in 1989 and 1995)…The 
meeting concluded that a reduction in risk behaviour was likely 
to have contributed to a real reduction in HIV prevalence among 
young Ugandans (Asiimwe-Okiror, Opio et al. 1997; UNAIDS 
1998). It also led to preliminary recommendations for wholesale 
changes to national HIV surveillance systems, described below 
(UNAIDS 1998). It was at that meeting that we first used the term 
“Second Generation Surveillance” to describe the systems that 
were emerging as the new model” (Pisani: 2006: pp. 26 – 27).  
 
Pisani also made reference to the 300 small-scale sociological surveys 
reviewed by Tom Barton, which as demonstrated above, appears to be a 
problematic issue according to Michel Caraël, the chair of the workshop and 
former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS. Prior to meeting Elizabeth 
Pisani for interview, emails were sent in an attempt to locate the 
aforementioned 300 small-scale sociological studies that feature within the 
UNAIDS official policy documentation for critical appraisal. In asking her 
where and how the 300 studies were conducted Pisani commented: 
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Re the 300 studies: You don’t really believe we took 300 studies 
into account, do you? We say all sorts of things post hoc to 
support the decisions we make, but most are made on sparse 
data and for largely political reasons. Though the politics was 
not that pronounced in the SGS process, the policy was based 
almost exclusively on the Ugandan sentinel data and Knut’s 
Zambian study, plus a desperate need to move away from 
pregnant women in countries where most infections are in men 
(Email from Elizabeth Pisani: 08/04/2011).  
 
In a subsequent email exchange intending to clarify the significance of the 
300 small-scale Ugandan sociological studies, which are cited as evidence 
within official UNAIDS documentation, Pisani reiterated her scepticism 
about their relevance and substance:  
 
I honestly think you are giving these mystical/mythical 300 
studies far too much importance. As far as I know, the only way 
they “underpinned” SGS was that Tom [Barton] made a 
presentation mentioning that he’d look at a lot of studies, and we 
wrote down in a report that we had lots of evidence for 
something that we decided to do on the basis of two days sitting 
in a room, and quite a few beers on a terrace. And since it was 
me that wrote the second generation surveillance guidelines, as 
far as I know is probably as far as anyone knows (Email from 
Elizabeth Pisani: 21/04/2011).  
 
The contradictory narratives advanced by Pisani, and the claim that 
Ugandan data sources were not used to support the development of SGS 
(due to their inadequate empirical quality) indicate that she had contrasting 
understandings about the function and value of Ugandan evidence in 
supporting SGS’s development. It also appears that Pisani’s 
conceptualisation, regarding the evidence used to support the development 
of SGS is unclear, as contradictory accounts have been advanced in her 




4.4.4 New York behavioural data and Demographic Health Survey data and 
the development of SGS 
 
A distinct theme relating to the evidence used to support SGS was also 
advanced by Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, 
who claimed that the evidentiary basis for SGS had a long-term time frame 
which goes back to the HIV epidemic emerging in gay men in HICs from the 
late-1980s onwards. Stoneburner noted that behavioural surveys on sexual 
behaviour conducted in New York in the 1980s initially provided evidence 
that behavioural data could be used to understand the transmission of HIV 
in specific at risk groups: 
 
To do a behavioural survey was a pretty radical idea back then 
we had some in New York…we did a population survey but 
most of them were done in special risk groups (Stoneburner: 
26/10/2011).  
 
Stoneburner also remarked that the idea for using behavioural surveys, 
which was the key idea proposed at the workshop, had been implemented in 
New York City nine years earlier: 
 
I mean we did the first behavioural survey in New York City in 
1988/89 and we didn’t call it second generation surveillance 
(Stoneburner: 26/10/2011).  
 
An additional standalone theme was advanced by Mary Mahy, a monitoring 
and evaluation advisor from UNAIDS, who claimed that other behavioural 
data sources supported the introduction SGS. Mahy claimed that data from 
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), and other large-scale household 
surveys conducted within the field of reproductive health, showed the 
benefits of conducting behavioural surveillance in addition to 
serosurveillance. These studies conducted in the mid to late-1990s were 
another source of data used to demonstrate the value of including 
behavioural data to enhance older approaches to HIV surveillance, and to 
generate more information that could be used to inform the development of 
subsequent HIV/AIDS prevention policy: 
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If you go to reproductive health stuff you have to collect data on 
behaviour in order to understand any behavioural changes…and 
so I think the DHS’s before…a lot of the data collected on 
maternal child health happened to be…it was fertility 
related…so it was when did you start having sex and those sorts 
of things. So those questions then could be used to understand 
what was going on with the HIV epidemic. So it was just a really 
natural progression…like okay where’s more data, where’s more 
data…and you sort of go into the DHS and other household 
surveys that were for reproductive health…but gave you 
answers for HIV as well (Mahy: 23/09/2011). 
 
The four sub-sections above have presented an array of heterogeneous 
claims about the evidence used to support the formal development of SGS. It 
is significant to note that the findings appear to suggest that different 
decision-makers, involved with the development of SGS, and more broadly 
HIV prevention policy, possessed different conceptualisations about the 
actual evidence used to support SGS’s introduction in the year 2000. The 
findings above are significant as they appear to contradict the recorded 
sources of evidence used to support the development of SGS, as advanced by 
UNAIDS within its official policy documentation (UNAIDS: 1998a). Equally, 
the findings outlined above appear to indicate that Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change evidence, presented at the workshop, are contested as 
certain HIV/AIDS experts debated the sexual behavioural change reasons 
that contributed towards Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to mid-1990s. 
Having examined the evidence used to support the introduction of SGS, it is 
now required to examine why SGS was formally introduced by 
UNAIDS/WHO in the year 2000. Doing this will enable the chapter to 
understand better the evolution of SGS and it will facilitate subsequent 
chapters to provide a more comprehensive account about the function of 
evidence used to support the introduction of SGS itself and the development 




4.5 Exploring the development of SGS an examination of narrow and broad 
reasons 
 
This section examines the reasons that contributed towards the formal 
development of SGS by UNAIDS/WHO in the year 2000. It is organised into 
narrow and broad reasons that emerged during data analysis. Narrow 
reasons relate to the need for SGS to improve older HIV surveillance 
approaches via the integration, and triangulation of, multiple data sources 
(which is mainly congruent with existing UNAIDS/WHO policy 
documentation). Whereas, broad reasons relate to the need for SGS to 
function as a marketing tool to help UNAIDS gain institutional credibility in 
developing an effective approach to global HIV surveillance policy (that 
could be used by countries to address the global HIV/AIDS epidemic more 
efficiently). An additional broad reason relates to the function of SGS to 
bridge socio-behavioural and epidemiological disciplinary approaches (and 
decision-makers from both disciplines) together when UNAIDS was 
launched in 1996. Interview data suggest that there was general consensus 
surrounding the narrow reasons that contributed towards the formal 
introduction of SGS in the year 2000. Four specific themes emerged in 
relation to the narrow reasons that led to the introduction of SGS. First, the 
theme of increasing the number and type of surveillance data sources to 
improve older approaches to HIV surveillance. Second, the theme of 
integrating behavioural data with existing serological data sources to 
facilitate the process of data triangulation. Third, the need for SGS to permit 
decision-makers to understand better the structural, or sociological factors, 
that influence patterns of HIV infection. Forth, the need for SGS to shift older 
HIV surveillance approaches away from AIDS case reporting as this kind of 
data did not give decision-makers up-to-date information about the 
evolution of the HIV epidemic. Each of these themes will now be examined 
in the order outlined above. 
 
The theme of increasing the number and type of surveillance data sources 
was raised by Peter Ghys, chief epidemiologist within the analysis division 
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of UNAIDS. Ghys claimed that SGS emerged as earlier HIV surveillance 
guidelines were “quite simple” (Ghys: 06/12/2011) which possessed 
“limited content suggestions” (Ghys: 06/12/2011) therefore “different 
sources of data” (Ghys: 06/12/2011) were integrated to provide “more 
insight into the [HIV/AIDS] epidemic and its trends” (Ghys: 06/12/2011). 
This theme was echoed by an HIV/AIDS official within the WHO, claiming 
that SGS emerged having realised that the global HIV/AIDS pandemic was 
behaving in a very diverse manner, which required multiple sources of data 
to be triangulated to understand better ongoing HIV prevalence and 
incidence trends (HIV/AIDS official within the WHO). Stefano Lazzari, 
former chair of the UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global 
HIV/AIDS/STI Surveillance, claimed that SGS was developed as HIV/AIDS 
surveillance experts realised that serologically focused HIV surveillance 
systems generated a “late and incomplete epidemiological picture” (Lazzari: 
21/09/2011). SGS was therefore developed for data improvement and to 
make ongoing epidemiological information emanating from HIV 
surveillance systems more complete and up-to-date. Focusing on increasing 
the number of surveillance data sources, Frank Kaharuza, from CDC 
Uganda, claimed that older HIV surveillance approaches were “inadequate” 
(Kaharuza: 13/02/2012) noting that SGS was important in understanding the 
need to “use all your data…and to use multiple data sources” (Kaharuza: 
13/02/2012). Emphasising data improvement and increasing the number of 
HIV surveillance data sources, Elizabeth Madraa, the former manager of 
Uganda’s AIDS Control Programme, claimed SGS was developed:  
 
To improve the quality of the data in HIV…the previous HIV 
data was just being collected…just using the mothers from 
sentinel sites (Madraa: 20/01/2012). 
 
Madraa also claimed SGS was needed “to improve the quality of the data 
collected on HIV and AIDS” (Madraa: 20/01/2012). One former UNAIDS 
official claimed that SGS was developed to integrate multiple types of 
surveillance data, which had formerly been analysed in a state of isolation 
into a unified framework “it [SGS] brings together HIV seroprevalence data, 
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behavioural surveillance and AIDS mortality data together” (former 
UNAIDS official: 25/10/2011).  
 
A second theme relates to older HIV surveillance approaches lacking 
behavioural data sources which could, if triangulated 6  with existing 
serological prevalence data, be used to understand better variations in the 
evolving HIV epidemic. Incorporating “behavioural surveillance side by side 
with biological surveillance” (Kirungi: 19/01/2012) was a key data 
improvement need which could help “increase the explanatory power” 
(Kirungi: 19/01/2012) of older HIV surveillance approaches according to 
Wilford Kirungi, a senior epidemiologist within the Ugandan Ministry of 
Health. This assertion was echoed by Joshua Musinguzi, former head of the 
AIDS control programme within the Ugandan Ministry of Health, who 
stated that SGS was developed: 
 
To put together protocols that collect good biological 
data…biological markers…but at the same time behavioural data 
that can help us to explain the various trends…the dynamics of 
the trends that we were observing (Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
Noting that older surveillance approaches to HIV/AIDS were limited in 
providing up-to-date surveillance data, Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS 
consultant, asserted the importance of getting decision-makers to understand 
the significance of conducting behavioural surveillance alongside 
serosurveillance: 
 
We [UNAIDS] wanted to help people understand what a 
prevalence figure was giving them and we wanted people...to 
encourage people to think earlier in the epidemic. Because if you 
do behavioural surveillance well enough you can actually predict 
what might happen next (Pisani: 31/08/2011).  
 
It was also claimed by Pisani that SGS was developed to create a degree of 
precision in relation to behavioural surveillance methodological approaches:  
 
																																																								
6 Triangulation can be defined as “a data analysis process in which multiple 
sources of data are considered together to come to a conclusion on a question 
related to an epidemic or intervention” (UNAIDS: 2013: pp. 61).  
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The behavioural part of second generation surveillance was to 
try and get some kind of rigour into behavioural 
surveillance…so that you would have data that were properly 
comparable…and because you had generalised 
epidemics…where everyone was thought to be at risk it seemed 
sensible to just integrate the behavioural surveillance (Pisani: 
31/08/2011).  
 
Highlighting the importance of integrating behavioural data sources, Manuel 
Carbello, the former chief of behavioural research within GPA, claimed that 
SGS was developed as older, serologically focused, HIV surveillance systems 
did not give decision-makers “any insights as to the socio-behavioural 
factors” (Carbello: 20/09/2011) that were contributing to ongoing patterns of 
HIV infection. Referring to the addition of behavioural data to serological 
data sources, Daniel Tarantola, a former senior employee of the GPA/former 
senior policy advisor to the Director General of the WHO, stated that SGS 
was developed to “bring colour to a black and white picture of the 
[HIV/AIDS] epidemic” (Tarantola: 27/10/2011). This particular phraseology 
can be interpreted as the colour being behavioural data which is added to 
complement the older black and white serological surveillance data.  
 
Two individual themes relating to why SGS was developed also emerged 
from data analysis. The first distinct theme relates to the need for SGS to 
allow decision-makers to understand the structural causes, or sociological 
factors which influence patterns in HIV infection. The following data 
highlight the extent to which SGS expanded upon biomedically focused 
approaches to HIV surveillance. Frank Kaharuza, from CDC Uganda, 
claimed that SGS was developed to “de-medicalise” (Kaharuza: 13/02/2012) 
HIV surveillance approaches by allowing decision-makers to understand the 
precedent structural causes that influence the transmission of HIV: 
 
I think it [SGS] increased the awareness of the precedent causes 
of HIV infection and acquisition…but even the broader 
aspect…to the whole social fabric…I think to me is what makes a 
difference. It [SGS] has de-medicalised HIV it’s become a social 
thing…it’s become a cultural thing…it’s become everything. And 
people realise how each of these things have…kind of lead into 




The second individual theme, which is closely related to the theme of 
increasing the number and type of surveillance data sources, pertains to the 
SGS approach moving away from AIDS case reporting, which was the key 
methodological approach to quantifying AIDS mortality in the early stages of 
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS external 
consultant, advanced a detailed account relating to the development of SGS, 
which provides an historical insight into early HIV/AIDS surveillance 
methodological approaches and their respective limitations: 
 
 
It [SGS] came about because HIV surveillance sort of started arse 
backwards right? Because…when we first started seeing AIDS 
cases…we didn’t even know…what pathogen was…that caused 
that syndrome. So it started off with AIDS death 
reporting…which became mandatory very quickly…in a lot of 
countries. Once HIV was identified we realised…that by doing 
AIDS surveillance…you’re actually tracking infections that 
happened maybe ten years ago. So it’s telling you absolutely 
nothing about your evolving epidemic (Pisani: 31/08/2011).  
 
The findings above suggest that SGS was introduced for a range of narrow 
reasons, which are broadly congruent with existing UNAIDS policy 
documentation. However, data indicate that SGS was also introduced for 
two broad reasons, which included the need for SGS to function as a 
marketing tool to promote the institutional identity of UNAIDS, and to 
bridge social scientific and epidemiological disciplinary approaches together 
in the mid-1990s. The notion of marketing was advanced by an HIV/AIDS 
official within the WHO. It was asserted that SGS was named in order to 
create an awareness of the new HIV surveillance approach itself and for SGS 
to function as a sound marketing tool for UNAIDS in the late-1990s and early 
2000s. Indeed, it was claimed that the name SGS was not uninteresting and 
that SGS itself was constructed as a marketing breakthrough for UNAIDS. 
 
These ideas about SGS performing the broader function to market improved 
HIV surveillance approaches for UNAIDS was echoed by Stefano Lazzari, 
former chair of the UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global 
HIV/AIDS/STI Surveillance, who framed the naming and development of 
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SGS as an effective rebranding exercise. Lazzari maintained that SGS helped 
the “re-launching of the whole idea of HIV surveillance in a more 
comprehensive way” (Lazzari: 21/09/2011) remarking that “the fact that it 
changed name” helped to “give it a new face” (Lazzari: 21/09/2011) which 
in turn facilitated “the reselling of the policy” (Lazzari: 21/09/2011). Lazzari 
also claimed that the naming of SGS was an effective policy rebrand that 
“wasn’t totally new…but the new packaging was attractive” (Lazzari: 
21/09/2011).  
 
Two additional interviewees noted that SGS functioned to market improved 
HIV surveillance approaches. Indeed, a former UNAIDS official claimed that 
the rebranding of SGS functioned to promote the institutional credibility of 
UNAIDS in the early 2000s: 
 
So the policy rebrand or marketing in the early 2000s – I think it 
was in the early 2000s it was a marketing activity in the 
sense…that was the genius of Elizabeth Pisani to come up with 
this thing called HIV second generation surveillance. In fact, it’s 
not new because if you look – here in Geneva – there is second 
generation – I don’t know what…for some kind of huge 
multinational company. So it’s something that has come…and of 
course it [SGS] was a boost in authority for UNAIDS. UNAIDS 
picked up on this – the rebrand and of course then came the 
authority in [HIV/AIDS] surveillance (former UNAIDS official: 
16/01/2013). 
 
The notion that SGS functioned as a marketing, or rebranding tool, was 
posited by Frank Kaharuza, a former medical epidemiologist from CDC 
Uganda: 
 
It is similar to what we have now in the sense that you have all 
these first generation, second generation computers, 
3G’s…you’re looking at something that is an add on to what you 
have. So the critical question is what is it that is being added on? 
Like now we need to go a step further so what’s the sexy 
term…so second generation it’s a branding (Kaharuza: 
13/02/2012).  
 
Interview data also indicate that SGS served the broader function of unifying 
two formerly distinct disciplines (namely socio-behavioural disciplinary 
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approaches and epidemiological disciplinary approaches) within the newly 
formed institutional context of UNAIDS in 1996. This notion was advanced 
by Daniel Tarantola, a former senior employee of the GPA/former senior 
policy advisor to the Director General of the WHO. Tarantola claimed, when 
discussing the historical evolution of older HIV/AIDS surveillance 
methodologies, which had previously analysed epidemiological and socio-
behavioural data sources in isolation, that:  
 
In the mid-1990s, shortly after the launching of UNAIDS, there 
was a recognition that information gathering, or knowledge 
production if you will, had followed two tracks one was 
epidemiological and the other was social and behavioural 
through time limited research projects. So one was the social 
behavioural research area and the other was the 
epidemiological...so there was the need to bridge those two 
worlds both in terms of being able to focus strategies. So there 
was also a sort of disciplinary commitment to try and bridge 
those fields. So in the 1990s, when UNAIDS was launched, a lot 
of interest had already been generated around getting those two 
worlds together (Tarantola: 27/10/2011) 
 
Tarantola also asserted that the process of integrating socio-behavioural and 
epidemiological approaches together was an easy process in the mid to late-
1990s, as there was a commitment from HIV/AIDS experts to learn about the 
respective strengths of both disciplinary approaches. When discussing the 
process of disciplinary integration within UNAIDS, Tarantola claimed:	
 
I think it was in a way easier at that time [mid-1990s] than it 
would be today. There is a lot of resentment today in the social 
science discipline about the response to HIV having become too 
medicalised…and so there is, I think today, a tension. But in 
those days it did not exist…there was actually a lot of 
enthusiasm on the part of public health workers to learn from 
social and political sciences and vice versa. I think that’s what 
made this second generation surveillance guidelines and 
methods it merged the fact that people did want to work 
together and did want to cross the boundaries of disciplines 
(Tarantola: 27/10/2011) 
 
However, a narrative contradicting the claims advanced by Daniel Tarantola 
was advanced by Stefano Lazzari, former chair of the UNAIDS/WHO 
Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS/STI Surveillance. In a discussion 
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about the reasons supporting the development of SGS, Lazzari commented 
upon the process of integrating socio-behavioural and epidemiological 
disciplinary approaches (and decision-makers from both disciplines alike) 
together:   
 
Stefano Lazzari: I think it [SGS] required epidemiologists to work 
with behavioural scientists and this are different work [sic]… 
 
Interviewer: How easy was that? 
 
Stefano Lazzari: It wasn’t easy at all. I think you had a whole 
generation of people who crossed over in a sense of behavioural 
scientists who started to understand statistics…real statistics and 
epidemiological data and vice versa epidemiologists who 
understood that you can live with uncertainties about things. But 
the basic concept behind second generation was also that you 
could triangulate data by multiple sources of information even if 
they weren’t absolutely 100% accurate or even 80% accurate 
(Lazzari: 21/09/2011). 
 
The process of integrating behavioural surveillance data, alongside existing 
serological surveillance data, and the process of merging socio-behavioural 
and epidemiological disciplinary approaches in the early-1990s, was 
advanced by an HIV/AIDS official within the WHO. It was maintained 
during interview that there was an institutional commitment to unify 
behavioural surveillance approaches with existing epidemiologically-based 
surveillance approaches. However, it was suggested that there was a degree 
of scientific conservatism, in relation to the integration of behavioural 
surveillance approaches in the early to mid-1990s, and that a degree of 
disciplinary resistance existed among epidemiologically focused HIV/AIDS 
experts. The notion of resistance to using behavioural surveillance data to 
build upon older, serologically focused HIV surveillance approaches, was 
described further by an HIV/AIDS official within the WHO—
acknowledging that there were ‘tribal’ differences between socio-behavioural 
and epidemiological disciplinary experts in the early to mid-1990s.  
	
The findings above indicate that SGS emerged for two broad reasons which 
included the need for SGS to function as a marketing tool to promote the 
institutional credibility of UNAIDS in the mid-1990s. Data also suggest that 
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SGS emerged to bridge two formerly distinct disciplines, namely socio-
behavioural and epidemiological disciplines together (in order to enhance 
understandings of HIV/AIDS and to focus the direction of subsequent HIV 
prevention strategies advanced by UNAIDS). Findings appear to suggest 
that the process of bridging both disciplinary fields was viewed as an easy 
process by certain interviewees, whereas, others maintain that the process 
was more difficult—noting that there was a degree of scientific conservatism 
to integrate socio-behavioural (and qualitative-based data sources) to 
epidemiological and quantitative data sources in the early to mid-1990s. The 
following diagram provides a simple representation of the narrow and broad 
reasons that contributed towards the formal development of SGS by 
UNAIDS/WHO in the year 2000: 
 
Figure 1 – Narrow and broad reasons that contributed towards the formal 
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4.6 Discussion – The genesis of a clearly defined problem and a contested 
evidence-base 
 
Interview data above have demonstrated the central role of an HIV 
surveillance workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya between the 10th – 13th 
February 1997 in helping to develop the SGS approach and in gaining 
formative understandings of the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 
1990s. This particular UNAIDS sponsored event enabled attending 
HIV/AIDS experts to examine limitations with existing serologically focused 
HIV surveillance methodological approaches, and to analyse the sexual 
behavioural change reasons that could account for the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline of the mid-1990s. Importantly, the solution proposed at 
the workshop was to integrate behavioural data sources with existing 
serological surveillance data, which was intended to enable decision-makers 
to understand better evolving trends in HIV prevalence rates, their 
underlying behavioural determinants and the utility of behavioural data 
analysis in the development of subsequent HIV prevention policy. The 
workshop was therefore central in enabling the idea for SGS to ‘come about’ 
and in demonstrating the function of behavioural data in the creation of HIV 
prevention policy by global and national level actors. Importantly, the 33 
attendees of the workshop, primarily through the presentation and critique 
of Ugandan and Zambian data were able to understand the potential value 
of building upon older, serologically focused HIV surveillance approaches 
with behavioural data sources—sources of information which could be used 
in the development of subsequent HIV prevention policy. These two country 
case study presentations at the workshop were therefore central in helping to 
justify the development of the SGS approach, the rationale for analysing 
behavioural data and its utility within the development of HIV prevention 
policy. Although other presentations from attending East African countries 
were given at the workshop, Ugandan data appear to have taken the lead 
role stemming from the well-established Ugandan HIV/AIDS surveillance 
system, the availability of behavioural data for analysis, and the formative 




It can be argued that the workshop was an example of a “focusing event” 
(Kingdon: 1995: pp. 94 – 95) where attending expert decision-makers were 
able to improve upon older HIV surveillance approaches through a working 
method which presented “centrepiece” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) Ugandan 
behavioural surveillance data. Although focusing events are generally 
associated with crises such as aeroplane crashes, environmental accidents or 
natural disasters (Kingdon: 1995; Birkland: 1998) attention can also be turned 
to a specific problem if a “powerful symbol” (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 94 – 95) 
which “catches on” (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 94 – 95) amongst decision-makers is 
present for discussion. It could be argued that the “powerful symbol” 
(Kingdon: 1995: pp. 94 – 95) of Ugandan behavioural change data, and its 
association with the broader HIV prevalence decline emerging from the 
country, helped to focus attention with regard to improving older HIV 
surveillance approaches at the workshop with behavioural data sources. The 
problem of improving older HIV surveillance approaches at the workshop 
thus received “a little push to get the attention of people” (Kingdon: 1995: 
pp. 94 – 95) involved with improving older HIV surveillance approaches on 
the basis of Ugandan behavioural change data presented at the workshop. 
 
Despite clear problem and solution identification at the workshop a range of 
competing narratives were advanced by interviewees relating to the actual 
evidence used to support SGS. It is important to state that the sources of 
evidence, which were used to help support the development of the SGS 
approach, appear to be both contested and complex. It is clear that multiple 
(and at times contradictory) narratives have been advanced relating to the 
evidence used to support the policy development of SGS. Although official 
UNAIDS documentation published after the workshop emphasises the 
important role of Ugandan and Zambian data, Elizabeth Pisani one of the co-
authors of the UNAIDS documentation, downplayed the centrality of 
Ugandan behavioural data used to support the policy development of SGS 
during interview. Furthermore, the 300 small-scale sociological surveys, 
which are referred to as evidence demonstrating sexual behavioural change 
within Uganda, have been framed in a problematic manner by Elizabeth 
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Pisani as “mythical” and “mysterious” and by Michel Caraël as a source of 
“conflict” involving other decision-makers.  
 
In addition to Pisani’s and Caraël’s narratives, it has also been demonstrated 
that other individual decision-makers had their own conceptualisations 
relating to the specific evidence used to support the development of the SGS 
approach. Reflecting on the various evidence narratives outlined above, it is 
clear that long-term GPA behavioural surveillance data, Ugandan 
behavioural data, behavioural survey data from high risk groups in New 
York and DHS data all appear to have informed the idea for SGS in a 
complex fashion. However, long-term GPA behavioural surveillance data, 
two Ugandan population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change 
conducted in 1989 and 1995 combined with 300 small-scale sociological 
surveys were officially cited as “centrepiece” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) data 
used to enhance older HIV surveillance approaches by UNAIDS in the late-
1990s.  
 
Reflecting on the heterogeneous narratives described above, it can be 
suggested that the evidence used to support the idea for SGS built up 
gradually over time from a variety of geographical locales. However, the 
workshop was a central forum, or focusing event, which permitted the cadre 
of attending HIV/AIDS experts to showcase the value of Ugandan 
behavioural data to develop the idea for the SGS approach and to gain 
behavioural change understandings of the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline 
which, in turn, could influence the subsequent development of global 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy. In the process of examining the complex 
evidence-base used to support the SGS approach at the workshop, certain 
decision-makers, who were involved with the creation and analysis of 
behavioural data sources have been identified specifically: Michel Caraël, 
Daniel Low-Beer, Rand Stoneburner, Bernhard Schwartländer and Elizabeth 
Pisani. Importantly, these decision-makers, and their role in developing and 
interpreting behavioural evidence used to support SGS and global HIV 
prevention policy, will be critically investigated in greater analytical detail in 
the two subsequent results chapters. Greater attention will be given to these 
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individuals as it appears that Ugandan behavioural data, which were used to 
support the development of SGS and global HIV prevention policy, have 
been competitively analysed by these HIV/AIDS experts, which further 
complicate how evidence informed subsequent global HIV policy output 
produced by UNAIDS/WHO in the mid to late-1990s. 
 
The findings above also indicate that SGS was introduced for a range of 
narrow and broad reasons. Echoing UNAIDS policy documentation, 
interview data suggest that SGS was introduced to improve older HIV 
surveillance approaches via the triangulation of multiple data sources. 
However, it was also ascertained that SGS was introduced for two broad 
reasons, namely, the need for SGS to function as a marketing tool to promote 
the institutional identity of UNAIDS, and to bridge social scientific and 
epidemiological disciplinary approaches (and decision-makers from both 
disciplines together) in the mid-1990s. The marketing of SGS has parallels 
with the notion of policy branding as in the case of Directly Observed 
Treatment – Short Course (DOTS) for tuberculosis control (Ogden et al : 2003: 
pp. 179). They noted that in the case of tuberculosis policy: 
 
After a long period of neglect, resources were mobilised to put 
tuberculosis back on the international and national public policy 
agenda, and then how the policy was ‘branded’ and marketed as 
DOTS, and transferred to low and middle income countries 
(Ogden et al: 2003: pp. 179).  
 
It could be argued that SGS was marketed for UNAIDS to generate attention 
towards this improved global HIV surveillance policy, and to boost 
UNAIDS’ institutional credibility in the mid-1990s, whilst helping to put HIV 
surveillance back on the public health agenda at the national and global 
levels. It was also discovered that SGS was introduced for a second broad 
reason, namely the function of SGS to unify two formerly distinct 
disciplinary approaches (and decision-makers from different disciplines). 
However, the claim that socio-behavioural and epidemiological decision-
makers were successfully joined together via SGS is contested as two 
competing findings were advanced—with one stating that the process of 
integration was easy and another stating the process was difficult. This 
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broad-based function of SGS remains analytically unclear and thus requires 
further analytical examination in subsequent chapters.   
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that SGS emerged at a UNAIDS sponsored 
HIV surveillance improvement workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya in 1997. 
The findings presented, in relation to the development of SGS, are broadly 
congruent with UNAIDS policy literature, as the majority of interviewees 
highlighted the significance of the workshop in facilitating the idea for SGS 
to emerge at this specific forum—which can be viewed as a focusing event as 
advanced by Kingdon (1995). However, it is interesting to note that Michel 
Caraël the chair of the workshop (and the former head of HIV prevention 
within UNAIDS) claimed that the workshop should not be overemphasised, 
as attendees were purportedly convinced about the need to improve older 
HIV surveillance approaches prior to the workshop taking place. This 
narrative is intriguing as it appears to contradict official accounts that 
explain the policy development of SGS as advanced by UNAIDS in 1998.   
 
While there was broad consensus about the historical development of SGS, 
the findings suggest that the sources of evidence used to support its 
introduction are both complex and contested. A range of competing 
narratives, pertaining to the evidence supporting the development of SGS, 
were advanced by the interviewees during data collection. Indeed, multiple, 
and at times, contradictory accounts about the evidence used to support the 
introduction of SGS were advanced by interviewees—which again call into 
question formal accounts relating to the evidence used to support the 
development of SGS as advanced by UNAIDS in 1998.  
 
This chapter introduced the idea that the Ugandan evidence, used to support 
the introduction of SGS, namely 300 small-scale sociological studies, and two 
population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change conducted in the 
1989 and 1995, are contested as experts involved with the analysis of these 
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data sources debated the sexual behavioural change reasons that were 
driving Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to mid-1990s. Importantly, the 
narrative surrounding the contested nature of the Ugandan evidence 
requires further analytical exploration, and there is an analytical imperative 
to explore relevant factors that have shaped the evidence/policy dynamic 
relating to SGS in greater detail. Such exploration is warranted as the claims 
of a “catfight” (Pisani: 31/08/2011)  and “misadventures” (Stoneburner: 
05/08/2011) over Ugandan sexual behavioural change evidence may have 
affected how evidence, supporting the introduction of SGS, was used within 
policymaking networks at both the Genevan and Ugandan levels. 
 
Findings also indicate that SGS was formally introduced by UNAIDS/WHO 
in the year 2000 for a range of narrow and broad reasons. In line within 
UNAIDS (1998a), SGS was introduced to improve older HIV surveillance 
methodologies via the integration, and triangulation of, multiple data 
sources. However, data also indicate that SGS also served two broader 
purposes—namely the need for SGS to function as a marketing tool to help 
promote the institutional identity of UNAIDS, and its role in attempting to 
integrate two formerly distinct disciplinary approaches (and decision-makers 
from different disciplines together). In summary, this chapter can state that 
the evidence supporting the development of SGS, and the reasons that led to 
its formal introduction in the year 2000, are much more complex than 
UNAIDS depicts within existing policy documentation. Significantly, the 
findings surrounding the contested nature of the Ugandan behavioural 
evidence, which helped justify the SGS approach at the workshop, require 
greater analytical examination as the underlying nature of the 
“misadventures” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011) surrounding the Ugandan data 




CHAPTER FIVE: Examining competing explanations 
for Uganda’s HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s via 
the analysis of SGS 
 
5.1 Introduction to chapter 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that Ugandan evidence supporting the 
introduction of SGS were contested. It was discovered that certain experts 
involved with the development of SGS were purportedly involved in a 
“catfight” (Pisani: 31/08/2011) over the sexual behavioural change reasons 
that were ostensibly determining Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to mid-
1990s, namely debates over condom use versus partnership reduction, and 
their association with declining HIV trends. Notions of “conflict” (Caraël: 
20/09/2011) and “misadventures” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011) were also 
introduced, in relation to the Ugandan evidence used to support the 
introduction of SGS, and formative understandings of Uganda’s HIV decline. 
While the previous chapter introduced the finding the Ugandan evidence 
supporting the introduction of SGS were contested, it did not examine the 
debate over the Ugandan evidence amongst HIV/AIDS experts in 
substantive analytical detail. Nor did it examine how experts, who supported 
different sexual behavioural change explanations, that emerged from the 
analysis of Ugandan evidence, attempted to legitimise their accounts of the 
Ugandan HIV decline, whilst discrediting the explanations of others, in 
HIV/AIDS policymaking networks.  
 
Therefore, this chapter aims to examine how HIV/AIDS experts advanced 
competing explanations for the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 
1990s, whilst identifying strategies used to legitimise, and discredit, 
competing explanations in policymaking networks at the national and global 
levels. The chapter thus seeks to examine the contested role of Ugandan 
evidence, used to support formative understandings of the Ugandan HIV 
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prevalence decline of the 1990s, and the development of SGS whilst 
elucidating the competitive nature of debates over evidence amongst 
HIV/AIDS experts. In relation to the thesis as a whole, it is the task of this 
chapter to examine competing sexual behavioural change explanations 
advanced for the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline via the analysis of SGS, 
whilst considering the implications of the competitive debate over Ugandan 
evidence upon the broader relationship between evidence and policy in 
HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. Via this exploration it will be possible to 
understand the role of evidence used to support the introduction SGS, the 
contestation over the Uganda HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s, and to 
introduce relevant factors that influence the relationship between evidence 
and policy in HIV/AIDS policymaking networks at the global level.  
 
5.2 Examining two competing sexual behavioural change explanations 
contributing towards declining HIV trends in Uganda 
 
Interview data suggest that HIV/AIDS experts involved with the analysis of 
Ugandan behavioural data advanced two competing explanations that could 
be used to explain decreasing HIV trends within the country. The first 
explanation focused on increased condom uptake within the Ugandan 
population, linking this with the external involvement of international 
organisations in contributing to this sexual behavioural change. The second 
explanation emphasised a reduction in multiple partnerships within the 
Ugandan population, linking this to an endogenous process of increased HIV 
awareness in the Ugandan population, and the influence of oral 
communication in contributing to a process that did not involve the external 
involvement of international organisations. The following section will 
outline how HIV/AIDS experts aligned themselves with the competing 







5.2.1 Examining the alignment of experts to competing sexual behavioural 
change explanations 
 
The alignment of HIV/AIDS experts, to either an increased condom use or a 
reduction in multiple partnership explanation, was discovered to be a 
contested issue. Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention within 
UNAIDS, described the alignment of HIV/AIDS experts to competing 
behavioural change explanations that could explain Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline of the early to mid-1990s: 
 
 …there is indeed a controversy for more than 15 years now 
about the Uganda data and the explanation for the drop in sexual 
behaviour. So I enter into a conflict with [Helen] Epstein, 
[Daniel] Halperin, Rand Stoneburner, [Daniel] Low-Beer…who 
had different interpretations on how to explain it. And they came 
with an explanation about oral communication being the major 
factor and that condom use was not…I would not come back to 
that it’s 15 years back we cannot rewrite the history (Caraël: 
20/09/2011). 
 
Caraël’s account was reinforced by a former UNAIDS official who claimed 
that participants, involved with the analysis of Ugandan behavioural 
surveillance data, organised themselves into distinct groups according to 
their alignment to an increased condom uptake or a multiple partnership 
reduction explanation:  
 
So you have one team looking at the [Ugandan] data one way 
with their own perspectives and views…and you have another 
team looking at it another way (former UNAIDS official: 
16/01/2013). 
 
The following diagram provides a simple representation of HIV/AIDS 
experts’ alignment to the two competing explanations for Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline based on a review of the interview material. ‘Full-
alignment’ refers to participants who explicitly supported either increased 
condom uptake or a reduction in multiple partnership as the primary 
explanation for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline. ‘Partial-alignment’ 
refers to participants who did not fully align to either an increased condom 
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uptake or a reduction in multiple partnership explanation. Participants were 
roughly divided in relation to which explanation they favoured:  
 
Figure 2 - Alignment to competing explanations for Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline 
 
Reflecting upon the figure above, it can be posited that Michel Caraël, the 
former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, and Elizabeth Pisani, a 
former UNAIDS consultant are fully-aligned to an explanation favouring 
increased condom uptake. Additional data, supporting the allocation of 
Pisani and Caraël to the fully-aligned grouping will now be examined.   
 
5.2.2 Data sources supporting the full-alignment of experts to an increased 
condom uptake explanation  
 
Supplementary evidence for Caraël’s and Pisani’s alignment with the 
condom explanation is drawn from UNAIDS policy documentation. A 
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UNAIDS report published after the 1997 Nairobi workshop, co-authored by 
Pisani and Caraël, claimed that Ugandan sexual behavioural surveys were 
demonstrating that younger age groups within urban areas were “delaying 
sexual activity and using more condoms than in the past” (UNAIDS: 1998a: 
pp. 3). This UNAIDS document also claims that: 
 
With evidence compiled from more than 300 small-scale 
sociological studies, the survey results strongly suggest a rise in 
age of first sex and more condom use in cities (UNAIDS: 1998a: 
pp. 3).  
 
Furthermore, within ‘A Measure of Success in Uganda – The Value of 
Monitoring both HIV Prevalence and Sexual Behaviour (UNAIDS: 1998b) 
increased condom uptake amongst the Ugandan population is claimed to be 
the primary behavioural change that occurred in Uganda between 1989 and 
1995:  
 
Between 1989 and 1995, the percentage of sexually active people 
claiming to use condoms increased significantly. For men, the 
proportion of people who said that they had ever used a condom 
rose from 15% to 55% and for women from 6% to 39% (UNAIDS: 
1998b: pp. 10). 
 
Reflecting upon “evidence complied from more than 300 smaller-scale 
sociological studies” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5) that were reviewed by 
anthropologist Tom Barton, UNAIDS also claimed that:  
 
Many studies indicate an increase in condom use, and some of 
these have followed the same cohorts over time. Taken together, 
these would suggest that the proportion of sexually active people 
who had ever used a condom at the national level rose between 
1987 and 1996 from about 3% to 25% (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp.10). 
 
UNAIDS policy documentation (UNAIDS: 1998a; 1998b) thus emphasised 
increased condom uptake at the salient factor emerging from an analysis of 
multiple Ugandan data sources. The condom-based explanation is also found 
in an academic paper written by Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) that was 
published in the journal AIDS in 1997 (please note that Michel Caraël 
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contributed towards the development of this journal). Asiimwe-Okiror et al 
(1997) assert that: 
 
During the study period, a 2-year delay in the onset of sexual 
intercourse among youths aged 15-24 years and a 9% decrease in 
casual sex in the past year in male youths aged 15-24 years were 
reported. Men and women reported a 40% and 30% increase in 
the experience of condom use, respectively. In the same study 
area, over the same period, there was an overall 40% decline in 
the rates of HIV seroprevalence among pregnant women 
attending antenatal clinics. It can be hypothesized that the observed 
declining trends in HIV correspond to a change in sexual behaviour 
and condom use, especially among youths [italics added] (Asiimwe-
Okiror: 1997: pp. 1157). 
 
Thus, these authors highlighted increased condom use as the most significant 
sexual behavioural change which could explain declining trends in HIV 
seroprevalence among pregnant women who attended ANCs within urban 
areas of Uganda. Significantly, the study concluded that the sexual 
behavioural change findings “should encourage AIDS control programmes 
to pursue their prevention activities” (Asiimwe-Okiror: 1997: pp. 1157) which 
included the promotion of condoms.  
 
5.2.3 Data sources supporting the full-alignment of experts to a reduction in 
multiple partnerships uptake explanation  
 
As indicated in Figure 1, Rand Stoneburner, Daniel Low-Beer and a former 
UNAIDS official supported a reduction in multiple partnerships as the 
primary explanation contributing to Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline—
a behaviour change arising from growing awareness in the Ugandan 
population about the risks of HIV/AIDS. Rand Stoneburner, a former 
GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, described the awareness of HIV/AIDS 
amongst the Ugandan population when reflecting upon his time spent in the 
country in the early to mid-1990s:  
 
In Uganda…I noticed, talking to cab drivers and other people, 
that in Uganda you’d ask them about AIDS and you couldn’t get 
them to stop talking about all the people in their family that died 
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and what’s going on in their communities. You’d go to Malawi 
and they’d be embarrassed…so complete denial. But in Uganda, 
it was just completely open and they had an opinion about what 
to do, and what the church was doing, and whether the Pope 
was right in saying to not use condoms. But at least they were 
debating it and it was palpable. It was amazing and we tried to 
look for empirical evidence of that (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). 
 
However, this explanation failed to gain traction within global HIV/AIDS 
policymaking networks from the mid to late-1990s onwards. Stoneburner, a 
former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, claimed that the reduction in multiple 
partnerships explanation was not published until 2004 as his explanation, 
contradicted the increased condom uptake explanation as advanced by 
UNAIDS (1998a; 1998b) and Asiimwe-Okiror (1997). He also asserted that 
funding was required from USAID to publish the reduction in multiple 
partnerships explanation having left UNAIDS in the mid-1990s. The data 
below highlight Stoneburner’s view of his role in analysing Ugandan data, 
and the extent to which he was marginalised within UNAIDS: 
 
I was kind of the last one when everybody else in GPA was 
finding other jobs…I was so involved in the Ugandan data I was 
just immersed in it because it was fascinating and I didn’t 
continue with UNAIDS. I was persona non grata over all this 
Uganda…and USAID gave me some funds (Stoneburner: 
05/08/2011). 
 
Stoneburner felt that Michel Caraël’s condom explanation received 
institutional support from UNAIDS, whereas Stoneburner was obliged to 
obtain ad hoc financial support from USAID to publish his multiple 
partnership reduction explanation (Stoneburner & Low-Beer (2004) 
Population-Level HIV Decline and Behavioural Risk Avoidance in Uganda, 
Science, Vol. 304, No. 5671, pp. 714 – 718): 
 
Michel’s [Caraël’s] data, he had institutional support to continue 
to do that through UNAIDS. I had institutional support sort of 
piecemeal from USAID to continue to investigate this, with the 





Stoneburner emphasised the difficulties he faced in publishing his account of 
the Ugandan HIV decline. He noted that another analysis of data – 
emphasising the role of increased condom uptake – was published some time 
before his own paper in Science and that this undermined the dissemination 
and credibility of his analysis (highlighting a reduction in multiple 
partnerships): 
 
We tried to publish a paper with the Ugandans about this [the 
Ugandan HIV decline]. They were really keen on it and UNAIDS 
was publishing a parallel paper. I was responsible for the 
epidemiology and there was another guy from UNAIDS [Michel 
Caraël] who was basically doing the social science part of the 
survey and their paper came out first [Asiimwe-Okiror et al: 
1997]…and I said ah shoot! Well, you know, at least it’s out 
there…and this was fine, at least it’s out there. And I read 
through it, I said this isn’t…these aren’t our findings. It basically 
said there was a modest change in sexual partners (Stoneburner: 
05/08/2011). 
 
Thus, the increased condom uptake explanation appears to have been widely 
disseminated as the principal reason for Uganda’s HIV decline in the mid to 
late-1990s sometime before the reduction in multiple partnerships 
explanation appeared in the public domain in 2004. The above data 
illustrates that some interviewees – particularly Rand Stoneburner – felt 
Ugandan data had been misinterpreted by UNAIDS/WHO experts in the 
late 1990s with Michel Caraël playing a key role in this. The personalised and 
somewhat provocative nature of the some of the claims presented highlight 
the extent to which such discussions were seen as both contentious and 
significant in terms of professional standing and credibility.   
 
Two contextual factors that may have contributed to the somewhat fraught 
nature of these discussions include the political significance of Uganda’s HIV 
decline in the 1990s and the absence of a conclusive evidence-base that could 
definitively support either an increased condom uptake explanation or a 
reduction in multiple partnership explanation as  the key factor behind 
Uganda’s HIV prevalence decline. Professor Thomas Rehle, a 
UNAIDS/WHO consultant who helped develop SGS in the late-1990s, 
asserted that the need to portray the narrative of Ugandan HIV ‘success’ 
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influenced the interpretation of sexual behavioural change data by 
HIV/AIDS experts from global-level institutions: 
 
In Uganda a lot of people wanted to portray a success story. So it 
was very much needed to have a success story and there were 
people included around the Global AIDS Programme and the 
WHO and so on. So there was this need to have a success story 
and to have explanations and make sure that things worked and 
then they attributed all kinds of findings to things they had done 
in the field. Of course, this was not always really evidence-based. 
So there was a lot of interpretation issues here and counterfactual 
interpretations were always possible (Rehle: 23/11/2016). 
 
Professor Thomas Rehle, a UNAIDS/WHO consultant involved in the 
development of SGS, notes that there was a dearth of Ugandan behavioural 
evidence which could not allow HIV/AIDS experts in the mid-1990s to 
support either a condom uptake explanation or a reduction in multiple 
partnership explanation. Professor Rehle claimed that HIV/AIDS experts in 
the 1990s relied on anecdote rather than evidence in relation to supporting 
competing behavioural explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline:  
 
Was it the condom use…reduction in partners? Well it depends 
what partnerships, what types of risk behaviours they have in 
these diets…so all these really nitty-gritty pieces were not there 
to really make a case for this one or the other explanation. People 
had to resort on anecdotal stuff or some little focus groups and 
so on – but most of this stuff was not even published. So there is 
a reason for researchers and for scientists…there was a lot of 
food for contention – there is no doubt (Rehle: 23/11/2016). 
	
Professor Thomas Rehle also contextualised the lack of consensus relating to 
the contested interpretation of Ugandan sexual behavioural data and the 
broader political context that surrounded the process of data interpretation 
by competing HIV/AIDS experts:   
	
There were definitely different opinions, different interpretations 
and people were then…the more they were digging into…the 
more they defended their position and there was not a real 
consensus. Like I said, to make really informed decisions on the 
data, or to make a decision…yes this was multiple partnerships 
versus condom use you would have needed very more insightful 
data in a qualitative context. Like I said, this was a political 
environment to make such claims and you were 
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successful…embraced by people who were funding this whole 
thing…many public health findings will be often used in the 
context for some people to provide the most beneficial outcome 
(Rehle: 23/11/2016). 
 
On a broader level, Professor Thomas Rehle also posited that despite the 
absence of a comprehensive evidence-base (to support either an increased 
condom uptake explanation or a reduction in multiple partnership 
explanation) there was a wider public health need to make definitive 
statements based on anecdote – particularly during the mid-1990s – when 
HIV/AIDS was a growing global public health problem:  
	
Well this is a typical public health situation – you don’t have 
enough data but you have to give some explanations for many 
constituencies and stakeholders. As a researcher…there was not 
enough evidence and data to make these strong statements. But 
it was necessary, at this time, to make these statements because 
the overriding…the overall good was that we get more funding 
for these overall [HIV/AIDS] projects (Rehle: 23/11/2016). 
	
Given the apparent ambiguity over the reason for Uganda’s HIV decline in 
the early 1990s, it is helpful to consider why an increased condom uptake 
explanation came to dominate global HIV policy discourse at that time. The 
following three sections will examine strategies used by experts in the 
UNAIDS/WHO community to advocate for particular explanations within 
global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. Such examination will enable this 
chapter to examine the competitive nature surrounding the analysis of 
Ugandan evidence, used to support the development of SGS, and formative 
behavioural change explanations for the Ugandan HIV decline. The 
following three sections will outline claims of disciplinary bias amongst 
competing experts involved with the analysis of Ugandan data sources, the 
role of policy entrepreneurship as a strategy to legitimise an increased 
condom uptake explanation, and claims of Ugandan sexual behavioural 
change data misinterpretation (and its purported influence upon the 




5.3 Claims of disciplinary bias and its influence upon competing behavioural 
change explanations 
 
Several participants appeared to question each others’ claims regarding the 
interpretation of Ugandan data sources on the basis of contrasting 
disciplinary backgrounds. Explanations of multiple partnership reduction, 
primarily advanced by experts with an epidemiological or biomedical 
background, were framed as methodologically inadequate by other experts 
who possessed a social-scientific or socio-behavioural disciplinary 
background—including Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention 
within UNAIDS. Caraël suggested that Rand Stoneburner’s explanation, 
which focused on a reduction in multiple partnerships, was a limited one 
stemming from Stoneburner’s epidemiological background: 
 
So when Stoneburner and others come in with their data, their 
interpretations of social behavioural data that they have no clue 
about…Rand Stoneburner is a hardcore epidemiologist and I’m 
not sure that he understands himself what he’s doing with 




Caraël also suggested that underlying disciplinary bias resulted in 
Stoneburner interpreting data on sexual behavioural change in a 
biomedically oriented manner that failed to incorporate the social 
dimensions of behavioural data itself: 
 
…social institutions, perceptions, institutes…you know ideology 
things like that…I mean its completely lacking for 
epidemiologists because it’s not part of their…on their radar 
screen; they take data as data (Caraël: 20/09/2011).  
	
The construction of Stoneburner as an epidemiologist and Caraël as a social 
scientist, was emphasised by Rand Stoneburner: “yeah they [other UNAIDS 
decision-makers] were saying…you know this guy isn’t a behavioural 
scientist the real behavioural scientist was Michel [Caraël]” (Stoneburner: 
24/03/2013). This was also emphasised by a former UNAIDS official: “you 
had Michel Caraël who’s more a social scientist and on the other hand you 
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have Rand Stoneburner who is really the pure epidemiologist” (former 
UNAIDS official: 16/01/2013). 
 
5.3.1  Claims of disciplinary bias as a strategic framing technique 
 
The explanation for Uganda’s HIV decline, based on increased condom use, 
appears to have gained wider acceptability within HIV/AIDS policymaking 
networks than the competing explanation focused on a reduction in multiple 
partnerships. Caraël’s statements suggest he links the dominance of his 
favoured explanation (increased condom use) with his status as an expert 
social scientist who could interpret socio-behavioural data more competently 
than Stoneburner. In contrast, he frames Stoneburner as a pure 
epidemiologist whose underlying biomedical background made him ill-
equipped to interpret data on changes in sexual behaviour. Interview data 
suggest that the participants’ disciplinary background were used to claim 
expertise, or inadequacy, in relation to their different interpretations of 
Ugandan behavioural data. The construction of certain HIV/AIDS experts as 
being unable to analyse Ugandan sexual behavioural change data, stemming 
from their underlying disciplinary background, may have influenced the 
perceived credibility of a multiple partnership reduction explanation for 
declining HIV trends in Uganda since the early 1990s. 
 
The idea that a social scientific interpretation of Ugandan data should 
dominate a more epidemiologically-informed explanation seems to counter 
the tendency for biomedical data, and methods, to control discussions about 
evidence in health policy. Indeed, during the period relating to these 
discussion, the biomedical paradigm was seen as dominating HIV/AIDS 
discourse (Tarantola: 2000: pp. 1). The claim of expertise, advanced by 
Caraël, is therefore of particular interest, and may have represented a 
deliberate strategy for advancing the credibility of his preferred explanation. 
Caraël’s claims about Stoneburner’s disciplinary bias were possibly used as a 
discrediting strategy to give greater credence to Caraël’s favoured 
explanation (i.e. increased condom uptake) for Uganda’s HIV decline. 
Having examined claims of disciplinary bias and the possibility that these 
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claims were advanced by competing participants for strategic reasons, it is 
necessary to examine a second strategy which appears to have facilitated an 
increased condom uptake explanation to dominate a reduction in multiple 
partnership explanation—namely policy entrepreneurship.   
 
5.4 Policy entrepreneurship as a strategy to facilitate an increased condom 
uptake explanation 
 
Kingdon (1995) maintains that it is possible when researching policy case 
studies to “pinpoint a particular person or at most a few persons, who were 
central in moving a subject up on the agenda and into position for 
enactment” (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 180). This section of the chapter will support 
this contention by presenting interview data to illustrate that Michel Caraël, 
the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, functioned as a policy 
entrepreneur within global HIV/AIDS policy networks, advocating for the 
increased condom uptake explanation as the main cause of Uganda’s HIV 
decline in the early to mid-1990s.  
 
Prior to examining this strategy, it is necessary to define what policy 
entrepreneurs are, how they operate within policy networks, and what 
motivates them to take an active role within the policymaking process. 
According to Kingdon (1995), policy entrepreneurs are individuals who 
possess three central qualities. First, policy entrepreneurs possess a known 
level of expertise which in turn gives them a legitimate claim to hearing 
within a policy network.  Second, policy entrepreneurs are known for their 
negotiating skills and their political connections. Third, policy entrepreneurs 
are persistent and tenacious individuals who aim to push their ideas about 
policy problems and how to address them in multiple fora (Kingdon: 1995: 
pp. 180 – 181). According to Kingdon (1995) the primary incentive which 
motivate policy entrepreneurs to function within the policymaking process is 
the promotion of personal interest—this may include protecting one’s 
bureaucratic turf, maintaining one’s employment, expanding one’s agency 
and personal career promotion (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 123).  
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Interview data suggest that Michel Caraël possessed a legitimate claim to 
hearing within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks underpinned by 
his perceived expertise as a socio-behavioural scientist. Indeed, Caraël was 
defined as a “key mover” in relation to behavioural surveillance 
methodological approaches within sub-Saharan Africa—this notion was 
raised by Manuel Carbello, the former chief of behavioural research with the 
GPA (Carbello: 20/09/2011). Caraël was also noted as being directly 
involved with the critical appraisal of Ugandan behavioural data—in relation 
to HIV/AIDS surveillance policy “particularly in sub-Saharan Africa there 
were gentlemen like Michel Caraël involved with the process”—Alex Opio, 
assistant commissioner for national disease control within the Ugandan 
Ministry of Health (Opio: 14//02/2012). Joshua Musinguzi, former head of 
the AIDS control programme within the Ugandan Ministry of Health, 
emphasised the central role of Michel Caraël in relation to conducting 
Ugandan sexual behavioural studies “Michel Caraël was especially 
instrumental in the behavioural studies we were doing here” (Musinguzi: 
27/01/2012). 
 
In relation to the development of SGS, which used Ugandan sexual 
behavioural studies to support its introduction, Daniel Tarantola, a former 
senior employee of the GPA/former senior policy advisor to the Director 
General of the WHO also commented on the central role of Michel Caraël. 
Tarantola remarked during interview that despite a “whole group” 
(Tarantola: 27/10/2011) of people being involved with the policy 
development of SGS, Michel Caraël was “one of the most engaged” 
individuals involved with its development (Tarantola: 27/10/2011). 
Commenting on his own role in relation to the policy development of SGS, 
Michel Caraël stated “I don’t want to personalise it because it would be 
unfair -  but for sure I consider myself as key in UNAIDS” (Caraël: 
20/09/2011).  
 
It was also claimed by a former UNAIDS official that Michel Caraël, 
stemming from his socio-behavioural expertise, possessed a close and 
productive working relationship with Peter Piot, the former Executive 
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Director of UNAIDS. Indeed, he was framed as a “guru” of socio-
behavioural data analysis by Peter Piot according to a former UNAIDS 
official “Michel Caraël was the guru of this thinking and was the one who 
Peter Piot kept on-board” (former UNAIDS official: 19/9/2011). This notion 
was reiterated by the former UNAIDS official:  
 
Michel Caraël was the guru of Peter Piot and his voice was heard 
and he didn’t listen to the others. And so at the end of course it 
was the data and the truth from Michel Caraël that came 
across…his thinking was what went into the UNAIDS secretariat 
(former UNAIDS official: 19/9/2011). 
 
This relationship with Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, 
could be viewed as illustrating a facet of policy entrepreneurship as 
advanced by Kingdon (1995) namely their political connections and 
negotiating skills. It could be argued that Caraël’s productive relationship 
with Peter Piot, the most institutionally senior decision-maker within 
UNAIDS, could have facilitated Caraël’s ability to negotiate his explanation 
of Ugandan sexual behavioural change to gain wider political acceptance 
within UNAIDS than other competing sexual behavioural change 
explanations.  
 
On the basis of the interview data presented above, Michel Caraël could be 
viewed as a central actor within the policymaking domain of global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance. It could be argued that Michel Caraël was able to 
take a central role within the network of decision-makers involved with 
global HIV/AIDS surveillance stemming from the actual size of the SGS 
policy network itself. Importantly, the SGS policy network was relatively 
compact, perhaps stemming from the esoteric nature of global HIV/AIDS 
surveillance, and the limited stock of experts involved within this policy field 
at the global level. The compact size of the SGS policy network was 
described by an HIV/AIDS official within the WHO, claiming that it is 
possible to count to number of HIV/AIDS experts, involved with global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance on the fingers of two or three hands. The notion that 
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global HIV/AIDS surveillance policy networks were quite compact was also 
emphasised by Elizabeth Pisani, a former UNAIDS external consultant: 
 
…and here’s what we a bunch of twenty people in the world not 
even that many fifteen people in the world…whatever it was 
decided after a review of the existing data (Pisani: 31/08/2011). 
 
It could be argued, stemming from the small size of global HIV/AIDS policy 
networks, that Michel Caraël was able to function as a policy entrepreneur 
which facilitated his own ideas about Ugandan sexual behavioural change to 
permeate through global HIV/AIDS policy networks ahead of other 
competing explanations.  By possessing a legitimate claim to hearing, and the 
appropriate socio-behavioural expertise within the global HIV/AIDS policy 
networks, it can be tentatively reasoned that Michel Caraël may have actively 
functioned in an entrepreneurial fashion as a strategy to legitimise his 
increased condom uptake explanation. It can also by argued that Caraël’s 
close relationship with Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, 
was a useful political connection to possess—arguably such a political 
connection may have been utilised by Caraël to promote his analysis of 
Ugandan sexual behavioural change data more effectively than other 
competing HIV/AIDS experts.  
 
5.5 Claims of Ugandan sexual behavioural change data misinterpretation 
 
This section of the chapter presents claims of Ugandan sexual behavioural 
change data interpretation and possible misinterpretation. A small number 
of interviewees suggested there may have been a degree of misinterpretation 
in the analysis of Ugandan data which was seen as contributing to the 
dominance of explanations emphasising an increase in condom use as the 
main explanation for Uganda’s HIV decline.    
 
Prior to examining the claims of Ugandan data misinterpretation, it is also 
important to state that the interview data outlined below are understood by 
the author as an artefact of the contentious “catfight” (Pisani: 31/08/2011) 
that apparently took place between competing participants who attempted to 
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explain Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline of the early to mid-1990s. The 
material presented is intended to reflect the range of perspectives presented 
during interviews, some of which involve fairly personalised claims. The 
following parts of the chapter are organised into two sub-sections. The first 
sub-section will present the claim of Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
data misinterpretation, the specific Ugandan data sources which were 
potentially influenced by the alleged process of data misinterpretation, and 
the key participants involved with the purported process of Ugandan data  
misinterpretation itself. The second sub-section will examine the relationship 
between the claim of Ugandan data misinterpretation, its associated 
relationship with the emergence of SGS and the development of explanations 
for the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s.  
 
5.5.1 Examining the claim of Ugandan sexual behavioural change data 
misinterpretation  
 
A small number of interviewees suggested there may have been a degree of 
data misinterpretation in relation to Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
evidence and the contrasting explanations advanced for Uganda’s HIV 
decline, specifically, these claims relate to the purported oversight of a 60% 
reduction in multiple partnership finding that emerged from an analysis of 
two Ugandan population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change 
conducted in 1989 and 1995. Stoneburner suggested that this reduction in 
multiple partnerships was overlooked by some experts, thus increasing the 
apparent significance of increased condom use as highlighted in Asiimwe-
Okiror et al (1997) and ‘A Measure of Success in Uganda’ (UNAIDS: 1998b). 
This purported misinterpretation was seen as seemingly “confound[ing] the 
understanding of HIV dynamics in Uganda” (Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004: 
pp. 714) since Stoneburner & Low-Beer saw the 60% reduction in multiple 
partnership as “an important and perhaps overlooked measure of behaviour 
change” (Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004: pp. 715) that took place within 
Uganda between 1989 and 1995. This is reiterated – and stated even more 
strongly – in the following quotes from Stoneburner:  
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The amazing thing is that they [UNAIDS] eliminated the 60 
percent decline in multiple partners and you asked was this the 
condoms? Or the fact that we’re having one partner? But they 
[UNAIDS] eliminated that key indicator (Stoneburner: 
05/08/2011).  
 
I think they [UNAIDS] were being fraudulent. They made it – 
they did something to make some, they obscured it [finding of 
multiple partnership reduction] which I think but they obscured 
it with the intent - a mal intent (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011).   
 
Stoneburner notes that the authors of Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) referred to 
“only a 9% decline in casual sex among men and increases among women 
(Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004: pp. 716) and thus overlooked the 
significance of reduced sexual partnerships as an explanation for Uganda’s 
HIV decline. Stoneburner regarded Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV 
prevention within UNAIDS, as the key person responsible for this 
interpretation:   
 
We [Rand Stoneburner & Michel Caraël] were supposed to be 
writing up papers in tandem. I was doing it on the prevalence 
decline, the dynamics, and he [Michel Caraël] was doing all the 
social behavioural stuff and mine was sort of overlapping with 
his. And that’s when I learned that he [Michel Caraël] had 
manipulated the data in a manner to make the partnership go 
away and that was in 1996 and 1997 (Stoneburner: 24/03/2011).  
 
The purported misinterpretation of Ugandan behavioural data was also 
advanced by Rand Stoneburner & Daniel Low-Beer in their 2004 Science 
article, which posited their counter-explanation to the increased condom 
uptake explanation advanced by Michel Caraël and Elizabeth Pisani from 
1996 onwards: 
 
A comparative analysis of 1995 and 1989 Ugandan population-
based surveys of HIV behavioral risk indicators offered evidence 
of important changes since 1989, including an increase in the age 
of sexual debut, a decrease in indicators of casual or nonregular 
partners, and an increase in the use of condoms, both overall and 
in casual partnerships. The subsequent report, led by the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), 
emphasized the relative importance of sexual debut and condom 
use. An important and perhaps overlooked measure of behavior change 
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in Uganda between 1989 and 1995 was a 60% reduction in persons 
reporting casual sexual partnerships in the past year, evident in urban 
and rural populations [italics added] (Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 
2004: pp. 715).  
 
Stoneburner also claimed that when he attempted to advance his explanation 
of sexual behavioural change, that could be associated with declining HIV 
seroprevalence rates within Uganda,  there was a degree of reluctance within 
UNAIDS to internalise this finding:  
 
When we [Stoneburner & Low-Beer] came back with the data 
and kind of showed it at a meeting…the field people [working 
within Uganda] were really excited they said gosh something is 
really going on here something is working and it kind of got - the 
door got slammed shut on it. It was then very difficult to get it 
out (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). 
 
 
A narrative advanced by Stoneburner also highlights the contested nature of 
Ugandan behavioural data analysis, which echoes Elizabeth Pisani’s 
“catfight” (Pisani: 31/08/2011) notion outlined above. The claim below again 
indicates that the process of Ugandan behavioural data analysis was highly 
contested and it also reiterates Stoneburner’s claim of Ugandan data 
misinterpretation, which, again, should be understood as an artefact of the 
contested process of participants’ attempts to distil Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline into its constituent aspects:  
 
 
I was then invited…kind of as an afterthought to this meeting 
[the 1997 Nairobi workshop] because I was already sort of on the 
warpath with UNAIDS and the cabal of Ties Boerma and 
Bernhard [Schwartländer] and Elizabeth Pisani…but all of this 
had sort of been evolved and denied by UNAIDS. So their 
second generation surveillance was not acknowledging too much 
on what was going on in Uganda because Michel Caraël had 
already, you know, re-written some of the data (Stoneburner: 
24/03/2011). 
 
One other interviewee suggested Ugandan data may have been 
misinterpreted by UNAIDS/WHO experts. A former UNAIDS official 




Well the story between Michel Caraël and [Elizabeth] Pisani with 
[Bernhard] Schwartländer I know this story very well and that’s 
why, for me, I moved away from that because I find this dirty 
politics. And I love all these people I work with them closely and 
Rand Stoneburner go and speak to his friend Daniel Low-Beer 
and Uganda they fuzzed up the data (former UNAIDS official 
19/09/2011). 
 
The interviewee went on to state “I never wanted to get into this - but they 
[unnamed UNAIDS decision-makers] played with the data” (former 
UNAIDS official: 19/09/2011), suggesting this had a significant impact on 
the interpretation of Uganda’s HIV decline: 
 
…the interpretation on the condom use and sexual partners and 
the statistics behind were if not falsified they were not reported 
correctly (former UNAIDS official: 19/09/2011). 
 
Some Ugandan participants, one of whom was involved with the Asiimwe-
Okiror et al (1997) publication, also appeared to be sensitive to the notion 
that different participants from UNAIDS were analysing Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change data in a heterogeneous manner. Indeed, Joshua 
Musinguzi, former head of the AIDS control programme within the Ugandan 
Ministry of Health, who collaborated on the Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) 
publication with Michel Caraël, commented upon different data 
interpretations advanced by competing participants: 
 
When we [Ugandan Ministry of health officials] did collect our 
information we actually worked in collaboration…I remember 
we did have lots of discussions, internally first, and also with the 
group from there…Rand [Stoneburner] and Daniel Low-Beer 
and I think Michel Caraël and others to look at the 
processes…now the interpretation and the analysis and the 
usage I know that people were interpreting data variously 
(Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
Comments relating to the process of Ugandan behavioural data 
interpretation, that occurred during the institutional transition from GPA to 
UNAIDS between 1995 and 1996, were also advanced by Musinguzi: 
 
What I know is…I think what was difficult for them [competing 
participants] was when they were transitioning to GPA to 
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UNAIDS and I think there were some feelings with some of 
them…there were issues. There were them [sic] who did not 
move over from one to the other…what I know is there 
continued to be some turbulence within themselves. I don’t 
know to what extent that was probably an issue with the usage 
of data. What I was always sure about was the quality of the 
data. But how they used it and how people interpreted it was 
always different (Musinguzi: 27/01/2012). 
 
Musinguzi also indicated that issues arose when individual HIV/AIDS 
experts started to interpret the Ugandan sexual behavioural data itself:  
 
For us [the Ugandan Ministry of Health] what we always 
insisted on was to ensure that the data we collect are of the 
highest quality. But I think there was a price at some stage and 
people may have worked for it in different ways (Musinguzi: 
27/01/2012). 
 
5.5.2 Ugandan sexual behavioural change data misinterpretation and its 
relationship with the development of SGS 
 
Interview data were also generated by participants from Uganda who assert 
that the contested Ugandan sexual behavioural change data, which were 
used to support the development of SGS, and to provide explanations of 
Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline, were competitively interpreted by 
participants. The narrative below provided by Professor David Serwadda, 
director of the institute of public health at Makerere University, advances the 
key notion that participants attempted to “slice and dice” (Serwadda: 
06/02/2012) the sexual behavioural change reasons contributing to Uganda’s 
HIV seroprevalence decline which in turn “messed” (Serwadda: 06/02/2012) 
the formative interpretations of Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline:     
 
This is basically the crux of the matter. Now if you’re going to 
talk about politics in second generation surveillance it was 
driven truly by understanding the dynamics of the epidemic. So 
when we started to collect behavioural indicators then, you 
know, people wanted to slice it into whether it’s reduction of 
sexual partner, whether it’s condom use, whether it was 
abstinence that was really driving this. And that’s where 
really…issues of real politics at the local stage really started to 
come in…depending on who you talk to and who was a strong 
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advocate of what. That really sort of messed us up a bit 
(Serwadda: 06/02/2012). 
 
Serwadda’s narrative below relates to the attempts of various actors involved 
with global HIV/AIDS policy to understand which specific behavioural 
factors were contributing to Uganda’s HIV prevalence decline, and the 
manner in which individuals were using Ugandan behavioural evidence to 
advance their own sexual behavioural change preferences:  
 
So to go back to second generation…we were seeing these 
[sexual behavioural] changes but we needed to get handle onto it 
but the [sexual behavioural] changes were going into the right 
directions for politicians on one side for donors on the other. 
Everybody wanted to have a bite on this success [the Ugandan 
HIV seroprevalence decline]. And therefore, it was basically 
trying to get the evidence that would justify what they believed. 
So that is the politics of it. I think the original intention was…I 
don’t think in my opinion a very political thing it was very 
logical. But what happened was that you know? When they 
started to slice and dice the behaviour change and what might be 
contributing more that’s when we got in very muddied water 
(Serwadda: 06/02/2012). 
 
Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, also claimed 
that Ugandan sexual behavioural change data, which were used to support 
the development of SGS, and to understand the sexual behavioural change 
reasons contributing to Uganda’s emerging HIV decline, were interpreted 
and presented in a political manner by other UNAIDS decision-makers: 
 
I think the idea of moving into second generation surveillance 
was a very important progression in our ability to better monitor 
the epidemiological and social dynamics of the epidemic. I think 
the shortcoming was the way in which the data was [sic] 
interpreted and presented in very politically self-serving 
manners (Stoneburner: 24/03/2013). 
 
The notion that distinct “teams” (former UNAIDS official: 16/01/2013) of 
decision-makers, who were involved with the formative analysis of Ugandan 
sexual behavioural change data sources, and the notion that Ugandan 
statistics were possibly misinterpreted, was raised by a former UNAIDS 
official. The narrative below outlines this participants’ understanding of the 
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purported process of Ugandan data misinterpretation and the manner in 
which data were “played” (former UNAIDS official: 16/01/2013) with to 
determine what was statistically significant or not in relation to Ugandan 
sexual behavioural change: 
 
So you have one team looking at the data one way with their 
own perspective and views…and you have another team looking 
at it another way. My thinking is you can interpret and analyse 
data and come up with maybe quite some different stand [sic] 
than another team if you start to play with statistics. And like 
you maybe look at some variables and forget the others…you 
can look at some data…forget some other sources…you can look 
at some ranges and play with the ranges and say this is 
statistically significant or not. And this is exactly what happened 
I think in Uganda…that’s how you interpret differences between 
the people (former UNAIDS official: 16/01/2013). 
 
It is important to state that this former UNAIDS official attempted to 
function as a neutral arbiter during interview (attempting to provide a 
balanced account of the contested process of Ugandan sexual behavioural 
change data analysis) and the manner in which competing HIV/AIDS 
experts took part with the purported process of data misinterpretation. 
However, towards the end of the first interview the participant 
acknowledged that an increased condom uptake explanation was ostensibly 
presented as the salient behavioural change explanation that was 
contributing to Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline: 
 
So something happened around then [1996 – 1997] and that is 
where you can’t deny what Rand [Stoneburner] is saying is 
totally correct. I’m sorry somebody somewhere said things are 
screwed up and we need more of this or that… the condoms and 
all this. But I’m sorry it was already functioning there [Ugandan 
seroprevalence decline underpinned by reduction in multiple 
partnership]. And somebody was continuing…pressing the 
alarm saying okay look at this data from Uganda from here or 
there and I’m sorry that wasn’t the truth (former UNAIDS 
official: 19/09/2011). 
  
Having presented interview data, which appear to suggest that a reduction 
in multiple partnership explanation was misinterpreted as a strategy to 
emphasise increased condom uptake as the preeminent sexual behavioural 
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change reason contributing to Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline, it is 
important to reiterate that the author is not endorsing this narrative that 
emerged during data collection. Although Rand Stoneburner, and other 
participants interviewed during data collection indicated that Ugandan data 
misinterpretation took place sometime between 1996 and 1997 the author, in 
the interests of transparency, must make clear that these claims require 
further empirical investigation. Further empirical research is needed to 
substantiate or repudiate the complex and political notions generated as part 
of this doctoral study. The notions outlined above are conceptualised by the 
author as essentially exploratory in nature which therefore demand further 
independent analysis and empirical verification in the future—such 
exploration and analysis could take place once this doctoral study is 
completed. In the interest of good academic practice, please note that 
individual participants were given the right to reply to the highly 
personalised claims outlined above, however no responses were received by 
the researcher.  
 
5.6 Discussing the competition over Ugandan behavioural evidence amongst 
HIV/AIDS experts 
 
Findings suggest that HIV/AIDS experts involved with the development of 
SGS competed amongst each other to legitimise, and discredit, contrasting 
sexual behavioural change explanations that could account for Uganda’s HIV 
decline of the early to mid-1990s. It was discovered that certain HIV/AIDS 
experts aligned themselves to either a condom-based or a partnership 
reduction-based explanation that emerged from the analysis of Ugandan 
data sources. Importantly, the contested data sources, used to advance 
formative behavioural change explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, were 
the same data sources presented at the 1997 Nairobi workshop which helped 




• 300 small-scale sociological surveys reviewed by Tom Barton, an 
anthropologist under the instruction of Michel Caraël, the former 
head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS.  
 
• Two population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change conducted 
in Uganda in 1989 and 1995. 
 
Therefore, it was important for this chapter to examine the competition 
surrounding the contested Ugandan data sources, and the influence of this 
competition upon the evidence used to support the development of SGS 
itself. Data presented in this chapter illustrate how interviewees involved 
with the framing of Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story aligned themselves 
according to two competing explanations for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence 
decline (both of which could have conceivably informed subsequent 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy advanced by UNAIDS from 1996 onwards). 
This raises important questions about why an increased condom uptake 
became the dominant explanation for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline 
in subsequent policy discussions, UNAIDS documentation and journal 
articles in the mid to late-1990s.  
 
Interview data point to three factors that appear to have influenced which 
explanation came to dominate subsequent HIV policy development. First, 
claims were made about disciplinary differences between two key figures 
involved in competing interpretations of Ugandan data. Claims were 
advanced concerning the limitations of explanations favoured by scientists 
with an epidemiological or biomedical background. The construction of 
Rand Stoneburner as being poorly equipped to explain Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change data can be conceptualised as a discrediting technique 
intended to undermine support for his favoured explanations (i.e. a 
reduction in multiple sexual partners). This discrediting strategy has 
arguably been an important and overlooked element of the broader 
competition between HIV/AIDS experts, who attempted to frame their 
respective sexual behavioural change explanations as preeminent in the mid 
to late-1990s. The finding that an epidemiologist was not able to advance an 
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explanation, that could account for Uganda’s HIV decline, is surprising as 
biomedical and epidemiological understandings of HIV/AIDS were 
dominant during the early to mid-1990s. One would expect that greater 
analytical significance would have be given to Stoneburner’s explanation as 
the competing explanation, advanced by Michel Caraël,  a socio-behavioural 
scientist, emerged when behavioural and social scientific approaches (which 
relied on mainly qualitative based data) were beginning to disseminate in 
HIV/AIDS policy networks.    
 
Interview data also point to the importance of policy entrepreneurship 
within the global HIV/AIDS policymaking network and the ability of one 
expert, Michel Caraël (the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS) 
to function as a policy entrepreneur. Data have been presented which 
strongly suggest that Michel Caraël, underpinned by his reputation for socio-
behavioural expertise, and his close working relationship with Peter Piot, the 
former director of UNAIDS, was highly influential in securing acceptance of 
the increased condom uptake explanation as the primary reason for 
Uganda’s HIV decline. Finally, claims have also been presented concerning 
the purported misinterpretation of Ugandan data by Michel Caraël in order 
to strengthen the case for increased condom uptake as the explanation 
favoured for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline. Several participants, 
from both Genevan and Ugandan contexts, outlined their understandings of 
the purported Ugandan data misinterpretation. They elucidated that the 
interpretation, and analysis of, Ugandan evidence used to support SGS (and 
explanations of the Ugandan HIV decline) was a complex process, whilst 
acknowledging that increased condom uptake may not have been a wholly 
valid explanation that could account for the Ugandan HIV ‘success’ story.    
 
5.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter examined competing explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
‘success’ story and how HIV/AIDS experts, involved with the analysis of 
Ugandan behavioural evidence attempted to legitimise either an increased 
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condom uptake, or a reduction in multiple partnership explanation, as the 
preeminent factor that could account for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence 
decline. It was ascertained that HIV/AIDS experts were involved in a highly 
contested process of trying to make the case for competing explanations for 
Uganda’s HIV decline. The alignment process of HIV/AIDS experts, to each 
competing sexual behavioural change explanations, was framed by certain 
participants as highly divisive which led to significant levels of epistemic 
conflict within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. This chapter has 
highlighted that increased condom uptake became the accepted explanation 
for Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline, as reflected in UNAIDS policy 
documentation and peer-reviewed publications in the mid to late-1990s 
(UNAIDS: 1998a; UNAIDS: 1998b; Asiimwe-Okiror et al: 1997). Whereas, a 
reduction in multiple partnership explanation, which came about due to 
increased awareness of HIV/AIDS and communication amongst Ugandans, 
did not appear to inform UNAIDS policy documentation or peer-reviewed 
journals in the same time period. Indeed, it was noted that the reduction in 
multiple partnership explanation was not widely disseminated until 2004 in 
the journal Science. 
 
While this chapter examined the contested manner in which HIV/AIDS 
experts competed over Ugandan evidence, it did not examine the underlying 
reasons that contributed towards HIV/AIDS experts competing amongst 
each other within HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. Nor did it examine the 
political and institutional context, within which SGS and its evidence-base 
emerged, and the influence of political and institutional context change upon 
the evidence/SGS policy relationship. In reaction to the findings presented 
within this chapter, most notably the claim of Ugandan data 
misinterpretation, it is required to examine the broader political and 
institutional environment within which SGS emerged and their influence 
upon the Ugandan evidence used to support the introduction of SGS and the 
subsequent development of HIV prevention policy in the 1990s.    
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CHAPTER SIX: Examining institutional and political 
context adaptation and the competing behavioural 
change explanations 
 
6.1 Introduction to chapter 
 
The previous chapter highlighted that certain HIV/AIDS experts competed 
over two behavioural change explanations that could account for Uganda’s 
HIV prevalence decline of the 1990s. It explored the influence of disciplinary 
bias, policy entrepreneurship and claims of data misinterpretation as 
elements of a competition over contrasting behavioural change explanations, 
noting that an increased condom uptake explanation influenced the 
development of HIV prevention policy more directly than a partnership 
reduction explanation. While the previous chapter explored the competition 
amongst HIV/AIDS experts, it did not examine the broader institutional and 
political context within which the competition over Ugandan behavioural 
evidence occurred. Nor did it examine adaptations in the political and 
institutional context upon the competing behavioural change explanations 
that were advanced by HIV/AIDS experts in the mid to late-1990s. It is 
widely acknowledged that political and institutional contexts can influence 
policy development and how evidence gets synthesised into subsequent 
policy output (Hutchinson et al: 2011; Bowen & Zwi: 2006). Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine how the broader institutional and political context, 
which surrounded the competition amongst HIV/AIDS experts, influenced 
the competing behavioural explanations by those involved with the 
development SGS, formative accounts of Uganda’s HIV decline and the 
development of global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. Via an 
exploration of the institutional and political context, this chapter will 
facilitate the thesis to examine the contested explanations for the decline in 
HIV prevalence in Uganda in greater analytical detail and the role of 
evidence in the development of global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. 
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6.2 The emergence of competing behavioural change explanations and the 
institutional transition from GPA to UNAIDS 
 
To facilitate an analysis of institutional and political context adaptation upon 
the competing Ugandan behavioural change explanations that could account 
for the decline in Ugandan HIV prevalence, it is required to introduce an 
overarching finding that appears to have influenced the movement of the 
condom-based, and the partnership reduction-based explanations, within 
global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. Importantly, the emergence, and 
analysis of, the contested Ugandan data sources used to support the 
development of SGS, and explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, arose 
when a significant institutional change took place within the United Nations 
(UN) political system in the mid-1990s. In the year 1995, the GPA, a WHO 
institution mandated to direct and coordinate the global fight against 
HIV/AIDS shut down—having operated from February 1987. In its place, on 
January 1st 1996, UNAIDS was launched under the leadership of Peter Piot, 
the first Executive Director of the newly formed UN institution. Significantly, 
the closure of GPA in 1995, and the launch of UNAIDS in 1996, resulted in a 
major policy shift in the approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention. 
 
It is noted by Knight (2008), that GPA had adopted a biomedically focused 
approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention, which donors had expressed 
concern about as a strategy to mitigate the HIV/AIDS epidemic at the global 
level (Knight: 2008: pp. 18). Furthermore, it is claimed that GPA had adopted 
a “one-size-fits-all blueprint to countries when developing national AIDS 
plans” (Knight: 2008: pp. 18). This standardised approach to HIV/AIDS, it is 
argued, did not meet the need for culturally sensitive plans and effective 
HIV/AIDS programmes (Knight: 2008: pp. 18). The notion that GPA had 
adopted a mainly biomedical approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention was 
raised by Barnett & Whiteside (2002). It is claimed that GPA was medically 
and epidemiologically driven which adopted a short-term and conceptually 
restricted fire-fighting perspective on experience of other, more explosive, 
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and short-wave infectious disease epidemics (Barnett & Whiteside: 2002: pp. 
23). 
 
When UNAIDS was launched in 1996 it thus attempted to advance an 
expanded approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention which was broad-based 
and multisectoral, incorporating HIV/AIDS into all aspects of human 
development and economic planning (Knight: 2008: pp. 42). Departing from 
GPA’s biomedical approach to HIV/AIDS prevention, UNAIDS intended to 
pursue a multisectoral approach to mitigate HIV/AIDS at the global level 
from 1996 onwards. According to Harman (2012), multisectoralism pertains 
to the inclusion of multiple actors—state, non-state, community-based, 
globally-based, regional, public, and private—in the delivery and decision-
making of healthcare initiatives. The purpose of this integration is to 
acknowledge the inter-relationship of health with multiple sectors of state-
based activity, development and inequality; and to increase participation and 
accountability within global health (Harman: 2012: pp. 47). The adoption of a 
multisectoral approach by UNAIDS thus shifted the biomedical paradigm 
that had previously defined global health governance whilst positioning 
health as a development objective and practice (Harman: 2012: pp. 47). The 
formal adoption of a multisectoral approach to HIV/AIDS prevention by 
UNAIDS is stated within UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
Resolution 1994/24 Section 3.10: 
 
An important function of the programme will be to strengthen 
national capacities to plan, coordinate, implement and monitor 
the overall response to HIV/AIDS. The participation in the 
programme of six organizations of the United Nations system 
will ensure the provision of technical and financial assistance to 
national activities in a coordinated multisectoral manner 
(ECOSOC Resolution 1994/24: 3.10). 
 
The notion of multisectoralism is also emphasised within the objectives of 
Resolution 1994/24 which highlighted the need for UNAIDS to: 
 
Promote broad-based political and social mobilization to prevent 
and respond to HIV/AIDS within countries, ensuring that 
national responses involve a wide range of sectors and 
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An historical account that describes the institutional transition from GPA to 
UNAIDS, and the policy transition from clinically-focused HIV prevention 
strategies to multisectoral HIV prevention strategies, was advanced by James 
Guwani, a UNAIDS Strategic Information Adviser: 
 
UNAIDS was basically created to coordinate the UN around HIV 
programming because people felt it [HIV/AIDS] was a clinical 
disease when we had it at the Global AIDS Programme [GPA] at 
WHO [from 1987 – 1995]. They were looking at the clinical 
dimensions…and when we [UNAIDS] started realizing that it 
was no longer just a clinical condition, there was a need to have a 
more multisectoral approach to deal with it [HIV/AIDS]…and 
therefore the creation of an organisation that actually could bring 
in all the other agencies that were non-clinical: UNDP, UNCHR, 
UNICEF, ILO and all those other agencies aboard because then 
WHO did not have the…to be able to effectively interact with the 
external…the non-clinical actors (Guwani: 31/01/2012).  
 
As is emerging, the institutional transition from GPA to UNAIDS resulted in 
the introduction of a new approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention which 
attempted to depart from older, biomedically informed, HIV prevention 
strategies that had been implemented by the WHO’s GPA. Having 
introduced the idea of institutional change within the UN political system in 
the mid-1990s, it is now required to examine how the transition from 
biomedical-based HIV prevention approaches to multisectoral HIV 
prevention approaches affected the competing Ugandan behavioural change 
explanations. The two following sections will outline two themes that 
emerged from data analysis. First, the theme that the partnership reduction 
explanation did not appear to align with the prevailing political and 
institutional transition towards the multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention 
agenda as advanced by UNAIDS from 1996 onwards. Second, the theme that 
the partnership reduction explanation presented UNAIDS with possible 
funding dilemmas, as this explanation did not necessitate an extensive 
mobilisation of financial support from UNAIDS, and other external actors, to 
prevent HIV transmission.     
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6.3 Partnership reduction in Uganda and UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV/AIDS 
prevention approach 
 
Interview data suggest that the partnership reduction explanation, which 
Rand Stoneburner and Daniel Low-Beer claimed could account for Uganda’s 
HIV prevalence decline, did not align with UNAIDS’ multisectoral approach 
to global HIV/AIDS prevention. According to Stoneburner & Low-Beer, 
their explanation indicated that partnership reduction, which was catalysed 
by an endogenous process of increased HIV awareness and communication 
amongst Ugandans, occurred without the implementation of UNAIDS’ 
multisectoral approach. Their explanation, it is claimed, was potentially 
problematic for UNAIDS as it was attempting to implement its multisectoral 
approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention, an approach which wanted to 
emphasise the use of condoms to prevent the transmission of HIV via the 
engagement of multiple stakeholders and broad-based social mobilisation. 
By attempting to advance the partnership reduction explanation, 
Stoneburner claimed that the idea of a Ugandan-based HIV prevention 
initiative (which did not require a UNAIDS led multisectoral HIV response 
or the need to advocate for funds to promote the use of condoms) was met 
with scepticism by senior-level officials within UNAIDS: 
 
It’s just ridiculous that somehow this [Ugandan] population had 
done something on its own without an external product like a 
condom that interrupted [HIV] transmission. If it’s condoms it’s 
okay. That’s a biomedical product. But here they had 
spontaneously changed their behaviour…in threat to this public 
health disaster [HIV/AIDS]. That’s one explanation…and that 
interfered with their [UNAIDS’] whole basis…for a need to bring 
the UN and the World Bank and all these people in together to 
make bigger pieces of pie (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011).  
 
The claim advanced by Stoneburner was echoed by Daniel Low-Beer, an 
epidemiologist involved with the analysis of Ugandan data in the mid to 
late-1990s. Low-Beer asserted that the partnership reduction explanation 
conflicted with UNAIDS’ multisectoral approach to global HIV/AIDS 
prevention, whilst acknowledging that the reasons contributing towards 
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Uganda’s HIV decline were brought about, and owned, by the Ugandan 
Government: 
 
Well who owned it? It was a Ugandan public health programme 
a pretty direct one. It wasn’t a long-term multisectoral 
development response by the UN partners. So that 
fundamentally…there was a big institutional difference it was a 
direct country programme to fight AIDS…but it was different 
than what was being promoted at the beginning…the type of 
response that UNAIDS was built around in 1996 (Low-Beer: 
06/12/2011). 
 
It is also claimed by Daniel Low-Beer, an epidemiologist involved with the 
analysis of Ugandan data in the mid to late-1990s, that the partnership 
reduction explanation, and the evidence supporting the explanation itself 
was possibly “forgotten” (Low-Beer: 06/12/2011) by UNAIDS as it did not 
align with its multisectoral approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention: 
 
Well the evidence for me was forgotten…because UNAIDS was 
not about that basic public health response at the beginning. It 
was the development response a long-term cycle and it was 
based more on [HIV/AIDS] modelling. And it had some 
strengths, I mean there’s no doubt it had some strengths, but it 
was quite an institutional change (Low-Beer: 06/12/2011).  
 
Describing the partnership reduction explanation, and how it challenged 
UNAIDS’ development centered and multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS 
further, Daniel Low-Beer, an epidemiologist involved with the analysis of 
Ugandan data in the mid to late-1990s, raises the idea that a reduction in 
partnership explanation did not “filter through” UNAIDS when it was 
formed in 1996 citing political reasons: 
 
When Peter Piot [first Executive Director of UNAIDS] came in 
when he was in Uganda saying this is a long-term response…it 
wasn’t something that was going to happen quickly…it was 
something that was going to be 10, 15 years as we change 
development. But the fact is those countries…with some support 
from the outside…not driven with a large numbers of partners 
[external donors] could fight AIDS. And that institutionally 
didn’t filter through that new organisation [UNAIDS]. It wasn’t 
part of its rationale for creating something new…but that’s 
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politics. I mean politics is part of…there’s always going to be that 
political filtering (Low-Beer: 06/12/2011). 
 
The notion that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, may 
not have acknowledged the partnership reduction explanation, emerging 
from the analysis of Ugandan behavioural data sources, was also posited by 
Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist: 
 
But it’s very interesting because Peter [Piot] didn’t embrace this 
[partnership reduction explanation] and it was also because I 
think he’d already convinced the whole UN community to come 
in and create this mammoth organisation with its infusion of 
resources…which is good. But it may have been difficult for him 
to come back to them and say…oh by the way we’ve got a 60% 
decline in infections coming out of Uganda and people would 
say well how did that happen? It’s not because of our 
investment? Oh it’s just spontaneous behaviour change? This is 
happening in every [HIV] epidemic in the world you know? I’m 
speculating here…but I have a feeling that those things were 
going around in his head (Stoneburner: 26/10/2011). 
 
Stoneburner provided a detailed description of UNAIDS’ multisectoral 
response to HIV/AIDS, the narrative below outlines the dominant policy 
discourse of multisectoralism and its development centered approach. The 
data below also appear to indicate that there was a broad commitment by 
UNAIDS to not focus on HIV/AIDS as a narrowly defined biomedical policy 
problem (which GPA had done between 1987 – 1995):  
	
We need to bring the entire UN together and focus, not on just 
the dynamics of HIV and behaviour, treatments, or health issues 
[former GPA prevention approach]…but we have to fix the 
whole kit and caboodle of development. We have to go for 
women’s rights, we have to address stigma…but all these other 
dimensions that have now become the columns or the strategies 
for the development agenda. If you look at UNAIDS they’ve got 
so many things out there (Stoneburner: 26/10/2011). 
 
A description relating to how GPA was ostensibly “battling with” 
(Stoneburner: 26/10/2011) other UN organisations, prior to its closure in 
1995, and how scientists, who attempted to explain Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence through behavioural data, was advanced by Stoneburner. 
The data below appear to indicate that the sexual behavioural change that 
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occurred within Uganda in the early to mid-1990s took place without 
UNAIDS’ multisectoral response and the infusion of finance from external 
donors: 
	
GPA was battling with the other UN organisations. And then all 
the scientists were down….showing the [HIV] decline here [in 
Uganda]. We’ve got this…behavioural surveillance, which is in 
its infancy it’s not very good, but wow look something’s going 
on…but what it was telling you, potentially, was that whatever 
had happened without UNAIDS without this massive 
organisation and all this infusion (Stoneburner: 26/10/2011). 
 
The assertions above appear to suggest that the partnership reduction 
explanation, which emerged during the closure of GPA and the 
establishment of UNAIDS, was not actively internalised by UNAIDS as it 
may not have aligned with the prevailing institutional and political context 
and the transition towards multisectoralism. It appears that the endogenous 
process of sexual behavioural change, which was possibly brought about by 
Ugandans communicating about the threat of HIV, led to declining HIV 
trends within the country (at least according to Stoneburner and Low-Beer’s 
data analysis). However, this finding, which was initiated by Ugandans did 
not involve the newly developed multisectoral approach that UNAIDS was 
aiming to implement (and aiming to mobilise financial resources for) when it 
was created in January 1996. It therefore seems possible that the explanation 
of behavioural change, advanced by Stoneburner and Low-Beer, was 
perhaps working against UNAIDS’ development-centered and multisectoral 
global HIV/AIDS prevention strategy—an approach which aimed to 
promote the use of biomedical products, including condoms, to help reduce 
the transmission of HIV at the global level.  
 
This finding is surprising as it could be argued that the partnership reduction 
explanation, which came about via oral communication within the Ugandan 
population, could have worked with UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV prevention 
approach. This idea can be tentatively advanced as multiple sectors, state 
and non-state actors could have worked together under the rubric of 
multisectoralism to promote HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns (via broad-
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based social mobilisation) which highlighted the importance of domestic 
communication in fighting HIV/AIDS. Acknowledging that the partnership 
reduction explanation could have conceivably complemented UNAIDS’ 
multisectoral HIV prevention policy agenda, it is important to outline 
additional reasons which perhaps slowed the partnership reduction 
explanation from informing subsequent HIV/AIDS prevention policy output 
in the mid-1990s.      
 
6.4 Partnership reduction and UNAIDS funding implications  
 
A theme which may account for the partnership reduction explanation not 
informing HIV/AIDS prevention policy relates to funding implications 
which, according to certain participants, would have influenced UNAIDS’ 
institutional financial strategies in the mid-1990s. It was noted above that the 
partnership reduction explanation highlighted the principal role of 
communication within the Ugandan population in helping to prevent the 
transmission of HIV. This prevention strategy, it is claimed, did not require 
external investment from UNAIDS or its newly developed multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy approach. Commenting upon how the 
partnership reduction explanation was viewed by other HIV/AIDS experts, 
Rand Stoneburner asserted that “there was just a lot of negativity to it people 
said it’s great [partnership reduction explanation] but it will hurt funding” 
(Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). While Stoneburner claimed that certain 
HIV/AIDS experts within UNAIDS “believed” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011) 
the partnership reduction explanation, it was asserted that UNAIDS’ 
multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention policy agenda was influencing the 
perceived credibility of this explanation in HIV/AIDS networks: 
 
People said well we believe this [partnership reduction 
explanation] but…you’re in the big shit now because you’ve got 
all these UN agencies that are on-board. The UN agenda at that 
time was this multisectoralism…which I never could figure out 
what it was back then. But it was that you can not respond to a 
health problem by just treating it as a health problem. You have 
to deal with all the other intricacies, civil society, you have to 
remove discrimination, you have to remove all the obstacles to 
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access to education. So they took the whole development agenda 
and tried to pile it on…insert it into this public health disaster 
[HIV/AIDS] (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011).  
  
The possible implications of the partnership reduction explanation upon 
UNAIDS’ multisectoral approach, and the potential consequences for those 
who would ultimately receive funding from UNAIDS, in both HIC and LIC 
contexts, was raised by Rand Stoneburner: 
 
I even had people…scientists in Uganda and from the US who 
said this is really bad news…what is this going to be doing to our 
funding? Yeah…I heard that from several people. But I said what 
do you mean? But you can understand these people it’s their 
lifeblood…a lot of agendas (Rand Stoneburner: 24/03/2013). 
 
It was also asserted that attempts to promote the partnership reduction 
explanation challenged an element of UNAIDS’ multisectoral approach, 
namely, UNAIDS’ desire to unify multiple development partners in order to 
increase financial resources to mitigate HIV/AIDS at the global level: 
 
So when you tried to position spontaneous indigenousness 
behaviour modification up against the big boys…big pharma, big 
drugs and big development...I think the die had already been 
cast for all of these resources coming together…new structure 
and it was really hard to get it out after that (Rand Stoneburner: 
05/08/2011). 
  
Notions relating to the global policymaking implications of Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline were advanced by Stoneburner. The narrative below 
describes the UN’s attempt to unify under the multisectoral approach to take 
advantage of the Ugandan HIV decline, which was described by Stoneburner 
as a “hot piece of pie” (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). This metaphor alludes to 
the notion of the formative signs of HIV seroprevalence decline being an 
attractive, unfolding narrative that invited external actors to capitalise upon:     
 
…lots of institutional politics and then I got the feeling that 
UNDP, and UNCIEF, all of them wanted…World Bank they all 
came in with their big guns and said this is how you do it 
[address HIV/AIDS globally via multisectoralism]. You know 
what, this was hot piece of pie [the Ugandan HIV decline] this 
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was hot…if they [external UN actors] could catch on to this 
comet they could…bring together all of the agencies to work as 
one instead of this disjointed band of folk and country that were 
kind of sniping at each other (Stoneburner: 05/08/2011). 
 
A sub-theme regarding the funding implications of the Ugandan HIV 
‘success’ story was noted during data analysis, namely, the potential funding 
implications of the HIV decline upon Ugandan resource mobilisation from 
external donors. Concerns about the implications of the Ugandan HIV 
decline, and its influence upon domestic funding were noted by Joshua 
Musinguzi, former head of the AIDS control programme within the Ugandan 
Ministry of Health. The data below appear to suggest that Musinguzi, was 
concerned about the influence of the Ugandan HIV decline upon domestic 
funding within Uganda. It could be asserted, as a recipient of financial 
support from external donors, that there were genuine concerns surrounding 
the Ugandan ‘success’ story upon external funding streams—especially 
within the Ugandan Ministry of Health. Muinguzi’s narrative indicates that 
there was a joint concern about the HIV decline influencing domestic 
funding and a broader public health issue of sexual behavioural 
complacency which could lead to increasing rates of HIV infection:  
 
Especially at that time [1995 – 1996] and the concern was mainly 
twofold one was what would be the implication on resource 
mobilisation? And then capacity if you’re telling the world that 
the [HIV/AIDS] epidemic seems to be contracting in this part of 
the world will people have the same interest in funding your 
programmes? The second question was the issue, the potential 
issue of complacency–will people get complacent? (Musinguzi: 
27/01/2012). 
 
Two Ugandan Ministry of Health officials also commented upon the 
institutional transition from GPA to UNAIDS, and the associated shift from 
GPA (which was  depicted as a technical-based international organisation) to 
UNAIDS (which was depicted as a more politically-based international 
organisation). Elizabeth Madraa, the former manager of Uganda’s AIDS 




GPA was very strong at the beginning and of course when 
UNAIDS came in there was no money to transfer to UNAIDS for 
support. UNAIDS was not technical. UNAIDS has been really 
political it was not really technical…it wanted the emphasis on 
multisectoral. But in the multisectoral approach unless you set 
the system of coordination you find yourself in the problem 
because the other sectors have never understood why they 
should participate in the HIV (Madraa: 20/01/2012).  
 
Alex Opio, assistant commissioner for national disease control within the 
Ugandan Ministry of Health, also claimed that it was a core strategy of 
UNAIDS to concentrate on resource mobilisation when the institution was 
formed in 1996. The data below indicate that UNAIDS’ concentration on 
multisectoralism led to the institution being framed as less technical and 
more political that its predecessor GPA:   
 
UNAIDS came in and their focus…one they were saying that 
they wanted to do resource mobilisation say their focus was a 
little bit different…multisectoral and they were less technical – I 
mean…epidemiological aspect very weak, very, very weak. So 
for sure there was some loss period of time [sic] because of that 
transition from WHO to UNAIDS. So down the road then WHO 
started again reactivating some of the departments which they 
had given up which they thought UNAIDS would do – they 
started reactivating (Opio: 14//02/2012). 
 
The data above suggest that the partnership reduction explanation, which 
could have been constructed as a positive development in relation to 
HIV/AIDS prevention, was possibly framed as a problematic finding as it 
held the potential to impact upon the process of resource mobilisation, and 
subsequent resources distribution, by UNAIDS when it was formed in 1996. 
This finding is somewhat paradoxical as the data above illustrate a 
counterintuitive notion, namely, the ‘problem of Ugandan success’ (as the 
seemingly positive evidence of decreasing HIV rates, via oral communication 
and partnership reduction within the country were actually viewed as 
potentially problematic, in relation to funding mobilising at the global level, 
and funding distribution at the national level by certain HIV/AIDS experts 
in the mid-1990s). Acknowledging that there was a possible ‘solution’ to the 
prevention of HIV, via oral communication, a solution that did not require 
the broader UN system, multisectoralism and the infusion of external 
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financial support, it can be cautiously posited that the partnership reduction 
explanation faced considerable difficulty in establishing itself as a credible 
explanation for the Ugandan HIV seroprevalence decline during the mid to 
late-1990s. This difficulty can be attributed to the partnership reduction 
explanation failing to align with the prevailing political and institutional 
climate when UNAIDS was launched in 1996, and how this finding jarred 
with a multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention strategy that was formally 
established in UNAIDS’ founding ECOSOC resolution in 1994.  
 
6.5 UNAIDS’ decision-making structure and senior officials’ opinions on 
competing behavioural explanations 
 
Interview data have provided an examination of the institutional transition 
from GPA to UNAIDS, adaptations in institutional approaches to global 
HIV/AIDS prevention, and how the partnership reduction explanation may 
not have aligned with the prevailing institutional/political context and the 
transition to multisectoralism in the mid-1990s. However, the chapter has yet 
to examine the internal decision-making structure within UNAIDS, and how 
senior-level officials conceptualised the competing behavioural change 
explanations advanced by HIV/AIDS experts involved with the 
development of SGS, and formative accounts of Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline of the 1990s.   
 
The two following sections will present findings that examine these factors in 
order to establish how decision-makers’ institutional position within 
UNAIDS, and decision-makers’ ‘loyalty’ to UNAIDS itself influenced the 
significance afforded to the competing behavioural change explanations. 
These findings are advanced in order to demonstrate the salience of context-
specific institutional factors that appear to influence the relationship between 
evidence and policy within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. 
 
Interview data highlight that participants’ institutional position within 
UNAIDS contributed towards the significance afforded to the competing 
behavioural change explanations. Individuals who were institutionally more 
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senior within UNAIDS possessed the ability to promote their explanation for 
the HIV prevalence decline more efficiently than those further down 
UNAIDS’ decision-making hierarchy. This notion was emphasised by Michel 
Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS. During 
interview, Caraël critiqued the idea that Elizabeth Pisani, a less-senior 
UNAIDS consultant, was able to formulate novel HIV/AIDS policy within 
UNAIDS/WHO during interview. Caraël maintained that “the credibility to 
push ideas” (Caraël: 20/09/2011) was determined by enjoying a senior 
institutional position within UNAIDS, which Elizabeth Pisani did not 
possess: 
 
She [Elizabeth Pisani] was a consultant she wouldn’t have an   
institutional position that would allow her—she was never in a 
position in UNAIDS or WHO. She was engaged for the 
workshop in Nairobi…and I hired her for, I don’t know, 20 days 
you know? So we were using her but more to write documents 
like reports and things like that. But I mean she would come 
from another planet…so she would not have any credibility to 
push ideas (Caraël: 20/09/2011). 
 
The salience of “belonging” (Caraël: 20/09/2011) to an international 
institution, and how Elizabeth Pisani lacked this sense of institutional 
belonging, was advanced by Caraël: 
 
I think she’s [Elizabeth Pisani] probably not highlighting this but 
it’s important. Because unfortunately if you don’t belong to such 
international institutions [UNAIDS] you cannot produce the 
guidelines…the normative guidance to countries…I mean 
whether Pisani would have been there or not it wouldn’t have 
made any difference (Caraël: 20/09/2011). 
 
Caraël’s claim relating to Elizabeth Pisani’s function as a writer, and her lack 
of institutional standing, was reinforced by Daniel Tarantola, a former senior 
employee of the GPA/former senior policy advisor to the Director General of 
the WHO: 
 
Elizabeth Pisani was not a methodology developer. I mean she 
sort of presents herself as an anthropologist. She was a scribe, 
she was a writer, a rapporteur. And she would go out there with 
Michel Caraël and others…reports to which she would give 
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shape because of the quality of her writing. No, the methodology 
development came from a variety of sources at the same time. 
But while she was indeed shaping reports and presenting report 
outcomes in a clear way…I don’t think it would be fair to give 
her the credit (Tarantola: 27/10/2011). 
  
Michel Caraël explained his own institutional function in developing SGS 
and broader HIV/AIDS policy during interview. Caraël framed himself as a 
leader within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks in the mid to late-
1990s, emphasising that he “ordered” (Caraël: 20/09/2011) Tom Barton, an 
anthropologist, to conduct a review of Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
data. As noted in the chapters above, the Barton review was important in 
understanding Ugandan sexual behavioural change and how it helped to 
develop formative behavioural explanations that could account for Uganda’s 
HIV seroprevalence decline. Michel Caraël authoritatively remarked that “I 
was the one who ordered him to do it” (Caraël: 20/09/2011).  
 
Caraël also claimed that it was his role to appraise the Barton review prior to 
its findings informing subsequent HIV policy stating that “it was published 
and appraised by myself in UNAIDS and published at the time” (Caraël: 
20/09/2011). The interview data above thus appear to indicate that Caraël 
was an institutionally important decision-maker within UNAIDS who was 
able to tell subordinates to perform policy-related tasks in a top-down 
fashion. Furthermore, his ability to appraise data sources and to publish 
evidence within UNAIDS himself, further illustrate his centrality within 
UNAIDS’ compact global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks. It could be 
argued that Caraël possessed the requisite institutional power to promote the 
increased condom uptake explanation which, in turn, permitted it to be 
perceived as a more credible explanation that could account for the Ugandan 
HIV seroprevalence decline of the early to mid-1990s—especially within the 
institutional context of UNAIDS. 
 
Distinct from Michel Caraël’s institutionally senior position within UNAIDS, 
the following interview data suggest that Rand Stoneburner, a former 
GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, did not possess the requisite institutional 
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position (or institutional power) to advance the partnership reduction 
explanation within UNAIDS in the mid to late-1990s. A primary obstacle to 
the partnership reduction explanation failing to inform HIV policy, in the 
mid to late-1990s, was the termination of his employment during the 
institutional transition from the GPA to UNAIDS (occurring between 1995 – 
1996). Stoneburner claimed that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of 
UNAIDS, terminated his employment during the institutional transition: 
 
Peter Piot…most of the people at GPA were let go they found 
other jobs. He made sure that I was not given a job. I was the 
only one who was sort of summarily fired (Stoneburner: 
24/03/2013). 
 
Stoneburner’s claim about his employment being terminated during the 
GPA/UNAIDS transition, was echoed by Manuel Carbello, the former chief 
of behavioural research at the WHO’s GPA. The data also indicate that 
Stoneburner’s partnership reduction explanation was conceptualised as 
“vital information” by Carbello which may have been disregarded by 
UNAIDS in the mid to late-1990s: 
 
 
Rand [Stoneburner] had to leave [GPA & UNAIDS] as well so I 
think that in a sense you could say that intentionally, or 
unintentionally, decisions were taken to disregard vital 
information…and I think that it is no accident that a few years 
ago UNAIDS has had to backtrack on its statistics (Carbello: 
20/9/2011).  
 
A sub-theme which relates to the requirement of less senior HIV/AIDS 
experts to not counteract senior-level management within UNAIDS, in order 
to ‘survive’ in the institution itself, was noted during data collection. A 
former UNAIDS official indicated that Stoneburner’s partnership reduction 
explanation worked against the senior-level management position to global 
HIV prevention within UNAIDS in the mid-1990s—namely multisectoralism. 
The data below appear to suggest that Stoneburner’s failure to comply with 
UNAIDS’ senior-level management position, by pursuing a partnership 
reduction explanation, contributed to Stoneburner not enduring the GPA to 
UNAIDS institutional transition: 
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In these big [UN] bureaucracies the way we function is…we 
have what is called senior level managers. So you have in the 
department a senior level management team…and the others are 
those like us who do the daily work…and who are not listened to 
you know? So we just do our work…because that’s the way you 
survive in this organisation [UNAIDS]…you’re not allowed to go 
and counteract the senior level management position (former 
UNAIDS official: 19/9/2011). 
 
It could be advanced that attempts to promote a partnership reduction 
explanation, that could account for the Ugandan HIV decline, potentially 
worked against more senior-level decision-makers within UNAIDS, and 
their attempt to promote a multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention policy 
approach at the global level. In reaction to the findings presented above it 
can be suggested that the partnership reduction explanation may not have 
been afforded as much institutional significance within UNAIDS in 
comparison with the increased condom uptake explanation. It can be argued 
that the possession of a senior institutional position within UNAIDS was key 
in facilitating the use, or non-use, of the competing sexual behavioural 
change explanations. Findings above also highlight the importance of 
working with, rather than against, the prevailing policy positions of senior-
level management within UNAIDS in order to ‘survive’ within the 
institution itself.  
 
A sub-theme, which relates to the idea that certain interpretations of 
Ugandan evidence were not internalised by senior-level management within 
UNAIDS in the mid-1990s, pertains to the notion of institutional loyalty. 
Claims were advanced by certain participants who maintained that failure to 
function in an institutionally loyal manner, during the transition from GPA 
to UNAIDS, and its preconceived multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention policy 
agenda, resulted in dismissal. Data below appear to suggest that Peter Piot, 
the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, continued to employ HIV/AIDS 
experts who supported UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention policy 
agenda from 1996 onwards. The narrative below provides an explanation of 
Rand Stoneburner’s dismissal during the GPA/UNAIDS transition and how 
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other, institutionally loyal, HIV/AIDS experts were granted ongoing 
employment from Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS: 
 
It caused a lot of bitterness…and there are people who were I 
would say loyal WHO HIV/AIDS people who were kicked out 
like Rand Stoneburner. Others, for one reason or another were 
kept on board - Michel Caraël and a lot…people were kept on 
board. And some disagreed with Peter Piot’s policies or others 
they left between 1995 and 1996 and 2000 they 
disappeared…went to work with other people (former UNAIDS 
official: 19/9/2011).  
 
The notion that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, 
continued the employment of institutionally loyal HIV/AIDS experts was 
also advanced:  
 
Kept on board were people who…it’s like any institution…kept 
the thinking and loyalty to Peter Piot and his thinking. That’s 
how these institutions function you know? 100, 200, 300 
people…and then it grew up to several hundred across the 
world…that’s how these institutions function (former UNAIDS 
official: 19/9/2011). 
 
The sub-theme of institutional loyalty was elaborated even further, 
suggesting that HIV/AIDS experts who produced, and attempted to 
disseminate, evidence that countered the institutional direction of UNAIDS 
may not be given employment “loyalty means, you know, the others who 
disagreed…they’ll escape or they’ll never be hired” (former UNAIDS official: 
19/9/2011). An additional facet of institutional loyalty relates to the notion 
of “protective” relationships between senior-level decision-makers within 
UNAIDS. This was emphasised by Rand Stoneburner when discussing the 
process of Ugandan behavioural data interpretation. Stoneburner 
commented upon Michel Caraël’s institutional relationship with Peter Piot 
claiming that “Michel [Caraël] is very protective of Peter [Piot] in all of this” 
(Stoneburner: 24/03/2013). Stoneburner also described the consequences if 
less senior decision-makers operating within UNAIDS challenged Peter Piot, 
the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, advancing a narrative including 
Bernhard Schwartländer, the former director for evidence, strategy and 
results within UNAIDS: 
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Stoneburner: Bernhard [Schwartländer] certainly was part of that 
network…and I think they all knew…at least Bernhard 
[Schwartländer] knew what happens if you stand up to Peter 
Piot… 
 
Interviewer: And what happens? 
 
 
Stoneburner: You don’t fare well. Because he has his loyal - it’s 
feudal. He has his loyal people in his world which is 
interesting…I don’t think a lot of people ever trusted him. But I 
think he became much more…he was always on the political side 
and then became more and more political once he was up at that 
power level (Stoneburner: 24/03/2013). 
 
 
6.5.1 Views on the competing behavioural explanations by the former 
Executive Director of UNAIDS   
 
Interview data also suggest that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of 
UNAIDS, appeared to be more receptive to an increased condom uptake 
explanation compared with a partnership reduction explanation. A greater 
degree of significance was apparently given to the condom uptake 
explanation, stemming from the perceived expertise of Michel Caraël, the 
former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, by Peter Piot. The data 
below appear to suggest that Rand Stoneburner had to depart UNAIDS in 
the mid-1990s, whereas, Caraël successfully transferred from GPA to 
UNAIDS which can be attributed to his perceived expertise by other, more 
senior decision-makers—including Peter Piot: 
 
What happened between Michel [Caraël] and Rand 
[Stoneburner] GPA and UNAIDS is Michel Caraël was the guru 
of this thinking and was the one who Peter Piot kept on-board 
and Rand Stoneburner was kicked out in the butt (former 
UNAIDS official: 19/09/2011). 
 
 
The notion that Michel Caraël’s increased condom uptake explanation was 
synthesised more readily than the partnership reduction explanation was 
elaborated further by the former UNAIDS official. The data below indicate 
that the analysis of the Ugandan behavioural data sources, conducted by 
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Michel Caraël, informed institutional understandings of the Ugandan HIV 
decline within UNAIDS. When discussing the competing sexual behavioural 
change explanations, that could account for the Ugandan HIV 
seroprevalence decline, it was asserted that: 
 
So this is what I know. Michel Caraël was the guru of Peter Piot 
and his voice was heard and he didn’t listen to the others. So at 
the end of course, it was the data and truth from Michel Caraël 
that came across…his thinking was what went into the UNAIDS 
secretariat  (former UNAIDS official: 19/09/2011). 
 
The manner in which Peter Piot purportedly engaged with the partnership 
reduction explanation was raised by a former UNAIDS official. It highlights 
how certain forms of evidence can be strategically interpreted within an 
institutional decision-making context:  
 
I think Peter Piot favoured or just wanted to look at…consider 
Michel Caraël’s point of view…and pulled under…underplayed 
Rand [Stoneburner] and Daniel’s [Low-Beer] findings. So you 
will always find this in any science. Interpreting things…that 
you will have people saying…okay this is the evidence and the 
other…It’s not bad science…but we can’t talk about it…or we 
don’t have enough evidence to support…so they ignored or they 
didn’t want to hear about it [partnership reduction explanation] 
(former UNAIDS official 19/9/2011). 
 
The claim that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, did not 
personally synthesis the partnership reduction explanation, and how he 
purportedly downplayed this particular behavioural change finding was 
advanced by Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist. 
The data below indicate that Rand Stoneburner appreciated that he was 
perhaps functioning in a naïve manner, in relation to the partnership 
reduction explanation—assuming that his finding of sexual behavioural 
change would automatically disseminate without issue during the 
institutional transition from GPA to UNAIDS: 
 
Peter [Piot] wouldn’t necessarily come to these meetings he’d 
have somebody else come to see what was going on. I didn’t 
appreciate…I naively said god well everybody wants to hear 
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about this [partnership reduction explanation] but Peter Piot 
said…I forgot what the words were they said this is…what’s 
going on in Uganda is not sufficient to…he was trying to 
downplay it as not that important. So he’d already been part of 
the politics that were developing this new organisation 
[UNAIDS] (Stoneburner: 26/10/2011).  
 
This sub-section suggests that Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of 
UNAIDS may have been more receptive to the increased condom uptake 
explanation (as advanced by Michel Caraël) compared with the partnership 
reduction explanation (as advanced by Rand Stoneburner). The possible 
reasons which contributed towards this taking place relate to the perceived 
expertise of Michel Caraël by Peter Piot, and the idea that the condom uptake 
explanation aligned more directly with Peter Piot’s multisectoral approach to 
global HIV/AIDS prevention (as condoms were a tangible biomedical 
product that UNAIDS could advocate for and subsequently distribute via the 
multisectoral approach at the global level). However, it is again important to 
state that the claims advanced by Rand Stoneburner and other participants 
represent their own views and cannot be independently verified.  
 
Findings above also highlight that the partnership reduction explanation was 
not working with the prevailing institutional and political environment 
within UNAIDS (and the multisectoral global HIV/AIDS prevention 
approach advocated by Peter Piot). It could be argued that the failure to 
understand the implications of the partnership reduction explanation, within 
the context of major institutional and political change in the broader UN 
system, contributed to this explanation not being utilised to inform 
subsequent HIV/AIDS policy output by UNAIDS in the mid to late-1990s. 
The findings also indicate that the prevailing institutional and political 
context, and broader adaptations to the institutional and political context 
during the transition from GPA to UNAIDS, influenced the competing 
sexual behavioural change explanations. It can be argued that HIV/AIDS 
experts, who were more receptive to the evolving institutional and political 
climate between 1995 – 1996, and the need to facilitate the newly developed 
multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention policy agenda, stood a better chance in 
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allowing their behavioural explanations to inform subsequent HIV policy 
output in global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks.  
 
Findings have also highlighted that Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV 
prevention within UNAIDS, appeared to enjoy an institutionally close and 
productive working relationship with Peter Piot, the former Executive 
Director of UNAIDS. It has also been highlighted that Peter Piot listened to 
Michel Caraël which facilitated his particular views to influence the most 
institutionally senior decision-maker within UNAIDS. It appears that Michel 
Caraël was a central and institutionally powerful actor who can be 
confidently located in relation to influencing the process of Ugandan 
evidence interpretation within global HIV/AIDS policy networks. It can also 
be stated that senior-level decision-makers within UNAIDS operated in both 
a loyal and purportedly “feudal” (Stoneburner: 24/03/2013) fashion. While 
this decision-making behavioural is comparable to other international 
organisations, the protective nature of the close relationships between an 
elite of likeminded senior-level actors within UNAIDS, and their power to 
remove decision-makers who are not perceived as institutionally loyal, raises 
important questions pertaining to the relationship between evidence and 
policy within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks.  
  
6.6 Strategic management of Uganda’s HIV decline within UNAIDS 
 
A theme relating to the strategic management of Uganda’s HIV 
seroprevalence decline by UNAIDS emerged from data analysis. Findings 
suggest that the emergence of Uganda’s HIV seroprevalence decline (which 
occurred during a period of institutional  instability—i.e. the transition from 
GPA to UNAIDS) was cautiously approached by UNAIDS in 1996. This was 
emphasised by an HIV/AIDS official within the WHO. It was suggested that 
the timing to announce the Ugandan HIV seroprevalence decline was 
carefully selected by UNAIDS, as concerns existed about the behavioural 
evidence-base, which were revealing the HIV decline within the country. 
Indeed, it was asserted that there was a prevailing institutional concern to 
not announce a decline in HIV trends emerging from Uganda in case the 
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signs of decline were an artifact or the outcome of measurement bias. The 
emerging signs of decline coming from Uganda were compared, by the 
HIV/AIDS official within WHO, to that of a bomb exploding and the idea 
that the HIV decline itself presented UNAIDS with issues relating to its 
global advocacy role (and its need to mobilise financial resources to mitigate 
HIV/AIDS at the global level via political advocacy). It was also asserted that 
there were implications of Uganda’s emerging HIV seroprevalence decline, 
and the potential consequences upon UNAIDS’ institutional need to 
advocate for increased financing to address HIV/AIDS at the global level via 
multisectoralism.  
 
This notion is significant as it introduces the idea that the Ugandan HIV 
decline, and the possible reasons that contributed towards the Ugandan 
‘success’ story itself, may have influenced one of UNAIDS’ key functions—
namely its institutional role to advocate for increased funding to mitigate 
HIV/AIDS at the global level from the mid to late-1990s onwards. To 
acknowledge that there was an HIV/AIDS ‘success’ story emerging from 
Uganda, in the mid-1990s, could have been problematic for UNAIDS, as one 
of its core institutional functions was to advocate for greater financial 
mobilisation to mitigate HIV/AIDS via multisectoralism—which was a long-
term development centered prevention approach (which thus required 
extensive external financial support to implement). Acknowledging that 
HIV/AIDS had been ‘solved’ within a sub-Saharan Africa country in the 
early to mid-1990s (possibly based on increased oral communication without 
UNAIDS and its long-term multisectoral approach) was potentially 
problematic as acknowledging this ‘success’ would have questioned 
UNAIDS’ global HIV/AIDS prevention strategy, and its need to emphasise 
the growing problem of HIV/AIDS (in order to raise more financial support 
to fight HIV/AIDS globally).    
 
Rand Stoneburner, a former GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, maintains that 
the emerging signs of HIV seroprevalence decline were unexpected and how 
there was a general consensus amongst UNAIDS decision-makers that this 
HIV decline should not have happened (as UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV 
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prevention policy agenda had yet to be implemented). Such a position was 
advanced as there had been an absence of external UNAIDS led multisectoral 
programmatic involvement within the country: 
 
Then I came to WHO and we [Rand Stoneburner & Daniel Low 
Beer] started looking at Uganda and no one thought that 
anything would happen there because there hadn’t been any 
formal programme…there was an AIDS programme but as far as 
what the intervention purist would say…well we [UNAIDS] 




The findings above, which relate to the strategic management of the 
emerging HIV decline in Uganda in the mid-1990s, indicate that UNAIDS 
(then a newly formed institution) wanted to establish its multisectoral 
prevention approach and its wish to advocate for increased financial 
investment to mitigate the global impact of HIV/AIDS. Seemingly, the 
emerging signs of the Ugandan HIV decline were viewed with caution, as 
UNAIDS (in the mid-1990s) wanted to emphasise the growing problem of 
HIV/AIDS (rather than highlighting the emerging signs of Ugandan 
‘success’). Acknowledging ‘success’ in the fight against HIV/AIDS 
(especially within a sub-Saharan African country) potentially countered 
UNAIDS’ desire to mobilise resources and to unify the broader UN system to 
fight HIV/AIDS via multisectoralism, which, at the time, was a new 
approach to HIV/AIDS prevention that departed from the older GPA 
prevention model (which was viewed as a limited and outmoded global 
HIV/AIDS prevention model).     
 
6.7 Discussing the problem of Ugandan success and changes in the 
approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention	
 
Findings have highlighted how institutional and political context adaptation 
appeared to influence the two competing behavioural change explanations in 
the mid-1990s. It can be stated that the closure of GPA in 1995, and the 
establishment of UNAIDS in 1996, catalysed a major policy shift in the 
approach to the prevention of HIV/AIDS at the global level. This 
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institutional transition, and the departure from GPA’s biomedically focused 
HIV prevention strategies to UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV prevention 
approach, adapted the political context within which the debate over the 
competing behavioural change explanations amongst HIV/AIDS experts 
occurred. This adaptation consequently shaped the movement of the 
competing explanations within global HIV/AIDS policymaking networks, 
and possibly the agency of certain HIV/AIDS experts involved with analysis 
of Uganda behavioural evidence in the mid to late-1990s. 
 
Data highlighted how the partnership reduction explanation seemingly 
failed to align with the prevailing institutional and political context, and the 
transition towards UNAIDS’ newly developed multisectoral HIV/AIDS 
global prevention policy agenda. The partnership reduction explanation, and 
the subsequent decline in HIV prevalence, which was potentially catalysed 
by Ugandans communicating about the threat of HIV/AIDS, did not involve 
UNAIDS or its newly developed multisectoral HIV prevention approach. It 
was therefore potentially working against the evolving institutional and 
political climate and the shift towards UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategy, which aimed to promote the use of condoms (a tangible 
biomedical product that UNAIDS could advocate and raise funds for) to 
reduce the transmission of HIV at the global level. Importantly, UNAIDS 
was aiming to undertake two key tasks when it was formally established in 
1996. First, to depart from the older GPA prevention model (which was 
viewed as being too biomedically focused and thus anachronistic) towards 
multisectoralism—an approach which aimed to unify multiple UN partners, 
state and non-state actors to fight HIV/AIDS through broad-based social and 
political mobilisation. Second, to support increased financial investment, via 
political advocacy, in order to implement HIV prevention policies that could 
be used to prevent the acquisition and transmission of HIV at the global 
level. Seemingly, the partnership reduction explanation held the potential to 
challenge these two key institutional goals of UNAIDS in the mid-1990s 




It is surprising as the partnership reduction explanation, which came about 
via oral communication within the Ugandan population, could have aligned 
with UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV prevention approach. This idea can be 
advanced as multiple sectors, state and non-state actors could have unified 
under the totem of multisectoralism to promote HIV/AIDS awareness 
campaigns (via broad-based social mobilisation) which highlighted the 
importance of domestic communication in fighting HIV/AIDS. However, 
data have illustrated that the partnership reduction explanation presented 
UNAIDS with potential funding dilemmas, as the signs of Ugandan 
‘success’, emerged when UNAIDS was attempting to highlight the growing 
policy problem of HIV/AIDS at the global level (and UNAIDS’ need to 
increase financial resources to support its newly developed multisectoral 
approach to address the global problem of HIV/AIDS). 
 
The finding that the partnership reduction explanation may not have 
informed subsequent HIV/AIDS prevention policy output, raises a 
paradoxical notion namely the ‘problem of Ugandan success’. Seemingly, the 
good news of Ugandan sexual behavioural change (that was potentially 
facilitated by Ugandan-initiated communication strategies) and its influence 
in leading to decreasing HIV seroprevalence rates, was not internalised by 
UNAIDS as this finding did not “filter through” (Low-Beer: 06/12/2011) the 
newly formed institution in the mid-1990s. Indeed, a broader process of 
“political filtering” (Low-Beer: 06/12/2011) appears to have influenced the 
partnership reduction explanation, and this political filtering arguably 
resulted in this explanation facing considerable difficulty in establishing 
itself as a credible explanation for the Ugandan HIV seroprevalence decline 
during the mid to late-1990s.  
 
This difficulty can be mainly attributed to the partnership reduction 
explanation failing to align with the prevailing political and institutional 
environment, when UNAIDS was launched in 1996, and how this finding 
appeared to interfere with its multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention strategy 
that was formally enshrined in UNAIDS’ founding ECOSOC resolution in 
1994. It has also been highlighted that the emerging signs of the Ugandan 
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HIV decline were possibly managed by UNAIDS, as the formative signs of 
HIV decline may have influenced one of UNAIDS’ key functions—namely its 
institutional role to advocate for increased financial resources to mitigate 
HIV/AIDS at the global level from the mid to late-1990s onwards.  
 
To recognise the formative Ugandan ‘success’ (when UNAIDS was only just 
beginning to establish itself as a new UN international organisation) may 
have resulted in the institution having to adapt (or at least question) its long-
term development-centered response to HIV/AIDS at the global level. 
Importantly, UNAIDS was formed to advocate for greater financial 
mobilisation to mitigate HIV/AIDS via multisectoralism—which was a long-
term development centered prevention approach (which thus required 
extensive external financial support to implement over a long-term 
timeframe). By acknowledging the partnership reduction explanation, while 
the institution was attempting to establish itself as a competent international 
organisation that could implement a better HIV/AIDS prevention model 
than GPA, would have called into question UNAIDS’ need to keep 
emphasising the growing problem of HIV/AIDS and its institutional desire 
to raise more financial support to fight HIV/AIDS globally. Stated plainly, 
UNAIDS had to maintain the narrative of the ongoing problem of HIV/AIDS 
in the mid to late-1990s, rather than acknowledging (and acting upon) the 
emerging signs of ‘success’ within Uganda via partnership reduction 
underpinned by oral communication. Acknowledging an effective Ugandan-
based HIV prevention model (oral communication and subsequent 
partnership reduction) could have conceivably resulted in UNAIDS having 
to adapt elements of its multisectoral HIV prevention policy agenda, and the 
institutions desire to advocate for increased funding to support the 
production and dissemination of condoms at the global level. 
 
Findings also highlighted that the competing behavioural change 
explanations, and the significance afforded to the explanations, were 
influenced by decision-makers’ institutional position within UNAIDS, the 
importance of working with the prevailing institutional and policy 
environment and notions of institutional loyalty. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
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those HIV/AIDS experts who possessed a more senior institutional position 
(like Michel Caraël) had the power to control the analysis, and dissemination  
of, the Ugandan sexual behavioural change evidence (which were used to 
support the development of SGS and formative explanations for Uganda’s 
HIV decline). Less senior decision-makers, or HIV/AIDS experts who did 
not endure the GPA/UNAIDS transition, naturally were at a power-based 
disadvantage in terms of being able to advance their behavioural change 
explanations within the broader UN system. This arguably resulted in other 
avenues being used to publish competing explanations that could account for 
the Ugandan HIV decline (i.e. Rand Stoneburner’s and Daniel Low-Beer’s 
2004 article in the journal Science). The importance of working with, rather 
than against, the strategic direction of senior management within UNAIDS 
was also outlined. Naturally, failure to align oneself with the prevailing HIV 
prevention policy agenda within UNAIDS (i.e. multisectoralism) seemingly 
had consequences for ones institutional ‘survival’ in the mid-1990s.  
 
An interesting finding that emerged during data collection was the notion of 
institutional loyalty. Data highlighted that decision-makers, who functioned 
in an institutionally loyal manner were able to endure the GPA/UNAIDS 
transition and therefore able to promote their respective behavioural change 
explanations that could account for the Ugandan HIV decline. Functioning 
loyally to UNAIDS’ multisectoral approach, and senior level management 
within UNAIDS, arguably facilitated more politically savvy HIV/AIDS 
experts to facilitate their respective explanations of Ugandan behavioural 
evidence ahead of other competing explanations. This notion again 
highlights the importance of  broader institutional and political change upon 
the competing behavioural change explanations, and the requirement for 
evidence to be strategically adapted to suit the prevailing political climate in 
order to inform subsequent policy output. The manner in which Peter Piot, 
the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, internalised the competing 
Ugandan behavioural change explanation was also acknowledged as a key 
factor in potentially determining the movement of evidence within UNAIDS 




Ostensibly, Peter Piot, the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, considered 
the explanation of behavioural change, advanced by Michel Caraël, the 
former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, to be more convincing than 
the competing explanation advanced by Rand Stoneburner a former 
GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist. Two reasons can explain Peter Piot’s possible 
alignment to Michel Caraël’s increased condom uptake explanation. First, the 
perception of Michel Caraël’s expertise within a relatively compact epistemic 
community (Haas: 1992: pp. 1) and his construction as a ‘guru’ of socio-
behavioural data analysis. Second, the notion that the condom uptake 
explanation potentially aligned more directly with Peter Piot’s multisectoral 
approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention (as condoms were a tangible 
biomedical product that UNAIDS could advocate for and subsequently 
distribute via the multisectoral approach at the global level). Notions of 
policy entrepreneurship are again key to the apparent dominance of Caraël’s 
condom uptake explanation over Stoneburner’s partnership reduction 
explanation. Via a strategic alignment to the prevailing institutional and 
political climate (and the possible strategic misinterpretation of Uganda 
sexual behavioural change evidence itself) Caraël was potentially able to 
mould the behavioural change evidence, emerging from Uganda, in a 
manner that would work with UNAIDS’ enhanced global HIV prevention 
policy agenda namely multisectoralism.  
 
6.8 Chapter summary 
	
This chapter emphasised that institutional and political adaptation, namely, 
the shift from GPA to UNAIDS in the mid-1990s and the initiation of a new 
global HIV prevention approach (multisectoralism) appeared to influence the 
behavioural change explanations advanced by competing HIV/AIDS 
experts. Owing to the apparent failure of the partnership reduction 
explanation to align with the evolving institutional and political context, and 
the implications of the partnership reduction explanation in challenging 
elements of UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV prevention policy agenda, it did not 
appear to inform subsequent HIV/AIDS policy output in the mid to late-
1990s. Data have suggested that the partnership reduction explanation was 
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ostensibly politically filtered by UNAIDS in the mid-1990s. This arguably 
occurred as the partnership reduction explanation, had it been widely 
disseminated in the mid-1990s, would have called into question UNAIDS’ 
predesigned HIV prevention policy agenda, and the need for UNAIDS to 
advocate for increased financial resources to mitigate HIV/AIDS via the 
uptake of condoms that could be distributed through the multisectoral 
response at the global level. Seemingly, it was more important for UNAIDS 
(then a newly developed UN institution that aimed to depart from an out-
dated HIV prevention model used by its institutional predecessor GPA) to 
frame itself as a credible international organisation that could mitigate 
HIV/AIDS at the global level. Key to its perception of credibility was the 
introduction of an ‘enhanced’ multisectoral HIV prevention policy agenda, 
and its need to advocate for increased financial mobilisation to fight 
HIV/AIDS at the global level. Data appear to suggest that the emerging 
signs of the Uganda ‘success’ story were viewed by UNAIDS with 
trepidation. Indeed, the formative signs of ‘success’ (and certain forms of 
evidence which could account for the HIV decline in Uganda) were perhaps 
downplayed (and potentially strategically misinterpreted) by UNAIDS as it 
had to promote the narrative of HIV/AIDS as a growing global health policy 
problem (that needed to be fixed via multisectoralism). Acknowledging a 
successful Ugandan-based HIV prevention model (underpinned by oral 
communication and subsequent partnership reduction) could have 
conceivably resulted in UNAIDS having to question elements of its 
multisectoral prevention agenda and its need to magnify the growing 
problem of HIV/AIDS at the global level for financial reasons. In the interest 
of good academic practice, please note that individual participants were 
given the right to reply to the highly personalised claims outlined within this 




CHAPTER SEVEN: Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction to chapter 
 
Via an analysis of SGS, this thesis sought to examine contested explanations 
for the decline in HIV prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the 
development of global HIV prevention policy in the 1990s. This chapter 
critically reflects on the findings reported in the preceding three chapters, 
examining their contribution to existing empirical literature on the 
development of SGS and prevailing explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
prevalence decline of the 1990s. Reflections on the implications for our 
understanding of the relationship between evidence and policy within global 
and Ugandan policymaking contexts are also advanced. More precisely, this 
chapter aims to discuss the study’s empirical contributions to existing 
accounts of SGS’s development, to build upon historical narratives of 
Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story, and to engage with existing theoretical 
frameworks that have attempted to model the relationship between evidence 
and policy, in particular Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model—considering its 
applicability pertaining to LIC contexts. The main findings of the study are 
summarised, its limitations and strengths are discussed and directions for 
future research are suggested.   
 
7.2 Summary of the main findings 
 
Research findings coincide significantly with official accounts locating the 
development of SGS at a UNAIDS sponsored HIV/AIDS surveillance 
improvement workshop held in Nairobi, Kenya, in February 1997, but offer a 
more complex picture of how and why this development came about. 
Official accounts from both UNAIDS and the WHO present the development 
of SGS as a technocratic, problem-solving response to limitations in 
established global HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches. UNAIDS/WHO 
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documents highlight the significance of Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
evidence for the development and introduction of SGS (UNAIDS: 1998a; 
UNAIDS/WHO: 2000). Although findings from this research confirm 
UNAIDS’ and the WHO’s professed need for improved HIV/AIDS 
surveillance systems, they suggest a more complex picture in terms of the 
extent to which SGS was evidence-based and highlight contested 
interpretations of this evidence among HIV/AIDS experts. 
 
The introduction of SGS by UNAIDS/WHO may be understood as serving 
both technical and broader strategic purposes in the late-1990s and early 
2000s. As specified in UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation (UNAIDS: 
1998a; UNAIDS/WHO: 2000), SGS sought to improve older global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance methodologies via the integration, and triangulation 
of, multiple data sources—in particular behavioural surveillance data 
sources. However, the introduction of SGS also appears to have served two 
broader purposes, functioning as something akin to a marketing tool to help 
promote the institutional identity of UNAIDS, while concurrently signalling 
a shift towards a multisectoral approach that aimed to unify epidemiological 
and social scientific disciplinary approaches in the mid to late-1990s 
onwards. 
 
While interviewees’ accounts coincide in describing a decline in Ugandan 
HIV prevalence during the 1990s, based upon the analysis of Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change data sources, they present divergent interpretations of 
this evidence which became significant in the development of SGS and the 
development of subsequent global HIV prevention policy. One interpretation 
focused on a reduction in multiple partnerships within the Ugandan 
population as the key change driving the decline in HIV prevalence, while a 
contrasting explanation focused on increased use of condoms as the primary 
cause of this decline. Interviewees’ accounts suggest a process of 
competition, whereby different actors sought to secure the primacy of their 
preferred interpretation in institutional understandings of Uganda’s HIV 
prevalence decline and in the development of SGS. Certain interviewees 
assert that disciplinary bias and institutional marginalisation have 
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contributed to the subordination of explanations focused on a decline in 
multiple sexual partners, while the policy entrepreneurship of Michel Caraël, 
the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, appears influential in 
explaining the ascendency of explanations focused on increased condom use. 
Despite these contestations around the evidence used to inform the 
development of SGS and approaches to HIV prevention in the 1990s, 
UNAIDS documents and peer-reviewed publications from this period 
highlight one interpretation (that of increased condom uptake) which has 
emerged as the official explanation for the success of HIV control in Uganda. 
The transition from GPA to UNAIDS, and the initiation of a multisectoral 
HIV prevention approach, appear as important contextual and institutional 
influences in the interpretation of behavioural change evidence for Uganda’s 
HIV decline. The inability of the partnership reduction explanation to align 
with the evolving institutional and political orthodoxy, and the potential for 
this explanation to challenge UNAIDS’ new focus on multisectoral HIV 
prevention, may help to explain why it did not inform subsequent 
HIV/AIDS policy and does not appear in official accounts of SGS’s 
development. In contrast, explanations focused on increased condom use 
were consistent with UNAIDS’ HIV prevention policy agenda (including its 
emphasis on multisectoral approaches) and appeared to reinforce the 
organisation’s need for increased financial resources to mitigate HIV/AIDS 
via the distribution and promotion of condoms. 
 
7.3 Contributions of study 
 
This study makes empirical and analytical contributions to knowledge in 
three areas. First, it provides new understandings of SGS’s policy 
development, while introducing previously unidentified reasons 
contributing towards its formal introduction by UNAIDS/WHO in 2000. 
Second, it provides fresh insights into the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline 
(otherwise known as the Ugandan HIV/AIDS ‘success story’) that emerged 
during the 1990s. Third, it has located and examined an array of broad 
factors that can influence the relationship between evidence and policy 
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pertaining to sub-Saharan African and global level policymaking contexts—
factors which query the notion, and practice of, EBPM in both contexts.  
 
7.3.1 Contributions to existing accounts explaining the development of SGS 
as advanced by UNAIDS/WHO 
 
This study presents findings which challenge elements of existing accounts 
of SGS’s development as advanced by UNAIDS/WHO (UNAIDS: 1998a; 
UNAIDS/WHO: 2000). These official accounts provide a somewhat 
simplistic picture of how evidence was used to support the introduction of 
SGS, and do not explicitly acknowledge some of the reasons that appear to 
have contributed to its formal initiation in 2000. As noted in section 4.1 of the 
first results chapter, UNAIDS (1998a) depict the policy development of SGS 
as a problem-solving adaption to older, serologically focused, HIV/AIDS 
surveillance approaches supported by Ugandan sexual behavioural change 
evidence. Indeed, it is claimed that older HIV surveillance approaches could 
be built upon in reaction to the emergence of new knowledge – namely 
Ugandan behavioural surveillance data – which could be used to interpret 
trends in serosurveillance—thus validating the SGS approach (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 5).   
 
While this account reflects the significance of the Nairobi workshop in 
contributing to the development of SGS - which interview data confirms -  it 
should be understood as somewhat simplistic in its portrayal of how 
Ugandan evidence was used to improve older global HIV/AIDS surveillance 
approaches, and the functions that SGS actually performed. While evidence 
was certainly used to inform the development of SGS – particularly Ugandan 
sexual behavioural change evidence – the findings of this study challenge the 
above narrative depicting SGS as strictly ‘evidence-based’—including the 
inference that the introduction was used in a purely rational or problem-
solving manner. Significantly, HIV/AIDS experts involved with SGS’s 
development differed in their interpretation of the available evidence, 
resulting in a form of competition between contrasting explanations for 
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Uganda’s decline in HIV prevalence. Explanations emphasising a reduction 
in multiple sexual partners appear to have been subject to a degree of 
institutional marginalisation within evolving institutional and political 
contexts. Thus, aligning with the work of Hunsmann (2012), this case 
illustrates how political obstacles have influenced the use of evidence within 
the field of global HIV policy (Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1477). It is also clear that 
Ugandan evidence, used to support the development of SGS and formative 
explanations of Uganda’s HIV decline, has been interpreted and used 
somewhat selectively which, congruent with Weiss (1979), suggests a 
political – rather than a neutrally ‘rational’ -  use of evidence within Ugandan 
and global level policymaking contexts.  
 
Three particular facets of existing UNAIDS/WHO accounts describing the 
development of SGS – and the role of evidence in this process -  can be 
queried on the basis of findings generated within this study. First, the 
depiction of SGS’s policy development being based on a unified and 
undisputed Ugandan evidence-base. Second, assertions made within 
UNAIDS policy documentation which claim the successful partnership 
between epidemiologists and social scientists in the mid to late-1990s 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). Third, findings from this research suggest there 
were additional reasons which underpinned the formal development of SGS 
(in addition to the technical, problem-solving role described in official 
accounts).  
 
Analysis identified a somewhat broader array of evidence that indirectly 
contributed to the policy development of SGS (alongside the 1989 and 1995 
population-based surveys of sexual behavioural change and the 300 small-
scale sociological surveys mentioned in official accounts). As noted in section 
4.4 of the first results chapter, older HIV/AIDS surveillance data from the 
WHO’s GPA, sexual behavioural evidence from DHS surveys, and data 
emerging from the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States in the 1980s all 
informed the conceptual development of SGS. However, these sources of 
evidence were not mentioned in official UNAIDS/WHO accounts of SGS’s 
development. Existing UNAIDS/WHO documents present a somewhat 
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rudimentary account of the evidence which helped support SGS’s 
introduction, emphasising (in line with interview data) the principal role of 
Ugandan sexual behavioural change evidence. However, multiple, and at 
times contradictory narratives pertaining to the function of Ugandan 
evidence, and its role in supporting the development of SGS, were generated 
by certain interviewees—which again calls into question the simplistic and 
largely technocratic depiction of SGS’s evidence-base as advanced by 
UNAIDS in the late-1990s. 
 
The official accounts of SGS’s development, and the portrayal of a single, 
undisputed Ugandan evidence-base, serve as a reminder that documents 
produced by institutions like UNAIDS/WHO should not be viewed as 
neutral sources of information, as they are often written for particular 
audiences and specific purposes (Yin: 2003: pp. 86 – 87). It was arguably 
important for UNAIDS to portray SGS as a problem-solving, evidence-based 
policy within official accounts of its development in order to demonstrate 
UNAIDS’ commitment to evidence-based approaches—a commitment which 
maybe viewed as somewhat rhetorical in light of the findings reported 
within this study.  
 
It can also be reported that UNAIDS’ policy documentation was used 
strategically to promote its institutional standing in order to create a 
narrative of technical efficiency in relation to global HIV/AIDS surveillance 
and global HIV prevention. Via the presentation of SGS as a rational policy 
development in the late-1990s, and the advancement of an outwardly 
homogenous Ugandan evidence-base, UNAIDS/WHO documentation 
successfully framed the development of SGS as both unproblematic and 
evidence-based. However, findings call into question the extent to which 
such descriptions, as advanced by UNAIDS/WHO, are fully comprehensive 
or indeed persuasive.  
 
An additional claim, asserted within official UNAIDS/WHO policy 
documentation, can also be questioned in light of the findings generated 
within the study. It was recognised by UNAIDS (1998a) that barriers 
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between the medical community and social scientists existed during the time 
period that SGS emerged, and that “those barriers are hard to break down” 
(UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 5). The Nairobi workshop – the focusing event where 
SGS emerged – was perceived as “help[ing] to build up effective 
partnerships between behavioural scientists and epidemiologists” (UNAIDS: 
1998a: pp. 12). The depiction that “effective partnerships” (UNAIDS: 1998a: 
pp. 5) between HIV/AIDS experts – from contrasting disciplinary 
backgrounds – were formed during the Nairobi workshop is not entirely 
convincing given findings from interviews.  
 
In contrast, findings from the project suggest a high degree of contestation 
between competing HIV/AIDS experts from contrasting epidemiological 
and social-scientific backgrounds in the mid to late-1990s. As noted by 
Schoepf (2004), action within the discipline of public health takes places on a 
terrain of contested meaning and unequal power where different kinds of 
knowledge struggle for control (Schoepf: 2004: pp. 41). Rather than effective 
partnerships being formed, at the time of the development of SGS, experts 
from different disciplinary backgrounds vied over evidence where different 
forms of knowledge, congruent with Schoepf (2004), struggled to gain 
competitive advantage in the development of subsequent HIV/AIDS policy 
output (and formative explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline). The portrayal 
of effective partnerships being formed between HIV/AIDS experts within 
UNAIDS policy documentation conceals how experts, involved with the 
development of SGS and formative accounts of Uganda’s HIV decline, 
competed to secure the primacy of their opposing interpretations of 
evidence, and how disciplinary barriers arguably remained in place and 
contributed to shaping the development of SGS. 
 
Findings have also suggested that SGS was introduced by UNAIDS/WHO 
for a range of previously unidentified reasons. In addition to the need for 
SGS to improve older global HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches, findings 
show that SGS functioned as a rebranding tool to promote the institutional 
credibility of UNAIDS and to signal the unity of social scientific and 
epidemiological approaches in the mid to late-1990s. Pertaining to SGS 
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functioning as a rebranding tool, findings illustrate that SGS helped UNAIDS 
to re-launch global HIV surveillance methodological approaches, with the 
new packaging of SGS serving to promote the policy within international 
organisations involved with global HIV/AIDS prevention in the late-1990s. 
Findings also indicate that SGS acted as a marketing device which could 
facilitate the outward construction of UNAIDS as a credible, and efficient, 
institution that could address the global policy problem of HIV/AIDS in a 
successful manner. These findings have direct parallels with the notion of 
policy branding relating to DOTS for the treatment and wider control of 
tuberculosis at the global level. In this context, Ogden et al (2003) 
demonstrated that after a prolonged period of neglect, financial resources 
were mobilised in order to promote tuberculosis control on the national and 
global public health policy agenda (Ogden et al: 2003: pp. 179).  
 
It is argued by Ogden et al (2003), that via the marketing of the improved 
tuberculosis control policy with the DOTS brand, the policy successfully 
generated attention towards the problem of tuberculosis, which, in turn, 
facilitated the transfer of the newly branded policy to LMICs across the 
globe. In reaction to the findings that emerged from this thesis, it can be 
stated that SGS was marketed, or branded by UNAIDS, to promote a 
perception of institutional credibility, whilst concurrently positioning 
HIV/AIDS surveillance back on the public health agenda at the national and 
global levels. 
 
Analyses also suggest that SGS served a symbolic purpose in signalling the 
apparent unification of two formerly distinct disciplines (socio-behavioural 
and epidemiological) within UNAIDS/WHO in the late-1990s. Older global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance approaches had formerly analysed epidemiological 
and socio-behavioural HIV data sources in isolation—especially within the 
WHO’s GPA (Barnett & Whiteside: 2002: pp. 23). There was, therefore a 
commitment to transdisciplinary research by UNAIDS to unify the two 




However, the process of successfully bridging these disciplinary fields was 
constructed as unproblematic by certain interviewees, whereas others 
asserted that the process was more difficult, acknowledging that there was a 
degree of resistance to merge socio-behavioural data approaches with 
epidemiological approaches in the early to mid-1990s. As noted above, it was 
claimed by UNAIDS (1998a) that effective partnerships were created during 
the Nairobi workshop, with the implication that established barriers between 
epidemiologists and social scientists started to breakdown during the 
focusing event where SGS emerged. However, the degree of contestation and 
competition that actually occurred between HIV/AIDS experts involved 
with the development of SGS, calls into question the functional ability of SGS 
to help unify competing HIV/AIDS experts from separate disciplinary 
backgrounds. The findings again serve as a reminder that documentary 
sources of evidence should be viewed critically and are constructed by their 
authors in an attempt to consolidate a variety of views and opinions 
(Weishaar: 2013: pp. 258). Existing UNAIDS/WHO accounts of SGS’s 
development are thus somewhat one-dimensional as they mask how a range 
of evidentiary sources informed its policy development, how experts 
competed over Ugandan evidence and the role that contestation, rather than 
partnership, played during its formal introduction.     
 
7.3.2 Contributions to existing accounts of Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story  
 
Findings from this study have generated fresh insights into existing accounts 
of Uganda’s HIV ‘success’ story, as constructed by HIV/AIDS experts from 
international organisations and the Ugandan Government, in the early to 
mid-1990s. Via the analysis of SGS it emerged that Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change evidence, namely two population-based surveys 
conducted in 1989 and 1995 combined with 300 small-scale sociological 
surveys, were used by HIV/AIDS experts to generate explanations for 
Uganda’s HIV decline. However, results demonstrate that certain HIV/AIDS 
experts, involved with the analysis of these sources of evidence, competed to 
generate support for explanations highlighting the role of either increased 
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condom uptake, or a reduction in multiple sexual partners, as the main 
reason behind declining HIV prevalence in Uganda. Significantly, accounts 
of this contestation among HIV/AIDS experts provide new insights which 
challenge official explanations for the HIV decline as portrayed by UNAIDS 
in the mid to late-1990s.   
 
A key strength of this thesis is the data it presents reflects access to 
HIV/AIDS experts from Ugandan and Genevan contexts—experts who were 
directly involved with constructing formative explanations of Uganda’s HIV 
decline in the early to mid-1990s. Interview data obtained from these key 
HIV/AIDS experts, who were among the first to analyse the original data 
sources highlighting the emerging HIV decline in Uganda, enabled the 
identification of a range of broader factors – which appear to have influenced 
the development and depiction of the Ugandan HIV decline. Analysis of 
interview data suggests that claims of disciplinary bias, the influence of 
policy entrepreneurship and data marginalisation affected the competing 
increased condom uptake and multiple partnership reduction explanations 
that could account for the Ugandan HIV decline. These factors, which appear 
to be central elements of the broader competition that occurred among 
HIV/AIDS experts, seem to have directly contributed towards the possible 
subordination of an explanation focused on a reduction in multiple partners 
and the ascendency of an increased condom uptake explanation. 
 
The identification of these broader influences thus suggests that existing 
narratives of Uganda’s HIV decline, and literature which has attempted to 
explain the Ugandan HIV ‘success’ story itself, can be updated and expanded 
on the basis of the empirical findings generated within this study. As noted 
in earlier chapters, Uganda has been constructed as the first HIV/AIDS 
success story or ‘poster child’ within sub-Saharan Africa (Kiweewa: 2008: pp. 
54). Logically, as the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to experience 
decreasing HIV trends, the causal reasons contributing to this decline have 
been of analytical interest to international organisations and researchers 
within the field of HIV/AIDS prevention for the past 25 years. Indeed, there 
is an extensive body of literature that has attempted to reveal the reasons 
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that contributed towards the Ugandan HIV decline, with an array of 
contrasting explanations having been advanced to account for what actually 
caused the declining trends in HIV infection (Parkhurst: 2001; Parkhurst: 
2002; Parkhurst: 2012; Okuonzi & Epstein: 2005; Genius & Genius: 2005; 
Blum: 2004; Tumushabe: 2006; Green et al: 2006; Slutkin et al: 2006; Merson: 
2006; Hogle: 2002; Stoneburner & Low-Beer: 2004a; 2004b; Kirby: 2008; 
Kiweewa: 2008; UNAIDS: 1998a; UNAIDS: 1998b; Asiimwe-Okiror et al: 
1997).  
 
One of the central explanations, advanced for Uganda’s declining HIV 
prevalence, focuses on the impact of Uganda’s ABC strategy (Singh et al: 
2003; Slutkin et al: 2006; Blum: 2004; Murphy et al: 2006). Indeed, one of the 
most contested elements of existing explanations for the Ugandan HIV 
‘success’ story concerns the significance of the individual elements of the 
ABC explanation, with various individuals, organisations and national 
governments highlighting the discrete ‘A’ (abstinence), ‘B’ (being 
faithful/avoidance of multiple sexual partners) and ‘C’ (condom) elements 
(Green et al: 2006: pp. 335).  
 
As noted within section 5.2.1 of the second results chapter, certain 
participants aligned themselves - either fully or partially - to an increased 
condom uptake or a reduction in multiple partnership explanation as the key 
reason that led to declining trends in HIV infection within the country. A 
range of processes and strategies contributed to the subsequent dominance 
of the increased condom uptake explanation, and the apparent subordination 
of explanations emphasising a reduction in multiple partnerships. These 
processes maybe categorised into three broad groups—that is: the influence 
of disciplinary bias, policy entrepreneurship and claims of data 
marginalisation. These three factors, and their influence upon existing 
accounts of the Ugandan HIV ‘success’ story will now be discussed.  
 
Importantly, findings demonstrate that certain HIV/AIDS experts, who were 
among the first to create formative explanations of the emerging Ugandan 
HIV decline, competed over two different interpretations of the data, 
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highlighting different possible changes in sexual behaviour which could 
account for sub-Saharan Africa’s first HIV ‘success’. Interpretations focusing 
on multiple partnerships, advanced by epidemiologists Rand Stoneburner 
and Daniel Low-Beer, did not appear to gain traction as a valid explanation 
for the decreasing HIV prevalence within Uganda in the mid to late-1990s. In 
contrast, interpretations focused on increased condom uptake, advanced by 
Michel Caraël a social scientist, and former head of HIV prevention within 
UNAIDS, appeared to succeed in establishing itself as a valid explanation for 
decreasing HIV trends. Multiple factors appear to have contributed to the 
manner in which the condom-based explanation came to dominate the 
competing partnership reduction explanation, including claims of 
disciplinary bias, the influence of policy entrepreneurship and data 
misinterpretation. In combination, these factors apparently shaped the 
relationship between evidence and policy within global policymaking 
networks and formative narratives of the Ugandan HIV ‘success’ story itself.  
 
Results from this research suggest that discrediting tactics, including 
references to relevant expertise and disciplinary bias, inhibited certain 
constructions of Ugandan behavioural evidence from informing subsequent 
policy output. Indeed, results highlight that Rand Stoneburner’s expertise, in 
relation to socio-behavioural data analysis, was challenged by Michel Caraël, 
the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS. The purported tactical 
construction of Rand Stoneburner as being poorly equipped to analyse 
Ugandan sexual behavioural change evidence – principally on the grounds 
of being an epidemiologist – can be understood as an effective discrediting 
technique intended to undermine support for the partnership reduction 
explanation. This discrediting strategy has arguably been an important and 
overlooked element of the broader competition between HIV/AIDS experts, 
who attempted to frame their respective sexual behavioural change 
explanations as preeminent in the mid to late-1990s.  
 
The influence of policy entrepreneurship also emerged as a key factor which 
enabled an increased condom uptake explanation to dominate the rival 
reduction in multiple partnership explanation. Congruent with notions 
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advanced by Daniels & Lewin (2008) and Burris et al (2011), the role of policy 
entrepreneurship was seemingly key in influencing how certain forms of 
evidence were perceived as more credible than others, and how particular 
interpretations of evidence were subsequently able to inform HIV/AIDS 
policy output ahead of others. Aligning with Burris et al (2011), who 
acknowledge the importance of a well-placed policy entrepreneur for 
synthesising operational research findings into policy, in relation to 
HIV/HSV-2 interactions within Ghana, findings illustrated that Michel 
Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention within UNAIDS, functioned as a 
policy entrepreneur. This potentially enabled the increased condom uptake 
explanation to inform subsequent HIV/AIDS policy output (more 
successfully than competing HIV/AIDS experts who attempted to promote a 
partnership reduction explanation).   
 
Caraël’s ability to promote the increased condom uptake explanation within 
globalised HIV policymaking contexts, reflects his senior institutional 
positions which aligns with findings advanced by Hutchinson et al (2011). 
Usefully, Hutchinson et al (2011) note that the position of policy 
entrepreneurs, within distinct institutional contexts, is an important factor in 
facilitating the movement of evidence and the development of subsequent 
policy output. According to their analysis, policy entrepreneurs who 
possessed senior institutional positions were able to control the 
interpretation of evidence and thus influence subsequent policy 
development within the contexts of Malawi, Uganda and Zambia.  
 
Michel Caraël similarly possessed a senior-level institutional position within 
UNAIDS, which was arguably significant in enabling the increased condom 
uptake explanation to inform subsequent HIV/AIDS policy output—ahead 
of the partnership reduction explanation principally advanced by an HIV 
expert who was constructed as being poorly equipped to analyse 
behavioural data due to his epidemiological background. As head of HIV 
prevention within UNAIDS and chair of the 1997 Nairobi workshop (where 
SGS emerged and the formative explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline were 
discussed), Caraël possessed the requisite institutional power to promote the 
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condom uptake explanation more effectively than the competing partnership 
reduction explanation.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, Michel Caraël also demonstrated one of the key 
attributes of a policy entrepreneur within HIV/AIDS policymaking 
networks, namely, their possession of a known level of expertise which, in 
turn, confers an entitlement to be heard within distinct policy environments 
(Kingdon: 1995: pp. 180 – 181). Indeed, findings illustrated that Caraël’s 
perceived socio-behavioural expertise, particularly within UNAIDS, enabled 
the diffusion of his preferred explanation of sexual behavioural change 
(taking place within Uganda in the early to mid-1990s). The significance 
afforded to Michel Caraël’s expertise in relation to the acceptance of 
competing evidence explanations, emerges from the interview data as being 
key in determining the acceptance, or non-acceptance, of the two behavioural 
change explanations. Findings illustrate that Caraël’s construction of socio-
behavioural expertise positioned him as the central authority (within a 
relatively compact policymaking network) pertaining to socio-behavioural 
data analysis. This view was corroborated by HIV/AIDS experts from both 
Genevan and Ugandan contexts during data collection. 
 
Indeed, Caraël was constructed as a “guru” (former UNAIDS official: 
19/9/2011) of socio-behavioural data analysis and the perception of his 
expertise by others, including the former Executive Director of UNAIDS, 
arguably facilitated the dominance of his explanation of Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change. Interlinked with the social construction of Caraël’s 
expertise, is his close and productive relationship with Peter Piot, the former 
Executive Director of UNAIDS—which illustrates an additional facet of 
policy entrepreneurship as advanced by Kingdon (1995). Kingdon maintains 
that policy entrepreneurs have well-developed political connections and 
effective negotiation skills—underpinned by their savvy and tenacious 
nature (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 181). On the basis of the research findings, it can 
be posited that Caraël’s close, and institutionally productive relationship 
with other decision-makers within UNAIDS, especially Peter Piot, facilitated 
his ability to negotiate his explanation of sexual behavioural change to gain 
205	
	
wider political acceptance within UNAIDS than other competing sexual 
behavioural change explanations.  
 
Usefully, Burris et al (2011) also discovered that a key mechanism which 
facilitated policy entrepreneurs’ use of evidence (and the initiation of 
subsequent policy change) was personal ties, including either old friends and 
colleagues, in distinct institutional environments. Given his political 
connections, his perceived status as a socio-behavioural expert, his senior-
level institutional position and his personal ties with other powerful 
decision-makers, it can be understood why Michel Caraël was able to shape 
the interpretations, and use of, Ugandan behavioural evidence in order to 
promote his preferred framing of the policy problem of HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda and how to address this problem in multiple policy fora. Kingdon 
(1995) reasons that the primary motivation for policy entrepreneurs to 
function in an active manner within the broader policymaking process is the 
promotion of personal self-interest via the protection of one’s bureaucratic 
turf, the expansion of one’s individual agency and thus the advancement of 
one’s career (Kingdon: 1995: pp. 123). Findings within this study can suggest 
an additional motivation for policy entrepreneurs to function in an active 
manner within the broader policymaking process (at least within the context 
of global level HIV/AIDS policymaking networks). Namely, their wish to 
advance, and defend, their own ideas and to increase their own epistemic 
dominance, which, in turn, facilitates them to maintain their competitive 
advantage over less powerful experts in adversarial policymaking 
environments.  
 
Claims of data misinterpretation were also advanced by participants during 
interviews. Four participants made claims concerning the misinterpretation 
of the reduction in multiple partnership explanation. A version of this data 
purported misinterpretation is presented within Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) 
and ‘A Measure of Success in Uganda’ (UNAIDS: 1998b). The claims of data 
misinterpretation have implications for existing narratives of the Ugandan 
HIV decline and our understanding of the relationship between evidence 
and policy within Ugandan and global level policymaking contexts. In the 
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absence of this purported misinterpretation, it can be hypothesised that the 
reduction in multiple partnership explanation might have informed 
explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline and the subsequent development of 
HIV/AIDS prevention policy output from 1996 onwards. However, findings 
within this study appear to indicate the that multiple partnership reduction 
explanation was not formally published until 2004 in the journal Science (8 
years after evidence of this behavioural change emerged from the analysis of 
the Ugandan population-based surveys conducted in 1989 and 1995).  
 
The discovery that some sources of evidence were purportedly 
misinterpreted in the account of Uganda’s HIV decline and the development 
of SGS is perhaps unsurprising. The emerging signs of the ‘success’ of HIV 
control from a sub-Saharan African country for the first time in the history of 
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic had significant implications. Dickinson & 
Buse (2008) note that politics, ignorance and ideology can have a greater 
influence on HIV policy development than do evidence and best practice—
and this has been presented as particularly applicable within LMICs 
(Dickinson & Buse: 2008: pp. 1). It is additionally noted by Hunsmann (2012), 
that the development of HIV prevention policy, within the context of 
Tanzania, is far from being evidence-driven, noting that HIV policy is the 
result of a politically negotiated aggregation of competing, and frequently 
non-optimising rationalities, among policymakers who have different ideas 
about the prevention of HIV (Hunsmann: 2012: pp. 1477). The acknowledged 
political determinants of HIV/AIDS policy development, and the political 
implications of the explanations that could account for the Ugandan ‘success’ 
story, are likely to have been key factors in the use of evidence for broader 
political purposes within Ugandan and global level contexts in the mid to 
late-1990s. Okware et al (2005) note that debate over the Ugandan HIV 
decline has often revolved around conviction or ideology rather than 
evidence (Okware et al: 2005: pp. 627). Findings within this study congruent 
with Okware et al (2005) indicate that certain HIV/AIDS experts, involved 
with the construction of explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, were seen 
by some actors with competing perspectives as being perhaps driven 
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primarily by conviction (and broader political concerns) in their preferred 
explanation for the Ugandan HIV ‘success’ story. 
 
The political use of evidence, as opposed to a purely technocratic use, is 
again unsurprising—especially within the field of public health. As noted by 
Cookson (2005), experts within the field of public health tend to make a 
highly selective use of evidence, often reflecting political incentives, 
psychological biases and an over-confidence in one’s own judgement 
(Cookson: 2005: pp. 119). It is also acknowledged by Banta (2003), that 
representations of evidence can be biased, willingly or unintentionally, or 
even fabricated, and that evidence utilisation is based upon a combination of 
professional judgement and common sense, with the emergence of 
convincing evidence, in public health, frequently being a matter of 
presentation and rhetoric (Banta: 2003: pp. 569). Findings in this study are 
congruent with these notions, with certain HIV/AIDS experts using evidence 
in an apparently strategic or political manner. This links with Weiss’ (1977) 
perceptive summation of policymaking itself as an inherently political 
process, with the basic aim of reconciling interests in order to negotiate a 
consensus, rather than implementing logic and truth (Weiss: 1977: pp. 533).  
 
Congruent with Young (2005) and Bowen & Zwi (2005), the relationship 
between evidence and policy - in the case of SGS -  has been influenced by 
political processes and evolving political contexts (Bowen & Zwi: 2005: pp. 
601). The period during which the 1989 and 1995 population-based surveys 
were being analysed by HIV/AIDS experts coincided with a major 
institutional transition in global HIV/AIDS governance, and the initiation of 
a novel, multisectoral HIV/AIDS prevention approach. These contextual 
developments were influential in shaping the presentation of competing 
explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, and possibly the agency of 
HIV/AIDS experts involved within the analysis of Ugandan behavioural 
evidence in the mid to late-1990s.  
 
Analysis suggests that the closure of the WHO’s GPA in 1995, and the 
establishment of UNAIDS in 1996 catalysed a major policy change in the 
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approach to global HIV/AIDS prevention—and more broadly global 
HIV/AIDS governance. This institutional transition and the departure from 
GPA’s biomedically focused HIV prevention model to UNAIDS’ 
multisectoral HIV prevention approach, transformed the political context 
within which the debate over the competing behavioural change 
explanations among HIV/AIDS experts occurred. Analysis highlighted that 
this institutional adaptation had a direct influence upon the increased 
condom uptake and the partnership reduction explanation that could 
account for declining HIV trends in Uganda.  
 
The partnership reduction explanation and the successive decline in HIV 
prevalence which was potentially catalysed by Ugandans communicating 
about the threat of HIV/AIDS, did not involve UNAIDS or its newly 
developed multisectoral HIV prevention approach. Therefore, it was 
possibly working against the evolving institutional and political 
environment and the movement towards UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV/AIDS 
prevention strategy, which aimed to promote the use of condoms (a tangible 
biomedical product that UNAIDS could advocate and generate funds for) to 
reduce the global transmission of HIV. It could be advanced, aligning with 
Majone (1989), that the policy idea of an HIV prevention model, primarily 
based upon partnership reduction, was not adopted by UNAIDS as it was 
arguably not communicated persuasively, nor indeed did it meet the 
demands of the wider political environment (Majone: 1989: pp. 165). 
However, the discovery that the partnership reduction explanation, which 
was catalysed via oral communication, and broader social mobilisation 
within the Ugandan population, did not inform HIV/AIDS prevention 
policy within UNAIDS is somewhat surprising. Arguably, the partnership 
reduction explanation could have aligned with UNAIDS’ multisectoral HIV 
prevention approach as a myriad of sectors, state and non-state actors could 
have unified under the banner of multisectoralism to promote HIV/AIDS 
awareness campaigns – via broad-based social mobilisation – which 





However, analysis suggests that the partnership reduction explanation 
presented UNAIDS with a possible predicament, as the signs of Ugandan 
‘success’, emerged when UNAIDS was attempting to highlight the growing 
problem of HIV/AIDS at the global level (and its institutional need to 
advocate for increased financial resources to support its newly developed 
multisectoral approach to address the global problem of HIV/AIDS). It can 
be advanced that certain HIV/AIDS experts within UNAIDS, who were 
perceptive to the prevailing institutional and political environment (i.e. 
policy entrepreneurs like Michel Caraël) actively stressed the principal 
significance of increased condom uptake as an explanation for declining HIV 
trends in Uganda. Via the promotion of increased condom uptake, based 
upon the analysis of the 1989 and 1995 population-based surveys, UNAIDS 
could subsequently advocate for increased condom distribution as an 
‘evidence-based’ HIV prevention policy (which could be transferred from 
Uganda – a country ‘succeeding’ in its fight against HIV/AIDS – to other 
countries at the global level).  
 
Condoms are a highly effective barrier method that can prevent the 
transmission and acquisition of HIV at the population-level—and anyone 
who disputes their efficacy is, in fact, questioning a substantive evidence-
base. It can be reasoned that UNAIDS perhaps wanted to highlight the 
principal significance of increased condom uptake (as the cause of Uganda’s 
HIV decline rather than partnership reduction), as it could subsequently 
advocate for an effective, evidence-based biomedical product which could be 
promoted to reduce the transmission and acquisition of HIV at the global 
level. This notion relates with a finding advanced by Beague et al (2011), who 
note that external donors often use evidence instrumentally, with evidence 
itself being shaped by donors’ political imperatives to provide generalisable 
research recommendations, which can be applied systematically and 
similarly in most countries, and how nationally developed evidence-based 
policies hold little bearing in countering global policy interests (Beague et al: 
2011: pp. 1539). On the basis of findings within this thesis, it can be stated 
that the partnership reduction explanation emerged when UNAIDS was 
attempting to establish itself as a competent (and newly formed) UN 
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international organisation which sought to implement an enhanced global 
HIV/AIDS prevention model. It can be hypothesised that if UNAIDS had 
embraced the evidence of partnership reduction (emerging from the analysis 
of the 1989 and 1995 population-based surveys) in the mid-1990s, it would 
have questioned its need to advocate for increased financial support to 
mitigate HIV/AIDS via the distribution of condoms (a clearly-defined and 
effective HIV prevention policy that was perhaps easier to implement, and 
transfer across countries, at the global level compared with a partnership 
reduction based HIV prevention policy).  
 
7.3.3 Linking findings with existing understandings of the relationship 
between evidence and policy  
 
On the basis of findings presented within this thesis it can be advanced that 
rational, or linear, understandings of the relationship between evidence and 
policy can be challenged—especially within Ugandan and global level 
HIV/AIDS policymaking contexts. Premised on a sequential link between 
the production of evidence and subsequent policy development, rationalist 
understandings of the evidence/policy connection are both deterministic and 
problematically based upon an apolitical understanding of the use of 
evidence by ‘comprehensively rational’ actors (Cairney: 2014: pp. 1). 
Findings suggest that HIV/AIDS experts, involved with the creation and 
analysis of Ugandan evidence, may not have used evidence in a rational or 
neutral manner. Importantly, HIV/AIDS experts involved with the 
development of SGS, and explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, were not 
unified in their desired policy goals and evidence was not used to fill existing 
knowledge gaps to create subsequent policy output in an unproblematic 
manner. Aligning with Young (2002), findings illustrate that rational 
understandings of the relationship between evidence and policy fail to 
capture the complex and non-neutral use of evidence by actors who rarely 
make their decisions on the basis of the best available information (Young et 
al: 2002: pp. 218). Thus, a rational understanding of the evidence/policy 
connection should be criticised owing to its static portrayal of the 
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policymaking process in which evidence is assumed to directly link with 
subsequent policy output (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 7).  
 
Majone (1989) persuasively reasons that the institutional and political 
development of policy is always accompanied by a parallel intellectual 
process of argument and debate, with actors marshalling evidence in support 
of their own proposals and to challenge the assumptions of their opponents 
(Majone: 1989: pp. 148). It is also reasoned that actors operating within the 
policymaking process use evidence to help construct arguments that appeal 
to the beliefs, values and interests of broader constituencies (Majone: 1989: 
pp. 148).  
 
Findings presented within this thesis are clearly congruent with the notions 
advanced by Majone (1989), and the idea that HIV/AIDS experts involved 
with the development of SGS used evidence in a rational and unproblematic 
manner is too simplistic. This contention can be advanced as competition, 
argumentation and politics shaped the evidence/SGS policy relationship 
which therefore challenges the simple notion that evidence deterministically 
leads to the production of rational, ‘evidence-based policy’—especially 
within the context of global HIV/AIDS policymaking environments.  
 
Usefully, Weiss (1979) and Kingdon (1995) note that rationalist 
conceptualisations of the relationship between evidence and policy are not 
fully comprehensive, as the influence of individual agency, and broader 
political pressures, present clear challenges to an apolitical use of evidence 
within an inherently complex policymaking process. Models which depart 
from rational, or linear, understandings of the evidence/policy connection 
provide a more nuanced account pertaining to the movement of evidence 
within the policymaking process and are useful to consider when discussing 
the role of evidence in Ugandan and global level HIV/AIDS policymaking 
contexts. In line with Weiss’ (1979) political model, evidence supporting the 
development of SGS was utilised selectively by certain HIV/AIDS experts—
perhaps to satisfy their short-term interests (Weiss: 1979: pp. 7). Indeed, 
evidence has seemingly be used by certain HIV/AIDS experts as 
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“ammunition” (Weiss: 1979: pp. 429) to help bolster support for 
predetermined policy positions (i.e. an HIV prevention approach that sought 
to use condoms as the main tool to reduce the transmission and acquisition 
of HIV at the global level).  Furthermore, it has been demonstrated by 
statements from interviewees that certain HIV/AIDS experts, in line with 
Weiss (1979), have potentially used evidence in a political manner to 
promote one’s individual agency and for reasons of personal 
aggrandizement within competitive policymaking environments.  
 
7.3.4 Contributions to existing theoretical frameworks attempting to model 
the relationship between evidence and policy 
 
Findings from this study can be contextualised within existing theoretical 
frameworks that attempt to model the relationship between evidence and 
policy—in particular Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model. It is the broad 
analytical objective of this section to relate findings, that emerged via the 
analysis of SGS, with Stevens’ evolutionary model. More specifically, this 
section will briefly reiterate key aspects of the evolutionary model and it will 
explain how elements of the model relate to empirical findings that emerged 
within the study. Stevens (2007) asserts that existing models of the 
evidence/policy relationship neglect the tendency for attention to be focused 
on that evidence which is most helpful to the interests of powerful social 
groups (Stevens: 2007: pp. 25). He advances an evolutionary analogy to 
explain how evidence is used in policy development—seeing social 
structures and political tactics as important in supporting the use of evidence 
(Stevens: 2007: pp. 28 – 29). Influenced by notions of social Darwinism, it is 
reasoned by Stevens (2007) that:  
 
A variety of ideas come from evidence and compete for attention 
in policy, as genes arise and compete for survival…Some of these 
ideas fit with the interests of powerful groups and some do not. 
Ideas that do fit will find powerful supporters. Others will not. 
Those ideas that fit will therefore have groups and individuals 
that can carry them into policy, as would a gene be reproduced if 
it finds a place in organisms that survive. The ideas that do not 
fit will tend not to be picked up by the people who have the 
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power to translate them into policy. The evolutionary advantage 
leads to the survival of the ideas that fit (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28).  
 
Stevens maintains that this analogy illustrates the biased use of evidence 
without depicting policymakers as irrational, or the ability of powerful social 
groups to implement coordinated campaigns to ignore obstructive research 
(Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). Reflecting on the analogy above, it can be understood 
that in accordance with evolutionary social theory evidence comes to inform 
policy when it aligns with the ideas and objectives of those in positions of 
power (Monaghan: 2009: pp. 8). Distinct from more linear models (see 
section 2.3.1), the evolutionary model directs analytical attention to 
mechanisms of evidence selection and the influence of power upon evidence 
within the broader policymaking process. It is persuasively reasoned that 
certain actors, functioning within the policymaking process, have the power 
to choose those pieces of evidence that most closely align with the interests of 
powerful groups. Akin to biological theories of evolution, how evidence is 
selected for use in policy development is messy, complex and occasionally 
brutal (Stevens: 2007: pp. 28). Stevens’ ideas are congruent with Denzin’s 
(2009) realisation that evidence itself is never morally or ethically neutral, 
with discussions over evidence reflecting underlying contestations of power 
in terms of who gets to define what counts as evidence, who determines the 
methods used to generate evidence, and whose criteria are used to evaluate 
the quality of evidence itself (Denzin: 2009: pp. 142). Helpfully, Stevens 
(2007) posits five mechanisms via which evidence is selected and used to 
influence policy, namely: trawling, farming, repetition, flak and strain. Each 
of these mechanisms of selection will now be defined and used to 
contextualise empirical findings within this study. In the interests of clarity, 
Stevens’ five mechanisms of evidence selection have been advanced in table 
form (for a more detailed explanation of the mechanisms of evidence 







































In relation to trawling findings indicate that more powerful actors within 
UNAIDS hauled in bits of evidence, emerging from the analysis of Ugandan 
sexual behavioural change data – in particular evidence of increased condom 
uptake – and threw back bits of evidence that did not align with prevailing 
ideas about global HIV/AIDS prevention (and the desire to implement a 
multisectoral response to mitigate HIV/AIDS via the distribution and 
promotion of condoms). The experience of Rand Stoneburner, a former 
GPA/UNAIDS epidemiologist, maybe seen as an example of strain as more 
powerful actors within UNAIDS purportedly terminated his employment 
during the GPA/UNAIDS transition (as the evidence of partnership 
reduction conflicted with the need to highlight an increased condom uptake 
explanation that could be used to account for the declining HIV trends 
within Uganda).       
 
As described above power is key to the precepts of the evolutionary model. 
Findings demonstrate that Michel Caraël, the former head of HIV prevention 
within UNAIDS, possessed the requisite power to control how evidence was 
selected to inform HIV/AIDS policy output and explanations for Uganda’s 
HIV decline advanced by UNAIDS in the mid to late-1990s. Michel Caraël 
arguably used farming and repetition to draw attention to useful Ugandan 
evidence (that aligned with the broader political and policy interests of 
UNAIDS), whilst encouraging the ignorance of inconvenient evidence that 
did not align with the evolving institutional and political orthodoxy within 
UNAIDS from 1996 onwards. Pertaining to farming, fragments of research 
findings (i.e. evidence of increased condom uptake) were published by 
Michel Caraël within UNAIDS and peer-reviewed literature in the mid-1990s 
(namely Asiimwe-Okiror et al: 1997). In contrast, the competing reduction in 
multiple partnership reduction explanation was not widely disseminated 
during the same period of time. Thus, fragments of evidence were published 
by an institutionally powerful actor within UNAIDS—fragments that aligned 
with new ideas about global HIV/AIDS prevention. 
 
Repetition was also arguably utilised as a mechanism to reinforce one 
interpretation of the evidence for Uganda’s HIV decline. The explanation of 
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increased condom uptake (which could account for the emerging signs of 
HIV decline within Uganda) was repeated in UNAIDS/WHO policy 
documentations and peer-reviewed publications in the mid to late-1990s 
(unlike the reduction in multiple partnerships explanation, which was not 
widely disseminated until 2004). Indeed, within a document co-authored by 
Elizabeth Pisani and Michel Caraël (UNAIDS: 1998a), it is claimed that 
Ugandan sexual behavioural surveys were demonstrating that younger age 
groups within urban areas were “delaying sexual activity and using more 
condoms that in the past” (UNAIDS: 1998a: pp. 3). Furthermore, within ‘A 
Measure of Success in Uganda – The Value of Monitoring both HIV 
Prevalence and Sexual Behaviour’ (UNAIDS: 1998b) increased condom 
uptake within the Ugandan population is claimed to be the principal 
behavioural change that occurred in Uganda between 1989 and 1995 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 10). It is purported by UNAIDS (1998b) that condom 
use increased from 15% to 55% for men and from 6% to 39% for women 
(UNAIDS: 1998b: pp. 10). UNAIDS also claim, on the basis of an analysis of 
300 smaller-scale sociological studies (conducted by medical anthropologist 
Tom Baron under the direct instruction of Michel Caraël) that condom use 
increased among sexually active individuals between 1987 and 1996 from 3% 
to 25% (UNAIDS: 1998b: pp.10).  An additional reflection of a condom-based 
explanation that could account for Uganda’s HIV decline is located within 
Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) that was published in the journal AIDS in 1997.  
 
It is asserted by Asiimwe-Okiror et al (1997) that women and men reported a 
30% and 40% increase in the experience of condom use respectively. It is also 
claimed that the observed declining trends in HIV correspond to a change in 
sexual behaviour and condom use (Asiimwe-Okiror: 1997: pp. 1157). Thus, 
these authors point to increased condom use as the most significant sexual 
behavioural change explaining declining trends in HIV seroprevalence 
among pregnant women who attended ANCs within urban areas of Uganda. 
Significantly, the study concluded that the sexual behavioural change 
findings “should encourage AIDS control programmes to pursue their 
prevention activities” (Asiimwe-Okiror: 1997: pp. 1157) which would - on the 
basis of this contested evidence - include the promotion of condoms. Thus, 
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this explanation can be understood as an example of repetition as advanced 
by Stevens (2007). 
 
7.4 Study limitations 
 
The two sub-sections below reflect upon the limitations of the study. It 
commences with an examination of the sample size within the research 
project. A critical discussion of researcher reflexivity, and how my own 
actions, values and perceptions impacted upon the research process will also 
be advanced.  
 
7.4.1 Sample size of the research project 
 
As stated in the methodology chapter, it must be acknowledged that the 
sample size of the research project means that definitive statements about the 
Ugandan HIV decline of the 1990s, its contested nature, and the role of 
behavioural evidence used to shape the direction of HIV prevention policy in 
the 1990s cannot be advanced. While 29 HIV/AIDS experts who were 
directly involved with the development of SGS and the analysis of the 
original sources of evidence used to create formative explanations for 
Uganda’s HIV decline have been interviewed, at least four other key 
participants within UNAIDS/WHO declined to be interviewed as part of this 
research project. Furthermore, certain participants who were given the right 
to reply to some of the highly personalised claims pertaining to the 
misinterpretation of Ugandan behavioural evidence, did not avail 
themselves of this opportunity. The absence of narratives from other 
HIV/AIDS experts – especially within UNAIDS/WHO – means that a 
degree of uncertainty exists in relation to the analysis of Ugandan sexual 
behavioural change data in the 1990s. Although certain key HIV/AIDS 
experts declined to be interviewed as part of this study, the researcher 
remains confident that key perspectives are adequately represented and that 
the contours of the Ugandan HIV decline and the debate surrounding the 
interpretation of behavioural evidence are comprehensively described.   
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While multiple attempts were made to increase the sample size of the 
research project both in person and via email, the inability to increase the 
sample size of this project means that future research should be conducted 
and additional efforts made to gain more empirical data for analysis. Despite 
this limitation, the sample size of the research project is of sufficient quality 
and quantity to make inferences about the contestation surrounding the 
analysis of Ugandan behavioural evidence and its subsequent use in HIV 
prevention policy in the 1990s.   
 
7.4.2 Maintaining researcher reflexivity 
 
It must be acknowledged that my own actions, values and perceptions will 
have impacted upon the context within which research was conducted, the 
process of data collection, knowledge construction and subsequent data 
analysis (Gerrish & Lacey: 2006: pp. 23). While the researcher reflected upon 
his underlying values and perceptions – especially during data collection – it 
must be realised that the empirical findings generated in this project have 
been coloured by my own subjectivism which limited my ability to maintain 
critical distance.  
 
At times it was difficult for the researcher to stand back from certain 
narratives that arose during interview—in particular narratives that related 
to the misinterpretation of the multiple partnership reduction explanation, 
and the politics surrounding the evidence used to support SGS (and 
formative explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline). During the context of the 
semi-structured interviews, the researcher found it difficult to internalise the 
claims of evidence misinterpretation. While the researcher was conscious of 
his actions during data collection, it must be noted that the process of 
interaction (between the researcher and certain participants) was influenced 
by the researcher’s initial reaction to the complex claims relating to the 
function of Ugandan evidence and the development of SGS. Significantly, the 
claims of Ugandan evidence misinterpretation questioned certain 
preconceptions about the function of HIV/AIDS experts operating within 
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international organisations (including a preconceived notion that experts 
should utilise evidence in a non-political and consensus-based fashion). 
While the researcher was aware that evidence can be used for political or 
strategic purposes (in advance of data collection), the claims that certain 
sources of evidence were misinterpreted by HIV/AIDS experts within 
UNAIDS influenced one’s ability to be wholly reflexive within the context of 
the semi-structured interviews. 
 
It was also difficult to stand back from certain participants on an emotional 
level during interview. Various participants, interviewed within 
UNAIDS/WHO, were visibly very upset when discussing the political 
nature of the Ugandan HIV decline and their narratives pertaining to the 
misinterpretation of sources of Ugandan behavioural evidence. It must be 
noted that is was difficult for the researcher to divorce himself from the 
emotive atmosphere that manifested during interview. It was known, in 
advance of the interviews, that the kind of interactional exchange between 
the interviewer and the participant directly affects the process of knowledge 
construction (and thus the process of data analysis and, in turn, the 
subsequent validity of data). It must be noted that the researcher reacted to 
certain narratives on an emotional level during certain interviews which 
affected my ability to be reflexive and to maintain my critical distance. This 
was a clear limitation as emotions shaped the researcher’s partiality and the 
direction of the interview, which thus, influenced the researcher/participant 
dynamic and the subsequent process of data analysis.         
 
7.5 Strengths of study 
 
As noted in section 7.3.2, a central strength of this study is the empirical data 
it presents reflects the researchers’ access to an elite of HIV/AIDS experts 
from Ugandan and Genevan policymaking contexts—experts who were 
directly involved with creating novel global HIV/AIDS surveillance policy 
and formative explanations of Uganda’s HIV decline in the 1990s. 
Beneficially, the HIV/AIDS experts interviewed within this project were 
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open in their discussions about the policy development of SGS and the role 
of evidence used to support its introduction. This level of transparency – 
especially during interview – permitted detailed narratives to unfold which, 
in turn, enabled meaningful partnerships between the interviewer and the 
participants to develop. Meaningful partnerships with the HIV/AIDS 
experts ultimately led to context-rich insights into the development of SGS, 
the reasons supporting its initiation and the complex role of evidence in 
facilitating its formal introduction in 2000.  
 
It must also be noted that many of the experts interviewed within this project 
have been directly involved with HIV/AIDS prevention and HIV/AIDS 
surveillance policy development at the Ugandan and global levels since the 
late-1980s/early-1990s onwards. It was a genuine privilege to learn about 
SGS’s development (and how evidence was used to support its introduction) 
from an elite of HIV/AIDS experts who were the first individuals to analyse 
the formative signs of Uganda’s HIV decline, the first to disseminate the 
emerging HIV decline ‘success’ story, and the first to create updated global 
HIV/AIDS surveillance policy guidelines on the basis of behavioural 
evidence emerging from Uganda. Significantly, many of the HIV/AIDS 
experts interviewed within this project catalysed change in approaches to 
global HIV/AIDS prevention, global HIV/AIDS surveillance, and more 
broadly global HIV/AIDS governance. Thus, the data generated about SGS, 
and its evidence-base during interview, were usefully contextualised within 
participants’ relevant experiences of wider political and institutional change 
in relation to HIV/AIDS at both the Ugandan and Genevan levels. Having 
secured access to key HIV/AIDS experts involved with the development of 
SGS, it can be stated that the findings presented within the three preceding 
chapters are context-rich and appear empirically sound. 
 
An additional strength of the thesis was having direct access to a relatively 
compact body of UNAIDS/WHO policy literature that listed the key sources 
of documentation pertaining to the development of SGS in 2000—which was 
available online via the WHO website. Having direct access to official 
UNAIDS/WHO documentation, that explained the development of SGS in 
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the formative stages of the research project, permitted the researcher to gain 
detailed understandings of SGS’s development (and the background to the 
Ugandan HIV prevalence decline) prior to the commencement of data 
collection in Geneva and Kampala. The critical analysis of official 
UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation, enabled the researcher to observe the 
frequency of recurring concepts and themes, which, in turn, facilitated a 
much needed intellectual command of the ‘official’ history of SGS which 
proved to be beneficial during data collection. Possessing an analytical 
command of official UNAIDS/WHO policy documentation, and gaining 
access to some of the key experts involved with the genesis of SGS, and its 
underlying evidence-base, were two central strengths of this thesis. The 
access to official UNAIDS/WHO documentation and key HIV/AIDS experts 
led to creation of novel, context-rich insights of SGS’s development, and the 
subsequent identification of factors that affect the relationship between 
evidence and policy within HIV/AIDS policymaking environments at the 
national and global levels.  
 
7.6 Implications for evidence-based policymaking at the Ugandan and global 
levels 
 
Findings presented within this thesis suggest that the notion, and practice of, 
EBPM can be critiqued within Ugandan and global level policymaking 
contexts. For approximately the past twenty years, EBPM has gradually 
transferred from one policymaking domain to another becoming an 
aspiration of governments within HICs and more recently international 
development agencies (Botterill & Hindmoor: 2012: pp. 367). Reminiscent of 
1950s policy rationalism and logical positivism, EBPM seeks to ground policy 
formation in the ‘right’ evidence to provide decision-makers with the ‘best’ 
information about ‘what works’ in order to temper the influence of ideology, 
personal beliefs and politics upon policy formation (Botterill & Hindmoor: 
2012: pp. 367). Despite an extensive body of literature which queries the 
rationalist assumptions of EBPM, this vague and aspirational term, which 
should be conceptualised as an idealised form of policymaking (Cairney: 
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2014: pp. 1), has spread to global epistemic communities within UN 
organisations. Indeed, at the 51st World Health Assembly (WHA) held in 
May 1998, it was declared that all member states should “adopt an evidence-
based approach to health promotion policy and practice, using the full range 
of quantitative and qualitative methodologies” (WHA: 1998). This notion 
was echoed at the ninth plenary meeting of the 59th WHA held on May 25th 
2005, where it was declared that member states should: 
 
Establish or strengthen mechanisms to transfer knowledge in 
support of evidence-based public health and health-care delivery 
systems, and evidence-based health-related policies (WHA 58.34: 
Section II (5): 2005). 
 
Again, the imperative to promote EBPM was reaffirmed in 2010 at the 63rd 
WHA which urged member states to: 
 
Promote intersectoral collaboration and high-quality research in 
order to produce the evidence necessary for ensuring that 
policies adopted in all sectors contribute to improving health and 
equity (WHA 63: Section II (6): 2010). 
 
It was also declared that member states, partners and the Secretariat of the 
WHO should enhance existing mechanisms for good research and practice, 
including the proper utilisation of evidence to inform the development of 
guidelines (WHA 63: Section II (6): 2010). As is clear, the notion and practice 
of EBPM, and more broadly EBPH, have become well-established within UN 
organisations. The direct establishment of EBPM can also be witnessed 
within the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, EBPM is being promoted 
as an ‘enhanced’ form of policymaking by international organisations and 
international development agencies who operate within sub-Saharan African 
contexts. The normative and political commitment to EBPM is demonstrated 
via a plurality of donor driven initiatives—which are promoted from HICs 
and applied in LICs within sub-Saharan Africa. Such evidence-based 




• The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine ‘Getting 
Research into Policy Practice’ (GRIPP) program which attempts to 
“improve the practice of evidence informed health policy through the 
application of political, institutional and sociological analysis” 
(LSHTM: 2015).  
 
• The WHOs Evidence-Informed Policy Network (EVIPNet) which 
attempts to promote the systematic use of health research evidence in 
policymaking focusing on LMICs. The network specially seeks to 
enhance partnerships at the country-level between researchers, 
policymakers and civil society in an attempt to facilitate both policy 
development and policy implementation through the utilisation of the 
best scientific evidence available (EVIPNet: 2015). 
 
• The WHOs Supporting the Use of Research Evidence (SURE) for 
policy in African health systems which attempts to support the WHO 
to strengthen evidence-informed policy-making in Africa (WHO: 
2016).  
 
• The Regional East African Community Health (REACH) policy 
initiative (advanced by the East African Community) which attempts 
to link health researchers with policymakers and other vital research 
users—connecting these constituencies via shared and dynamic 
platforms that support, harmonize and stimulate evidence-based and 
evidence-informed policymaking processes in the East African region 
(East African Community: 2015).  
 
• The ODIs Research and Policy in Development Programme (RAPID) 
programme which attempts to enhance the integration of research-
based evidence and local knowledge into policy-making by working 
with: researchers, think tanks, civil society, donors and governments 
to develop capacity for policy influence and evidence-informed 
policy-making (ODI: 2015). 
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As is clear, a range of external actors from HICs operate within the context of 
sub-Saharan Africa in order to promote the notion, and practice of EBPM. 
However, on the basis of empirical findings advanced within this thesis, is 
must be stated that the promotion of EBPM by external actors within sub-
Saharan Africa and global level contexts is perhaps misguided. This 
contention can be advanced as EBPM is premised upon the assumption that 
evidence moves within the policymaking process in an essentially linear, 
unproblematic and neutral manner. EBPM also rests on the normative 
assumption that actors operating within the policymaking process should use 
evidence in a neutral and apolitical fashion—which clearly is not an accurate 
depiction of policymaking given the findings presented above.  
 
Such rationalist notions demonstrate a naïve understanding about the use of 
evidence within the policymaking process and demonstrate a failure to 
understand the multidirectional, and inherently complex nature of 
policymaking itself. While it can be asserted that evidence often informs 
policy it is not appropriate to assume that policy development can be fully 
evidence-based, and that actors (both individual and institutional) function 
in a comprehensively rational manner which subsequently leads to the 
development of ‘evidence-based’ policy. The successful implementation of 
EBPM and EBPH, pertaining to sub-Saharan African and global level 
contexts, can be questioned given the following statements that were 




Table 8: Empirical findings that query the notion and practice of EBPM in 







Policy…I’m	 not	 just	 talking	 about	 HIV,	
I’m	 talking	 about	 a	 person	 with	
experience	 working	 as	 a	 public	 health	
doctor	in	the	last	30	years	in	developing	
countries	 and	 it’s	 not	 always	 the	
case…often	 policy	 is	 not	 done	 on	
evidence…I	think	economic	interests	and	

















all	 belief	 driven.	 It’s	 values	 and	 beliefs	
that’s	it.	If	evidence	is	in	my	direction	of	




The findings displayed within the table above indicate that the notion, and 
practice of, EBPM within sub-Saharan African and global level policymaking 
contexts is possibly unrealistic. These notions suggest that policy is 
developed in the absence of evidence, with policy being more directly 
determined by personal beliefs, individual values and broader economic 
concerns. These notions are unsurprising to those analysts who comprehend 
that evidence is frequently created, analysed and disseminated by individual 
actors in a political manner in order to exercise their power within complex 
institutional environments (Weiss: 1979: Denzin: 2009: Kingdon: 1995). 
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However, the normative allure of EBPM (and the ideal of rational evidence 
utilisation) are so strong that international organisations and international 
development agencies are willing to purse the goal of EBPM – and indeed to 
promote this idealised form of policymaking within the context of sub-
Saharan Africa. The wish to promote EBPM arguably underestimates how 
evidence is inextricably interlinked with power-based discussions over what 
counts as evidence, the political actions of individuals tasked to analyse 
evidence, and the social construction of expertise (and evidence itself) within 
complex institutional environments. Findings in this thesis have 
demonstrated that sources of evidence, within Ugandan and global level 
policymaking contexts, have been shaped by a perplexing array of process 
and strategies which illustrate the gritty realism of evidence utilisation 
among HIV/AIDS experts functioning in sub-Saharan African and global 
level contexts. The empirical findings presented in the three preceding 
results chapter should serve as a reminder that the application of EBPM, in 
sub-Saharan African contexts by external actors, should be questioned as 
competition and politics appear to determine evidence/policy relationship 
more readily than logic and partisanship. 
 
7.7 Directions for future research 
 
Findings within this thesis point towards three areas for future research. 
First, research that further examines the competitive and political nature 
surrounding the Ugandan evidence used to support the development of SGS 
and formative explanations of Uganda’s HIV decline of the early to mid-
1990s. Second, research that could potentially lead to theoretical 
contributions to Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model via the creation of an 
additional mechanism of evidence selection. Each of these two directions for 
future research will now be discussed.    
 
Results have demonstrated that Ugandan evidence, used to support the 
development of SGS and explanations for Uganda’s HIV decline, have been 
influenced by an array of complex processes and strategies among 
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HIV/AIDS experts operating within competitive policymaking networks at 
the Ugandan and global levels. While findings indicate that certain sources 
of Ugandan evidence have been purportedly misinterpreted (as certain 
constructions of evidence failed to align with adaptations in the prevailing 
institutional and political orthodoxy at the global level in the mid-1990s), the 
underlying reasons contributing towards the political use of evidence 
remains analytically incomplete. While explanations were advanced by 
certain participants who introduced the notion of a political use of evidence 
within Ugandan and global level policymaking contexts, an array of 
narratives from other HIV/AIDS experts – who were involved with the 
development SGS and global HIV/AIDS prevention – were not captured 
within this research project (owing to time and budgetary constraints). 
Analysis suggests that additional HIV/AIDS experts should be interviewed 
in the future to help clarify the narrative of Ugandan data misinterpretation 
and the political use of evidence within HIV/AIDS policymaking networks 
at the Ugandan and global levels. On the basis of data analysis, potential 










3. Ties	 Boerma	 –	 Director	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	 Statistics	 and	
Information	Systems	in	the	WHO.	
4. Tom	 Barton	 –	 Medical	 anthropologist	 &	 researcher	 employed	 by	 Michel	
Caraël	 to	 review	 evidence	 of	 sexual	 behavioural	 change	 in	Uganda	 in	 the	
mid-1990s.		
5. Knut	Fylkesnes	–	Epidemiologist	 	&	 lead	researcher	of	Zambian	study	cited	
as	 evidence	 by	 UNAIDS	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 for	 concurrent	 analysis	 of	
behavioural	surveillance	data	with	serological	surveillance	data.		
6. George	 Tembo	 –	 former	 epidemiologist	 for	 the	 WHO	 &	 former	 Country	
Programme	Advisor	for	UNAIDS	within	Uganda.		
7. Godwill	 Asiimwe-Okiror	 –	 lead	 author	of:	 ‘Change	 in	 sexual	 behaviour	 and	






It would be beneficial for future research to interview the aforementioned 
individuals as a greater degree of analytical information would be generated 
in relation to the development of SGS and the function of Ugandan evidence 
used to support its formal introduction in 2000. This, in turn, would provide 
additional insights into the relationship between evidence and policy within 
global and Ugandan policymaking contexts and the identification of factors 
that shape the evidence/policy nexus itself.  
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A second direction for future research involves the potential creation of an 
additional mechanism of evidence selection to build upon Stevens’ (2007) 
evolutionary model. Findings indicate that Ugandan evidence of sexual 
behavioural change have been purportedly misinterpreted within HIV/AIDS 
policymaking environments. Aligning with Stevens’ biological notions, it can 
be reasoned that ‘mutation’ could be advanced as an additional mechanism 
of evidence selection on the basis of the empirical findings generated within 
this study. Mutation can be understood as a process undertaken by 
entrepreneurial policymakers to transform fragments of evidence to align 
with the prevailing political environment. Via mutation, biased evidence can 
then become part of the accepted body of knowledge in a given policy area. 
Mutated evidence subsequently diffuses within policymaking networks, 
with the mutated evidence having a competitive advantage over other forms 
of evidence which can contribute to the development of subsequent policy in 
a more efficient manner. The active deployment of mutation by policymakers 
gives evidence an evolutionary advantage within policymaking 
environments, and as the mutated evidence has been strategically aligned to 
fit the prevailing political orthodoxy, or the wider “climate of receptivity” 
(Kingdon: 1995: pp. 206), policy ideas emerging from mutated evidence can 
then transmit amongst those involved with policy development. The 
advancement of ‘mutation’ as an additional mechanism of evidence selection 
cannot be posited at this stage—future empirical research is therefore 
required to validate, or refute, this potential theoretical contribution to 
Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model. 
 
The third direction for future research relates to the possible application of 
Stevens’ (2007) evolutionary model in other LICs and LMICs when 
attempting to examine the role of evidence in policy development. The 
application of the evolutionary model in other geographical locales could 
help researchers to explore the complex role of evidence in policy 
development and how the power of various actors operating within LICs 
and LMICs – in particular international organisations – influence the 
relationship between evidence and policy. Findings above indicate that 
Stevens’ mechanisms of evidence selection influenced how certain kinds of 
230	
	
evidence informed, or failed to inform, subsequent policy output. It would 
be fruitful to discover if these mechanism of evidence selection – and the 
broader precepts of the evolutionary model itself – can be applied when 
attempting to explore how evidence is used by individuals and institutions 




CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusion 
 
This thesis aimed to examine contested explanations for the decline in HIV 
prevalence in Uganda and the role of evidence in the development of global 
HIV prevention policy via the analysis of SGS. This study demonstrates that 
the development of SGS, and the politics of evidence supporting its 
introduction, are more complex than existing UNAIDS/WHO accounts 
describe. Official explanations of the development of SGS provide a 
simplistic account of how evidence informed policy in a linear and rational 
way. In contrast, findings from this thesis suggest that SGS served multiple 
policy functions (i.e. marketing, promotion of institutional credibility, and a 
demonstration of disciplinary integration) in the context of the recently-
formed UNAIDS, and that the role and interpretation of evidence in this 
context were highly contested. 
 
Via the critical analysis of SGS it has been demonstrated that the relationship 
between evidence and policy, pertaining to Ugandan and global level 
policymaking contexts, is non-linear, competitive, and inherently political. 
Within global HIV/AIDS policymaking environments it has been 
demonstrated that evidence can be used in a political manner with 
constructions of evidence being shaped to align with adaptations in the 
prevailing institutional and political orthodoxy.  
 
By examining policy entrepreneurship, competition between HIV/AIDS 
experts, claims of disciplinary bias, and data misinterpretation, and their 
impact within HIV/AIDS policymaking networks, it can be concluded that 
existing explanations of Uganda’s HIV prevalence decline – as portrayed by 
UNAIDS in the late-1990s – were contested. Interview data suggest that 
alternative constructions of Ugandan evidence were available to inform the 
direction of HIV prevention policy and formative explanations for Uganda’s 
HIV prevalence decline in the 1990s. However, analysis indicates that the 
available empirical evidence may have been insufficient to definitively 
support either an increased condom uptake explanation or a reduction in 
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multiple partnership explanation as the key reason that could account for 
Uganda’s HIV decline and the subsequent direction of HIV prevention 
approaches in the 1990s. While the interview data highlighted the contested 
nature of the Ugandan HIV prevalence decline – and the sexual behavioural 
change reasons that could account for the decline itself – it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that the data generated via interviews may have been 
influenced by recall bias – a widely acknowledged limitation associated with 
qualitative interviewing. 
 
It can also be concluded that the concept, and practice of, EBPM pertaining to 
sub-Saharan African and global level policymaking contexts can be called 
into question. While international organisations may champion the 
promotion and practice of EBPM, data presented within this thesis appear to 
indicate that commitments to EBPM could be understood as somewhat 
rhetorical. While UNAIDS/WHO give the impression of rational evidence 
utilisation, and directional links between the production of evidence and 
subsequent policy development, these depictions conceal the complex 
manner in which evidence is also used to help promote broader political and 
institutional goals. Empirical findings suggest that researchers (and policy 
analysts) would benefit from more sophisticated understandings of how 
evidence does, and does not, influence subsequent policy development 
pertaining to sub-Saharan African and global level policymaking 
environments. To understand adequately the relationship between evidence 
and policy within Ugandan and global level policymaking contexts, it is 
important to realise that evidence is contingent upon complex social 
processes and, as Stevens (2007) notes, the broader influence of power within 
policymaking. Thus, researchers who seek to examine the relationship 
between evidence and policy within country and global level policymaking 
contexts, should be aware that politics, argumentation and the complex 
exercise of power within potentially adversarial policymaking networks are 
key factors that inform policy development more directly than evidence in its 

















I	 am	asking	you	 to	participate	 in	my	PhD	research	project.	 It	 seeks	 to	understand	
the	development	of	Second	Generation	HIV	Surveillance	and	the	evidence-base	that	
supported	 its	 introduction	 in	 the	 year	 2000.	 It	 will,	 through	 interviews	 and	

















All	 data	 generated	 within	 this	 research	 project	 will	 be	 password	 protected	 and	
securely	 stored.	 Audio	 recorded	 data	 and	 paper	 files	 will	 be	 secured	 in	 a	 locked	
desk.	 Participants	 are	 free	 to	 request	 copies	 of	 the	 recorded	 interviews	 and	












All	 participants	who	decide	 to	 take	part	 in	 this	 research	project	have	 the	 right	 to	
remain	 anonymous;	 participants	 will	 be	 asked	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 wish	 to	 be	




removed	 and	 your	 participation	 in	 the	 research	will	 not	 be	 disclosed.	 You	
agree	to	be	quoted	given	that	all	quotes	will	be	made	anonymous.	
	
2. You	are	willing	 to	participate	on	 the	basis	 that	you	will	be	 identified	as	an	













I	 am	 the	 primary	 point	 of	 contact	 for	 this	 research.	 My	 contact	 details	 are:	 Mr.	
Douglas	 Alexander	 Richards,	 PhD	 International	 Public	 Health	 Policy	 Research	
Student,	 Chrystal	 Macmillan	 Building,	 Room	 5.13,	 School	 of	 Social	 and	 Political	


























(i)	 I	am	happy	to	be	 interviewed	for	this	research	on	the	basis	that	all	 identifiable	
features	will	be	removed	and	my	participation	in	the	research	will	not	be	disclosed.	
	













• have	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 ask	 questions	 about	 the	 study	 and	 have	














SIGNED	 (INTERVIEWEE)	 ___________________________	 	 	 	 DATE	
___________________	
	




Appendix 2: Questions advanced during interview 
 
• What was the significance of the Nairobi meeting in 1997 in 
developing SGS? 
• Who attended the Nairobi meeting? Which organisations were 
involved? 
• Who was involved with the introduction of SGS from UNAIDS? 
• Who was involved with the introduction of SGS from WHO? 
• Who were the key players involved with the introduction of SGS both 
in terms of people and organisations? 
• Can you describe the process by which SGS came about? 
• What is the actual evidence base that underpins the introduction of 
SGS? 
• How central was sexual behavioural data from Uganda in supporting 
the development of SGS? 
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